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Abstract 
Access controls are traditionally designed to protect resources from users, and 
consequently make access decisions based on the identity of the user, treating all 
processes as if they are acting on behalf of the user that runs them. However, this 
user-oriented approach is insufficient at protecting against contemporary threats, 
where  security  compromises  are  often  due  to  applications  running  malicious 
code, either due to software vulnerabilities or malware. Application-oriented ac-
cess controls can mitigate this threat by managing the authority of individual ap-
plications. Rule-based application-oriented access controls can restrict applica-
tions to only allow access to the specific finely-grained resources required for 
them to carry out their tasks, and thus can significantly limit the damage that can 
be caused by malicious code. Unfortunately existing application-oriented access 
controls have policy complexity and usability problems that have limited their 
use. 
 
This thesis proposes a new access control model, known as functionality-based 
application confinement (FBAC). The FBAC model has a number of unique fea-
tures designed to overcome problems with previous approaches. Policy abstrac-
tions, known as functionalities, are used to assign authority to applications based 
on the features they provide. Functionalities authorise elaborate sets of finely 
grained privileges based on high-level security goals, and adapt to the needs of 
specific applications through parameterisation. FBAC is hierarchical, which en-
ables it to provide layers of abstraction and encapsulation in policy. It also sim-
ultaneously  enforces  the  security  goals  of  both  users  and  administrators  by 
providing discretionary and mandatory controls. 
 
An LSM-based (Linux security module) prototype implementation, known as 
FBAC-LSM, was developed as a proof-of-concept and was used to evaluate the 
new model and associated techniques. The policy requirements of over one hun-
dred applications were analysed, and policy abstractions and application policies 
were developed. Analysis showed that the FBAC model is capable of represent-
ing the privilege needs of applications. The model is also well suited to automa-    iii
tion techniques that can in many cases create complete application policies a 
priori, that is, without first running the applications. This is an improvement 
over previous approaches that typically rely on learning modes to generate poli-
cies.  A  usability  study  was  conducted,  which  showed  that  compared  to  two 
widely-deployed alternatives (SELinux and AppArmor), FBAC-LSM had signif-
icantly higher perceived usability and resulted in significantly more protective 
policies. Qualitative analysis was performed and gave further insight into the is-
sues surrounding the usability of application-oriented access controls, and con-
firmed the success of the FBAC model. 
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Preface 
What a long and fulfilling journey this has been. When I started this project I 
grossly underestimated the time it would take me to implement a Linux security 
module-based implementation of my initial designs. The design and program-
ming took me past the originally allocated three year timeline, and the policy de-
sign and evaluation and usability study were still to come. Much of the code 
complexity stems from the hierarchical approach to policy, which was designed 
for flexibility and usability. Where as most mechanisms simply enumerate a list 
of privileges for a subject, object or domain, my solution takes a more involved 
approach; a multigraph of data structures is used to generate a tree of data struc-
tures that can then be used to determine the privileges a process is granted, and 
unlike many models the process ancestry (and all the policies associated with 
parent processes) can be taken into consideration when making access decisions. 
 
Travelling to conferences to publish and present my research has been one of the 
highlights of my  candidature. The opportunity to meet some very interesting 
people from academia and the Linux security community, discuss problems the 
security community faces, and see some of this amazing world we live in has 
been a pleasure. 
 
I truly believe that there is need for serious improvements to application-oriented 
security solutions, and I trust that what I have produced will help to direct and 
inspire the future of this developing area of security research. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
“ 
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, VI:30, 6th century BCE [1]  ” 
 
 
1.1  Computer Insecurity 
Current computer security practices are failing to protect users. Security compromises 
cost corporations billions (by directly affecting business and by affecting share values [2, 
3]), deprive ordinary users of privacy, and expose users to unsolicited system behaviour 
such as targeted advertisements, loss of information, denial of service, and the use of 
computers to carry out unsolicited illegal activities such as sending spam, hosting contra-
band, and mounting attacks against other systems [4-9]. These compromises have become 
so common that the daily discovery of new vulnerabilities and malicious software that al-
lows attackers to take control of computers is commonplace.  
 
Many security practices are based on a reactive approach where each outbreak or incident 
of attack is countered by a custom-made solution to prevent the event. Vulnerabilities in 
applications are countered by “patching” or updating the flawed software to fix that par-
ticular problem, while anti-malware software typically operates by searching for and re-
moving known instances of malware. This approach does not prevent attackers from cre-
ating new malware to target a specific system in an unknown way or exploiting vulnera-
bilities that professionals are not aware of [10]. These reactive methods are defenceless 
against novel and new attacks. 
1.2  Insufficient Application Restrictions 
Traditional access controls insufficiently restrict applications. Access control models re-
strict what subjects are authorised to do. Traditionally access control models are based on 
the paradigm of restricting the actions of users: protecting users from each other or pro-
tecting  system  resources  from  users.  For  example,  the  traditional  discretionary  access 
control (DAC) model allows users to protect themselves and their resources from other     2 
users, while a mandatory access control (MAC) model allows a system administrator to 
restrict which system resources each user can access [11]. Executed programs are there-
fore essentially granted unrestricted access to a user’s privileges. Native security models 
of modern operating systems such as Linux 2.6, Mac OS X and Microsoft Windows 7 are 
user-oriented and are primarily based on the traditional DAC model
2.  
 
However, user-oriented access controls are insufficient, as a process is not necessarily 
acting on behalf of the user whose identity it is associated with. These models are unable 
to differentiate between legitimate actions, and behaviour that is beyond the scope of the 
functions the application is expected to perform. A process can act outside the behaviour 
the user expects of the application and exercise the user’s authority maliciously. This ma-
levolent behaviour could occur due to a malicious software author or a malicious attacker 
subverting the normal behaviour of legitimate software. 
 
Application-oriented restrictions have been proposed that limit the privileges assigned to 
each specific process or application. Unlike user-oriented access controls, policy is speci-
fied primarily in terms of programs or groups of programs, rather than users or groups of 
users. Therefore, by identifying the privileges required by each application, their ability to 
act beyond their purpose is limited. Attempts to act maliciously can be restricted.  
 
Application-oriented restriction schemes include models that isolate separate containers 
or sandboxes such as chroot(), BSD Jails [12], Solaris Zones [13], and Danali [14]. 
These schemes require duplicated and often redundant resources, and limit the sharing of 
resources  between  applications,  which  can  interfere  with  natural  workflows.  Other 
schemes provide controls over shared resources allowing applications to access the same 
resources in a restricted manner. These schemes include POSIX capabilities [15], Bitfrost 
[16], CapDesk [17], Polaris [18], TRON [19], Systrace [20], Janus [21], domain and type 
enforcement  (DTE)  [22],  and  role-compatibility  (RC)  [23].  Two  established  security 
mechanisms that provide application-oriented access control on Linux are SELinux [24] 
and  AppArmor  (previously  known  as  SubDomain)  [25].  These  and  other  security 
schemes are considered in further detail in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
2 Although primarily based on DAC, these operating systems also implement some mandatory controls, as 
discussed at various points throughout this thesis.     3 
1.3  Usability and Application Confinement 
Although application-oriented access controls can provide substantial security benefits by 
restricting the activities of individual applications, their adoption has been limited, argua-
bly  due  to  the  inadequate  usability  of  these  schemes.  Confining  an  application  using 
schemes that restrict access to shared resources generally requires an intimate knowledge 
of underlying system details such as the system call interface (such as is the case with 
system call interposition [26]), knowledge of system resources and services, and may re-
quire the re-labelling of all related files on the system (such as with label-based models 
such as DTE). Applying this knowledge, policies for individual applications are created 
based on detailed finely grained privileges. Thus constructing policies for application-
oriented access control schemes has required expertise that ordinary users do not possess. 
 
In general the task of restricting applications involves identifying the high level security 
goals – that is, discerning the behaviour that should be authorised –  and identifying all 
the low-level policy details required to enforce these goals. As a result, in addition to be-
ing difficult for users to create meaningful individual policies, policy is typically prob-
lematic to maintain and comprehend due to the detail and complexity of the policy asso-
ciated with each individual application.  
 
This thesis contends that the usability problem is due largely to the inflexibility of the 
policy abstractions of these models, and the fact that application security policies are 
therefore constructed based on low level finely grained details.  
1.4  Flexibility and Application Confinement 
Most application-oriented access control models simply associate a list of privileges di-
rectly with an application. Others provide policy abstractions that group privileges and 
which can be reused to a limited extent. With isolation sandboxes, the only policy ab-
straction available is an isolated container that groups subjects with the objects they can 
interact with. While models that restrict access to shared resources are generally either 
devoid of policy abstraction (privileges are listed for each application), or are defined in 
terms of large monolithic self-contained policy abstractions, such as is the case with DTE 
domains and RC roles. These policy abstractions typically have limited reusability as they     4 
only apply to the specific needs of an individual application. These models lack flexible 
policy abstractions that can be meaningfully reused by many applications to enforce high 
level security goals. Unless they share the exact same privilege requirements, these ab-
stractions cannot be flexibly reused for different applications.  
 
The nature of the policy abstractions not only adversely affects usability and manageabil-
ity of policy maintenance, but also the management of privileges associated with running 
processes. Due to the monolithic policies enforced by the mechanism, the ability to flexi-
bly manipulate the privileges associated with a process at run-time is inhibited. Changing 
the set of privileges of a process, if possible at all, typically involves switching to another 
complete monolithic policy. Therefore it may be necessary for multiple complete and 
very similar policies to be specified for an application in order to allow the application or 
the user to change privileges when carrying out tasks. 
 
Also, in addition to the inability of previously existing policy abstractions to describe re-
usable high level security goals, in the past, application-oriented access control models 
have been designed and implemented as either a discretionary or a mandatory control; ei-
ther end users have influence over the restrictions in place or restrictions are imposed on 
users by an administrator. If an administrator wants to restrict all instances of a program 
to enforce a system wide security goal, such as with a privileged setuid program or sys-
tem service, they can use a mandatory control such as AppArmor or SELinux. If an ordi-
nary user wants to protect their own resources, they can confine their applications using a 
discretionary control such as Janus or Systrace. It would be advantageous to provide both 
mandatory  and  discretionary  controls,  yet  doing  so  using  these  schemes  requires  the 
maintenance of multiple application-oriented access control mechanisms. 
1.5  Research Aims 
The general aim of the research described in this thesis is to improve the usability and 
flexibility of application-oriented access controls, so that they can be applied by users of 
various expertise to enforce their own security goals. This thesis proposes and evaluates 
several improvements. A new application-oriented access control model, known as func-
tionality-based application confinement (FBAC), is proposed and a prototype implemen-    5 
tation for Linux, FBAC-LSM (Linux security module), is also presented
3. The access 
control model and implementation contribute new techniques for restricting applications. 
The implementation allows these techniques to be assessed in practice. 
 
The new application-oriented access control model provides flexible policy abstractions 
that can define policy in terms of high level security goals. Inspired by the role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC) model [27, 28], FBAC leverages RBAC constructs and provides hi-
erarchical abstractions. These policy modules, known as functionalities, are designed to 
describe the features applications provide (such as Web_Browser or Image_Viewer), 
are parameterised, and can be adjusted to the needs of specific applications. The task of 
identifying and applying the security goals of application restriction is thereby separated 
from the task of constructing detailed policies mediating access to all required resources 
and services. By dividing the task of detailed policy construction from that of general se-
curity goal association, construction can be carried out by someone with security exper-
tise while association can be carried out with less specialised knowledge. Various tech-
niques for simplifying the creation of functionalities and the association of functionalities 
with applications are also proposed. 
 
Unlike other existing application-oriented access control models, the FBAC model can 
simultaneously restrict applications based on a combination of policies representing the 
security goals of users and administrators. If authorised to do so, users can specify the 
purposes  of  the  applications  they  run.  These  rules  are  enforced  using  a  discretionary 
scheme, where users have discretion over policies that restrict the actions of applications. 
Administrators can also specify policies to restrict applications and can selectively en-
force rules on users using a mandatory scheme. Processes or users can also selectively 
drop functionalities from a running application, thereby reducing the need for separate 
policies for a single application. While existing application-oriented access controls are 
typically designed to enforce policies specified by either individual users or an adminis-
trator (for example, Janus allows users’ to confine their applications, while AppArmor’s 
policy is defined by an administrator), FBAC simultaneously enforces mandatory and 
discretionary controls. This approach removes the need to either choose to enforce one or 
manage multiple mechanisms. 
                                                 
3  FBAC-LSM  is  free  open-source  software  developed  for  this  research  and  is  available  online: 
http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSM     6 
 
This thesis explores and evaluates the viability of applying these concepts to the domain 
of application confinement to provide benefits in usability and flexibility. 
1.6  Research Methodology 
This research was carried out using a design research approach. Design research involves 
the development and analysis of a new artefact, thereby contributing knowledge at both 
stages.    illustrates  the  general  steps  involved  in  design  research  and  the  output  and 
knowledge contributions that can be generated by each step. 
 
Applying a design research approach to the field of access control for this research conse-
quently involved designing a new access control model (which corresponds with “Sug-
gestion” in ), developing a Linux implementation of the new model (“Development” in 
the diagram), analysing and evaluating the implementation in terms of policy expression 
and usability studies, then making conclusions about the model and implementation. The 
overall structure of this thesis generally follows this approach; additionally some evalua-
tion and conclusions also occur within each chapter. 
 
Figure 1.1: The general methodology of design research [29]     7 
1.7  Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the aims, method, and structure of the thesis. The following two 
chapters (2 and 3) discuss the problem of malicious code and excess authority, and previ-
ous attempts to mitigate this problem. Chapter 2 presents a detailed review of the litera-
ture. Chapter 3 describes the author’s initial work in this field, which this thesis builds 
upon. 
 
In Chapter 4 the new access control model, FBAC, is proposed. The access control model 
is defined and described in depth, and design decisions are explored. This model is a new 
contribution to the field of application confinement, a functionality-based application-
oriented access control model inspired by RBAC research. 
 
The following three chapters describe the implementation, FBAC-LSM. Chapter 5 de-
scribes implementation goals, how the access control model was implemented and how 
design decisions were made. Chapter 6 describes the architecture of the implementation 
and describes each of the components. Chapter 7 presents the language used to express 
functionality-based  policies,  FBAC-PL,  and  compares  it  with  the  policy  languages  of 
previous schemes. The implementation itself, a Linux security module (LSM) with policy 
tools, is a contribution to the research field and wider open source community. 
 
The  subsequent  chapters  describe  evaluation  of  the  proposed  techniques  and  models. 
Chapter 8 evaluates the ability of the new scheme to express policies to confine applica-
tions by presenting the analysis of over 100 Linux applications and the FBAC-PL policies 
and abstractions that can restrict them. Hierarchical functionality-based policy modules 
have been designed as FBAC model policy abstractions. These abstractions were created 
based  on  the  analysis  of  numerous  applications’  low-level  privilege  requirements  and 
open source policies for confining applications using previous mechanisms. This analysis 
yields valuable insight into the classification of application behavioural classes, supple-
menting previous classification efforts [30, 31]. These policy abstractions serve as a proof 
of concept of the viability of applying the FBAC model concepts: that it is possible to 
construct high level reusable policy abstractions using the new model. These policy ab-    8 
stractions are available in full online
4 and are expected to also be of use to the security 
and open source communities. 
 
Chapter 9 explores the suitability of the FBAC model to a priori policy specification and 
presents automation techniques for achieving a priori specification. These techniques are 
also new contributions to the field and, as postulated in the literature review in Chapter 2, 
a priori policy specification has the potential to overcome many of the issues with rule-
based application restrictions. 
 
A usability study was conducted to evaluate the usability of a functionality-based ap-
proach  to  application  restriction.  The  usability  study  compared  FBAC-LSM  with  two 
widely deployed mechanisms, SELinux and AppArmor. To date, this is the most compre-
hensive  comparative  usability  study  conducted  on  application  confinement  systems. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis were used to evaluate the access control 
model  and  mechanism.  Chapter  10  explains  the  methodology  of  the  study:  a  within-
subjects design where 39 participants used all three systems. Chapter 11 presents the 
quantitative results of the study, which show significant advantages in terms of both per-
ceived usability, and risk exposure related to policy quality. Chapter 12 presents qualita-
tive results of the usability study, which identify factors that affect the usability of appli-
cation-restriction mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 13 discusses current ongoing work, opportunities for further research, and pre-
sents conclusions. 
1.8  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has given an overview of the problems this thesis addresses: that programs 
are typically granted excess authority that does not sufficiently limit the effects of mali-
cious code, and that previous attempts to restrict programs have problems such as usabil-
ity issues. The aims of the research have also been described: to present a model, imple-
mentation and techniques to address problems with previous schemes. The structure of 
the thesis generally follows the steps of the design research methodology: awareness, 
suggestion, development, evaluation, and conclusions. The next chapter explores in fur-
                                                 
4 Available at: http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSM     9 
ther detail the problems this thesis addresses, previous approaches to application authori-
ty, and related literature. 
    10 




Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your comput-
er, it's not your computer anymore 
It's an unfortunate fact of computer science: when a computer program 
runs, it will do what it's programmed to do, even if it's programmed to be 
harmful. When you choose to run a program, you are making a decision to 
turn over control of your computer to it. Once a program is running, it can 
do anything, up to the limits of what you yourself can do on the computer. It 
could monitor your keystrokes and send them to a website. It could open 
every document on the computer, and change the word "will" to "won't" in 
all of them. It could send rude emails to all your friends. It could install a 
virus. It could create a "back door" that lets someone remotely control your 
computer. It could dial up an ISP in Katmandu. Or it could just reformat 
your hard drive.  
(Microsoft, “10 Immutable Laws of Security”, Classic TechNet Essay 




2.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the problem, literature, and existing systems related to 
the security techniques presented in this thesis. The chapter starts with a discussion of the 
limitations of the traditional security approaches; introducing the concept of user-oriented 
access controls and the inability of this method to sufficiently mitigate the threat posed by 
malware and vulnerabilities. Some of these approaches – particularly role-based access 
control (RBAC) – are discussed in further detail as they relate to the model presented in 
this thesis. This is discussion is followed by a comprehensive overview of application-
oriented access control schemes
5. Isolation-based schemes are described and drawbacks 
to these approaches are explored. Rule-based schemes and their advantages are discussed, 
followed by the problems with these systems, which this thesis addresses. 
                                                 
5 Some related but out-of-scope techniques are discussed in Appendix A.    11 
2.2  Limitations of User-oriented Access Controls 
Security rules have been enforced on processes since the 1960s. Seminal systems such as 
Multics [33] and UNIX [34] applied techniques for limiting the actions processes could 
perform. Considerable effort was made to evaluate the security of the schemes developed 
[11, 35-37], and helped to motivate formally verified designs such as GEMSOS [38]. 
Process isolation techniques, such as virtual addressing, are commonly used to protect 
processes from each other, by preventing processes from modifying each other. Process 
isolation techniques such as these enable access controls to be enforced. Access controls 




As evidenced in the quote from a Microsoft technical essay at the start of this chapter, a 
long held assumption (thought to be “immutable”) has been that programs run with the 
full authority of the user who starts them [32]. Access controls have typically been de-
signed based on the supposition that programs are trusted to act on behalf of users, and 
that the actions of software can be treated as the actions of users. However, these assump-
tions are flawed, and a number of prevalent types of security compromise misuse the au-
thority of users; this illustrates that many programs cannot be trusted with these rights. 
 
In the past, access control has been almost exclusively considered in terms of user con-
finement. Access control models were developed to specify exactly what each user could 
do with shared resources (based on the user’s clearance or roles) and to protect users from 
each other (based on the identity of the user) [11, 39]. Essentially the goal has been to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the system’s resources from 
malicious users. With user-oriented access control it is typical for active entities within 
the system (known as ‘subjects’) to have access to all the user’s privileges regardless of 
the actual program that is running. In most access control models in the literature, sub-
jects are considered to act on behalf of users and are therefore confined based on the iden-
tity of the user the subject is working for. In practice this typically translates to treating 
processes as the corresponding users. 
 
                                                 
6 The focus of this work is on modern access controls and application confinement; it is outside the scope of 
this thesis to explore process isolation, mainframe era schemes, or evaluation efforts in depth.    12 
User-oriented access control, as a sole access control mechanism, is often insufficient, de-
spite its widespread deployment. Subjects do not always act on behalf of the users they 
belong to. Two of the major threats to operating system access control, those posed by 
software vulnerabilities and by malware, are particularly effective due to attackers execut-
ing malicious code via processes associated with local users.  
 
The 2009 SANS Cyber Security Risks report [40] highlights attacks against software vul-
nerabilities in applications as the highest priority security risk. The report states that at-
tacks against vulnerable applications, such as Adobe PDF Reader, QuickTime, Adobe 
Flash and Microsoft Office, are “currently the primary initial infection vector used to 
compromise computers that have Internet access” [40]. Software vulnerabilities often ex-
ist that enable attackers to gain control of legitimate processes, and misuse the authority 
to perform malicious actions. The causes of software vulnerabilities are numerous and 
varied, and have been explored and categorised by taxonomies in the literature [4, 6, 41, 
42]. Causes include design and implementation flaws, such as buffer overflows, race con-
ditions, and input validation errors [43-45].  
 
Software that is malicious by design, known as malware, also poses a significant threat 
that user-oriented access controls do not sufficiently mitigate. Malware poses security 
risks  to  users’  integrity  (via  malicious  destructiveness),  confidentiality  (privacy  con-
cerns), and availability (denial of service). There are many ways of classifying malware. 
Classifications of malware include Trojan horses, adware, spyware, viruses, and worms. 
Taxonomies proposed in the literature further categorise malware [5, 7, 8]. There are 
many ways that malware can propagate to computers including: 
·  Man-in-the-middle attacks can intercept communications between hosts and insert 
malware via trusted websites and hosts. It is even often possible to intercept “se-
cure” encrypted communications [46]. 
·  Viruses copy themselves to other programs. 
·  Worms propagate across networks, often by exploiting software vulnerabilities. 
·  Trojan horses pose as legitimate programs. 
·  Malware can be sent via email in targeted attacks. 
    13 
The exploitation of software vulnerabilities and malware is often devastating because the 
attacks execute after assuming the identity of an authorised user [47]. This is a significant 
problem because user-oriented access controls assume that subjects are acting on behalf 
and with the consent of an authorised user, allowing software to act freely with all of the 
user’s privileges. This deficiency is often insufficiently addressed by applying patches, 
which do not protect against zero-day exploits, and anti-malware software, which often 
fails to detect zero-day malware [10, 48, 49]. Many security systems rely upon user-
oriented access control as their only access control measure. User confinement, when uti-
lised correctly, protects system resources or users’ objects from other users, but does not 
protect users from the applications they execute.  
2.3  Existing User-oriented Access Controls 
Some examples of user-oriented access control include traditional discretionary access 
control (DAC) models [11] (as implemented on most commodity operating systems [50 
pp. 122-160, 51]
7), traditional mandatory access control (MAC) models [11, 52-55], and 
role-based access control (RBAC) [11, 39]. This research proposes a new application-
oriented access control model that is, in part, inspired by the RBAC model. Therefore 
RBAC is described in some detail. 
2.3.1  Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control model (or class of models) that 
associates users with privileges via semantic constructs called roles [39, 56]. Although 
originally designed and normally used as a non-discretionary model, RBAC has been 
shown to be capable of also modelling discretionary controls [57, 58]. First conceived in 
the 1970s, and subsequently formalized in 1992 by Ferraiolo and Kuhn [39], RBAC has 
received increasing interest in the literature since [27, 59-72]. RBAC has emerged as an 
alternative model for user-oriented access control, and is particularly useful in organisa-
tions where users are assigned duties or responsibilities requiring specific privileges. Its 
strength lies in the use of abstract constructs: reducing management tasks and simplifying 
                                                 
7 Microsoft Windows Me and earlier did not provide user-oriented access controls. User confinement is lim-
ited in Windows XP, most users run as an administrator as many programs do not execute correctly on user 
confinement restricted accounts. Windows Vista and later provides improved user-oriented controls, known 
as User Account Control (UAC). Unix has incorporated user-oriented access controls since the 1970s.    14 
policy. RBAC is particularly relevant to this research as similarities exist between the rea-
sons for the development of RBAC for user confinement and problems faced in the field 
of application confinement. RBAC inspired the foundation of the functionality-based ap-
plication confinement (FBAC) model, which is presented in this thesis. 
 
In RBAC, roles are used to associate users with sets of permissions, they name and define 
many-to-many relationships between users and privileges [39]. RBAC privileges are usu-
ally a set of defined transformation operations that can be performed on a set of associat-
ed objects. Permissions are assigned to roles based on the minimum privilege required for 
role members to perform their necessary tasks. When a user joins an organisation (in oth-
er words, the system) they are simply assigned the roles representing their responsibilities 
and duties, thus eliminating the task of manually assigning permissions to each new user 
[69]. Access decisions are then made based on the permissions associated with the roles 
the user is assigned. 
 
RBAC also includes the notion of sessions, which allow users to selectively activate and 
deactivate roles [27]. Each session is a mapping between a user and an activated subset of 
roles that have been assigned to the user, and each user can have multiple active sessions. 
Which roles are activated (from the roles the user is authorised) in a given session is at 
the user's discretion unless a role constraint is applied by the administrator. The user is 
able to activate roles when their privileges are needed. In access control terms, each ses-
sion is the subject (or principle) to be confined. 
 
RBAC also features the concept of role hierarchies, which allows role-role relationships 
where roles can be defined in terms of other roles. If roles within an organization share 
common privileges, that set of privileges can be defined once as a role, and subsequently 
included in many roles [62]. Often this hierarchy models the organizational authority and 
responsibilities within an organization. For example, senior staff members may be author-
ized to perform all duties done by (and hence the roles of) junior staff. 
 
RBAC also features role constraints that place restrictions on the association or activation 
of roles. The issue of mutually exclusive roles has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature [39, 60, 62, 65, 66, 70, 71]. By declaring roles to be mutually exclusive it can be 
assured that the same user cannot be in conflicting roles simultaneously. This type of con-   15 
straint is known as separation of duty and can restrict certain conflicting permissions from 
being associated with the same user (known as static separation of duty), or accessed con-
currently (dynamic separation of duty) [71]. 
2.3.2  RBAC Standards 
Many models have been proposed to formally describe RBAC [39, 66, 69, 70], and there 
have been many discussions towards creating a standard RBAC specification. The Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a proposed standard for 
RBAC [27]. After being further refined within the RBAC community, the model has been 
adopted by the American National Standards Institute,  International Committee for In-
formation Technology Standards (ANSI/INCITS) as ANSI INCITS 359-2004 [28]. Many 
RBAC standards for specialized domains such as health care, biometrics, military and in-
dustrial control groups are also currently under development. 
 
The NIST and ANSI/INCITS RBAC specifications define RBAC as a collection of func-
tional  components,  which  can  be  combined  using  the  NIST  methodology  for  creating 
RBAC functional packages to create a practical implementation of RBAC. As illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 the components are: a) Core RBAC (not optional), b) Hierarchical RBAC 
(optional, a type of hierarchy can be chosen), c) Static Separation of Duties (optional), 
and d) Dynamic Separation of Duties (optional). 
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a) Core RBAC                 
b) Hierarchical RBAC               
c) Static Separation of Duties             
d) Dynamic Separation of Duties       
Figure 2.1: NIST and ANSI/INCITS RBAC Functional Components [27] 
2.3.3  Advantages of RBAC 
RBAC is particularly suited to situations where users do not own resources, where they 
only have access to the resources owned by the organisation that they require to perform 
their tasks within the system. When the situation suits a role-based solution, RBAC pro-
vides many benefits over other access control models, such as traditional MAC and DAC. 
RBAC can improve manageability and scalability of security policy and allow policy that 
would otherwise be difficult to achieve [73].  
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The simple user-role-permission association can greatly reduce the complexity of manag-
ing user rights. Allocating the roles a user is associated with is much simpler than assign-
ing direct associations between users and permissions. Role-permission association can 
be complex and require expertise; however, user-role association requires less expertise 
and in large organisations occurs much more frequently than changes in role-permission 
associations. If the privileges necessary to perform the tasks required of a role changes, 
only the relevant role-permission association needs to be altered, thus user permissions 
can be changed without updating every user’s permissions separately on an individual ba-
sis [68]. This represents a distinct advantage over traditional access controls where the 
complexity of privilege management increases in proportion to the number of subjects 
present. 
 
Role hierarchies can further improve manageability and scalability by reducing redundan-
cy in policy and simplifying role relationships by abstracting groups of permissions and 
constraints. Role constraints allow high level policies to be defined that can then restrict 
the capacity of system administrators to create low level policies that contradict higher 
level policies. 
2.3.4  RBAC Implementations 
Several operating system access control mechanisms that implement role-based solutions 
exist, such as grsecurity [74], Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [75], and Solaris ver-
sions 8 and later [76 pp. 613-654, 77]. Many of these operating system access control 
mechanisms do not implement the standardised RBAC specifications: for example, many 
of these systems discard the requirement that RBAC must allow multiple roles to be ac-
tive concurrently. Role hierarchies are also often not included, meaning that roles often 
include overlapping privileges. 
2.4  Application-oriented Access Control 
To reduce the threat of the problems posed by the limitations of user-oriented access con-
trol, application confinement has become an active area of research: for example: [19-21, 
23, 25, 26, 78-84]. Application-oriented access controls restricts subjects based on the 
identity of the application or process rather than just the identity of the user. Application    18 
confinement can limit the ability of applications to access resources outside of those they 
require to perform legitimately, thus restricting the damage malware or exploited vulner-
abilities can cause, and can limit software to actions that are those expected by whomever 
configures the security policy: end users, administrators, or software developers. 
 
This section contains a comprehensive overview of the various methods and techniques 
that are available to provide application-oriented restrictions. Policy can be specified by 
various parties, and policy can either simply specify which programs are authorised to 
run, isolate programs and their effects from each other, or allow programs to co-exist in 
the same namespace and restrict what they are allowed to do. An argument is made for 
finely grained rule-based schemes and the limitations of previous schemes are explored. 
The model presented in this thesis overcomes many of these problems. 
2.4.1  Policy Providers 
To some extent, independent of the actual techniques used to enforce security decisions, 
application confinement schemes can be differentiated based on who provides the securi-
ty policy. Application confinement can be discretionary (in the control of the user) or 
non-discretionary (imposed on the user, and thus providing an additional element of user 
confinement). In different situations application confinement policy can be defined by 
various stakeholders, who may have diverse incentives and goals to improve security by 
restricting the behaviour of certain processes [85]. This section describes the main ways 
that application restriction policies can be provided. Each of the example security mecha-
nisms mentioned are subsequently described in further detail in the following sections. 
 
Policy may be defined by distributors (such as software repository administrators) or au-
thors of software, in order to prevent their software from behaving outside of their expec-
tations due to software vulnerabilities. MapBox is an example of an application confine-
ment mechanism where vendors specify what behaviour the application should exhibit (in 
this case users can alter the exact policy assigned to these behaviours) [30]. A different 
example is Android applications, which are distributed with manifest files that include the 
privilege requirements of each application (granting access to protected APIs); users must 
accept these policies in order to install applications [86]. Software vendors and authors 
are in a good position to create policies that effectively restrict the damage that vulnera-   19 
bility exploits can cause, as they have access to internal documentation and sources that 
can facilitate least privilege policies. However, authors often cannot be trusted to confine 
their applications to behaviour users or system administrators expect, since it is not al-
ways in the authors best interests to restrict their applications and authors of malware 
have malicious motives. Also, distributors of software are unlikely to provide policies un-
less the security system is widespread enough to justify the additional work. These poli-
cies may be discretionary or non-discretionary. 
 
Some schemes allow policy to be defined by software, which can, at run-time, confine it-
self to prevent unexpected behaviour
8. Programs can use these schemes to safely execute 
mobile code or reduce the risk of vulnerabilities. Some examples of such mechanisms 
available to applications are chroot() and Jails system calls [12, 87]. Also, the Mac OS X 
Seatbelt sandbox mechanism allows applications to isolate themselves [88 pp. 156-178]. 
These policies are typically non-discretionary; that is, users usually cannot configure the 
policies applications request. 
 
Policy may be defined by system administrators to limit the behaviour of applications 
installed  on  a  system  and  the  actions  users  can  accomplish  with  applications.  Server 
applications,  or  any  Internet-enabled  applications,  can  be  confined  to  minimise  the 
damage caused by exploited vulnerabilities. Also, the applications accessible to users can 
be restricted to certain authorized behaviour. Some examples of application confinement 
mechanisms that are managed by system administrators are AppArmor [25], DTE [89], 
and SELinux [90]. These are non-discretionary controls, configured by administrators. 
 
Policy may also be defined by end users, who can confine specific applications, thus re-
stricting malware or exploits. Examples of systems that provide discretionary application 
controls include Systrace [91] and Alcatraz [92]. End users who are the ‘administrators’ 
of their own systems may use the previously described non-discretionary controls. Users 
are in a good position to restrict applications to behavioural expectations and to protect 
themselves against malicious code; although, for most users policy management must be 
simple and unobtrusive.  
 
                                                 
8 The  related  field,  sometimes  referred  to  as  “application  security”,  that  deals  with  applications  which 
change their behaviour based on the user’s identity and authority, is outside the scope of this research.    20 
Each of these options can address various security goals. Previous application confine-
ment models or mechanisms do not typically provide the flexibility to enforce policies de-
fined at more than one of the levels described above, meaning that sometimes it is neces-
sary to combine these mechanisms.  
2.4.2  Isolation Sandboxes and Virtualisation 
An effective approach to mitigating the risk associated with untrusted software is to re-
strict each program’s authority to access resources. One way to restrict programs is to run 
them in a sandboxed environment, where each application can only access objects within 
their sandbox. Although the terminology in use varies, in general a sandbox is separate 
from the controls provided to all running programs. Typically sandboxes only apply to 
programs explicitly launched into or from within a sandbox. In most cases no security 
context changes take place when a new process is started, and all programs in a particular 
sandbox run with the same set of rights. Sandboxes can either be permanent where re-
source changes persist after the programs finish running, or ephemeral where changes are 
discarded after the sandbox is no longer in use [93, 94]. Appendix B further discusses 
terminology and the fact that sandbox literature is often considered separate from access 
control literature. 
 
Most sandboxes provide an isolation-based approach where the effect of programs run in-
side a sandbox is entirely isolated from resources outside the sandbox’s authority. How-
ever, due to practical requirements, sandboxing schemes often provide ways of circum-
venting this isolation in order to copy data into and out of sandboxes.  The disadvantages 
of  isolation-based  restrictions  are  discussed  following  this  discussion  of  the  sandbox 
schemes that exist. 
 
System-level sandboxes provide complete operating environments to confined applica-
tions. One way of achieving this is through the use of hardware-level virtual machines 
(VMs). A virtual machine monitor (VMM) can be used to multiplex the physical hard-
ware between multiple self-contained fully virtualised VM operating environments, each 
containing a complete operating system. In the 1970s Madnick and Donovan showed that 
VMs can be used to improve overall system security by providing an additional layer of 
controls [95]. More recently researchers have proposed using VMs to confine applications    21 
to mitigate the risks associated with excess application authority. For example, Whitaker 
et al. presented a scheme designed to provide a lightweight VM and operating system for 
each application [14]. It is possible to confine specific programs or sets of programs by 
containing them within separate VMs. This can be done manually using emulation based 
virtualisation software (such as VMware [96], VirtualBox [97], Parallels [98], Microsoft 
Virtual Server [99] and QEMU [100]) or using paravirtualisation software, which requires 
guest operating systems are aware that they are running as VMs and participate in provid-
ing virtualisation. Xen [101], User-mode Linux (UML) [102], and Denali [14] are exam-
ples of paravirtualisation. 
 
Systems such as Qubes [94] (released by Rutkowska et al.) provide an interface to simpli-
fy the management of VMs from a security perspective. Qubes provides lightweight ‘Ap-
pVMs’, which are used for different types of tasks and, unlike most hardware-level VMs, 
share the same read-only system filesystem. For example, ‘personal’, ‘work’, and ‘bank’ 
VMs could be specified to keep the applications used and the risks associated with each 
task separate from each other. Although not based on system-level virtualisation, the ear-
lier WindowBox scheme, proposed by Balfanz and Simon [103], provides an experience 
similar to Qubes where different desktop sandboxes are used for different types of tasks. 
Most of these types of systems provide ways for users to manually move files between 
VMs. 
 
Container-based virtualisation, also known as operating-system level virtualisation, shares 
the one operating system kernel, but virtualises user space resources, allowing separate 
instances of the operating environment to be created. The UNIX chroot() system call 
isolates a process and its children to a subset of the file system namespace; however, it 
was not designed as a security mechanism. FreeBSD Jails provides a jail() system call 
that  aims  to  improve  upon  the  security  and  functionality  provided  by  chroot  [12]. 
FreeBSD Jails confines each jail to a particular IP address with particular network privi-
leges, prevents well-documented means of escaping chroot confinement, restricts certain 
super-user privileged actions from ever taking place within jails, and each jail has a pri-
vate copy of operating system objects such as shared memory and sockets  [104]. Rule 
Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) [105] includes a jail module similar to FreeBSD Jails 
for Linux. Other similar systems include Solaris 10 Containers [13], Linux Containers    22 
(lxc) [106], Linux VServer [107], OpenVZ [108], FreeVPS, SWsoft Virtuozzo [109], and 
AIX Workload Partitions (WPARs) [110]. Some of these systems are primarily designed 
for  running  complete  operating  environments  and  for  isolating  multiple  virtual  hosts. 
These solutions allow applications to be confined (along with the resources they require) 
by encapsulating them within a partitioned environment with no access to objects outside 
of the sandboxed environment. However these container sandboxes are often easier to 
manage than hardware-level VMs, as different containers can be configured to use the 
same resources, such as portions of the operating system.  
 
Potter and Nieh have proposed a more sophisticated approach to container-based sand-
boxes for application confinement, with an implementation known as Apiary [93]. Simi-
lar to how Qubes provides an interface to manage VMs for security purposes, Apiary pre-
sents a desktop environment that provides a user interface to launch applications into con-
tainers. Users can select whether to launch applications into ephemeral or persistent con-
tainers. Each container is isolated from one another, although there are ways for users to 
intervene to share directories with containers or copy data between containers. 
 
Some sandbox schemes allow confined applications to read the host computer’s data with 
few restrictions, and provide copy-on-write features to write any modifications programs 
make to a virtual disk rather than to the actual hard drive. Systems such as Sandboxie 
[60], Pastures [111], Alcatraz [92, 112, 113], and Returnil [77] take this approach. Typi-
cally, upon termination of the sandboxed programs, these systems present the user with a 
list of all the files that were modified, and the user has the option to commit changes to 
the regular file system.  
 
Other sandbox solutions run single, self-contained applications using a VMM or an inter-
preter, which isolates the application from making changes to the host computer without 
user intervention. Java Applets [114], Silverlight [115] and Flash [116] use this approach 
to embed mobile code content into websites; limited access is granted to storage and fur-
ther access is subsequently granted with user interaction. Google native code (NaCl) exe-
cutes native instructions inside an isolated sandbox, and interacts with JavaScript and 
other plugins that are responsible for granting restricted access to other resources [117]. 
As previously mentioned, the Denali system [14] was originally designed to have VMs 
running single-application lightweight operating systems, to provide individual internet    23 
services that are confined; however, newer versions virtualise full commodity operating 
systems. Miller et al. developed CapDesk Caplets [17], which are self-contained pro-
grams that gain additional authority via ‘Powerboxes’, which are a special type of file se-
lection dialog that grants access to files selected by the user. 
 
Kato and Oyama proposed a different approach [118]. The scheme, known as Software-
Pot, restricts programs to an encapsulated filesystem that is mostly isolated but which can 
contain rules for mapping resources on the local computer to the name-space accessible to 
the restricted program.  
2.4.3  Disadvantages of Isolation-based Approaches 
All of the aforementioned security schemes attempt to mitigate the effects of malicious 
code by isolating programs or groups of programs from each other. Although relatively 
simple to initially configure, isolated sandboxes present a number of problems. Many of 
these schemes suffer from redundancy of resources and management, and isolating pro-
grams entirely is often not practical. 
 
Isolation-based security schemes can require significant redundancy of resources, as any 
resources that an application requires must be contained within or accessible from the 
sandbox. In the case of VMs this typically requires complete copies of the entire operat-
ing system for each group of programs that are confined. This can also involve the signif-
icant management overhead of managing the configuration of the VMs. For container-
based sandboxes and self contained application sandboxes, often any shared libraries or 
resources must be duplicated within each sandbox that requires access to them [12]. Even 
copy-on-write sandboxes, which allow read access to the same operating environment, 
can introduce management overhead if configuration files are changed within a sandbox. 
 
Isolation sandboxes inhibit applications with differing access needs from easily and se-
curely exchanging information or sharing resources. However, applications commonly 
require access to shared resources and this is integral to the way some applications are 
used. For example, it is common for multiple applications to collaborate on the same 
files, although requiring different types of access to perform their tasks. A user may use 
one program to create a file, another to view it, and then use a third application to transfer    24 
the file over a network. Isolated sandboxes do not suit this situation well, as typically ap-
plications and the files they create would be completely isolated from each other. Alterna-
tively, all three applications and the file could exist in a single sandbox. However, in this 
case each of the three applications are entrusted with the same privileges, despite their 
different requirements, and consequently the viewing program could maliciously edit or 
send the file over the network. 
 
Since the ability to share resources is such a common requirement, many of these systems 
provide ways of circumventing straightforward isolation. VMs can use the network to 
communicate and share files, containers can use hard-linked files to share the same re-
sources, and others provide mechanisms that require user intervention. These methods of 
sharing pose additional challenges and new security problems, and risks are associated 
with requiring users to circumvent the security model.  
 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle is that isolation sandboxes inhibit users from using software 
in the way in which they are accustomed. In most cases users need to decide which appli-
cations they need to launch or install into sandboxes. As discussed by  Potter and Nieh 
[93], these applications are often not integrated into the user’s desktop, and each applica-
tion cannot leverage other applications. Also, requiring user interaction to manually copy 
files between sandboxes requires users to understand these concepts. Due to the large 
number of resources typically required to run an application, the decision making process 
for user intervention can be complicated [119, 120]. This last point is related to the com-
plexity associated with rule-based confinement, which the security system presented in 
this thesis addresses. 
 
Although isolated sandboxes suit certain situations – such as when there are only a few 
untrusted programs that do not require interaction with other applications – these sand-
boxes are arguably not suited to restricting many programs that are untrusted, that require 
different privileges, and that share resources. Consequently, it is argued that isolation-
based schemes do not provide a scaleable solution to the problems posed by malicious 
code. This thesis focuses on developing a new approach to rule-based restrictions, which 
are better suited to many situations.    25 
2.4.4  Rule-based Sandboxes 
Rather  than  focusing  on  completely  isolating  applications,  rule-based  schemes  aim  to 
control what each application is authorised to do. This approach allows applications to 
cooperate and share resources; although each application can only perform the actions 
and access the resources that are required for the program to function as expected by the 
person who specified the security policy. These systems often include methods for policy 
transitions and the propagation of privileges when processes are started. These techniques 
can restrict individual programs with different rules and mitigate the confused deputy 
problem  where  one  program  misuses  another  program’s  privileges  by  influencing  the 
program to act on its behalf [121, 122 p. 19]. This section discusses rule-based sandbox-
ing  schemes,  and  the  following  section  covers  system-wide  rule-based  application-
oriented  access  controls.  This  thesis  addresses  issues  with  rule-based  application  re-
strictions, which apply to these types of security systems. 
 
In 1995 Berman et al. presented TRON [19], which was a discretionary (user managed) 
application confinement mechanism for UNIX, implemented on ULTRIX. TRON con-
fined applications to ‘domains’ that were assigned privileges based on text strings naming 
the files and directories domains could access and the type of access allowed. Users then 
had the option of confining their applications by running them within a domain using a 
command line interface. TRON was implemented using system call interposition within 
the kernel. 
 
System call interposition is a method for regulating and monitoring application behaviour 
by intercepting system calls [26]. All potentially harmful operations that an application 
can perform are via system calls. Therefore filtering calls based on a security policy can 
confine an application by restricting the application’s access to the operating system’s 
privileged  kernel  operations.  System  call  interposition  tools,  such  as  Janus  [21,  78] 
(which was one of the first such systems), Systrace [20, 80], and ETrace [123], can en-
force extremely fine grained policies at the level of granularity of the operating system’s 
system call infrastructure. A number of system call interposition mediation mechanism 
designs have been proposed [124, 125], including library modifications [126], kernel me-
diation [127, 128], and user-space mediation [78, 123, 124, 129]. In most cases this in-
volves a monitoring process enforcing the policy on a traced process. For each application    26 
being confined, its security policy is typically defined in terms of the specific system calls 
and arguments that are allowed. In some cases one operation requires many system calls. 
For example, in order to make a network connection the socket is created, and then the 
protocol is specified. To ease the burden of policy development Systrace includes a policy 
learning mode, which can generate policy rules based on recorded application actions. 
Some schemes such as Software Wrappers [127], proposed by Fraser et al., specifies pol-
icy using a slightly higher level policy language, which is independent of the actual sys-
tem call interface. Plash uses system call interposition and jails to provide a form of capa-
bility-based security, which restricts programs to only access the user’s files that the user 
selects using a Powerbox [130].  
 
System call anomaly detection is a related field, pioneered by Forrest et al., which aims to 
monitor system calls in order to detect, and potentially react to, anomalies in system call 
sequences [131, 132]. These approaches attempt to apply concepts from immunology and 
epidemiology to the problem of detecting and reacting to abnormal behaviour from pro-
cesses. A number of techniques for defining what constitutes valid sequences or parame-
ters for system calls have been proposed: including learning modes that record program 
activity [133, 134], and static analysis of binary or source code to determine code path or 
data flow [135-138].  
 
Application virtualization is primarily designed to allow portable application bytecode to 
run regardless of the platform; the virtual interface allows code to treat different platforms 
the same way. These interfaces can also provide controls on the resources available to ap-
plications. Java [114] and .NET [139] confinement models restrict applications based on 
properties of the code. Both languages also incorporate application restrictions based up-
on security policies defined by the user or administrator, explicitly permitting or denying 
certain operations from particular sources and authors. Each set of rules needs to be con-
figured individually. These security models can only be applied to applications written in 
the appropriate programming languages. Due to the complexity of policy specification, in 
practice these restrictions are rarely specified. Language-based security schemes such as 
type checking and proof-carrying code [140-142], object-capability schemes [143-145], 
intra-component access controls [146], and code/binary transformation [147, 148] provide 
related additional layers of protection, but are outside of the scope of this research. 
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Mac OS X includes a sandbox feature that can enforce two types of confinement [88 pp. 
156-178]. It allows an application to voluntarily confine itself and its subsequent children 
to  one  of  five  coarsely  grained  policies:  for  example,  a  ‘no  Internet’  profile.  Finely 
grained policies can also be applied to applications by launching them into the sandbox 
using the “sandbox-exec” command. The iOS platform specifies one fine-grained policy 
that applies to all installed applications, which largely inhibits their ability to access the 
data from other applications. However, this policy currently allows all iPhone applica-
tions to access various resources without notifying the user. For example, all iPhone ap-
plications have access to the address book, phone number, email account settings, and 
web search history [149]. 
 
The MAPbox scheme, proposed by Raje and Acharya [30, 31], explores the prospect of 
allowing the vendor of an untrusted application to specify its behaviour class, which is 
then executed and confined based on user-assigned discretionary application confinement 
policies for each allowed behaviour class. This allows the provider to communicate the 
general expected functionality of the program to the user, similar to the way in which 
MIME-types describe the expected format of data files. Programs are described in terms 
of  being  of  a  behaviour  class,  and  the  resources  they  require  are  further  clarified  by 
providing parameters. For example, a program may be of class “editor”, requiring access 
to parameters that specify the program’s home directory and a list of files it can edit. The 
security model presented in this thesis incorporates some aspects of this approach. 
2.4.5  Rule-based System-wide Controls 
Another, more comprehensive, approach to restricting applications is to do so at the oper-
ating system security kernel level. Rather than only confining applications that are explic-
itly launched into sandboxes, all processes can be considered for controls and if a policy 
has been specified it is enforced. This section continues discussion of rule-based applica-
tion restrictions, focusing on system-wide controls. 
 
The simplest form of rule-based system-wide control is achieved by overloading the user-
oriented access controls already in place to restrict applications. For example, on Linux 
systems the standard DAC mechanism can be used to control the actions of particular 
programs by creating a synthetic user account for a program. If the program has sufficient    28 
authority and is trusted to do so it can restrict itself by changing its own user identity (for 
example, when running the Apache web server as root it automatically changes its user 
identity, as typically configured to the “nobody” or “apache” account), setuid file permis-
sions can be used to launch the program as the owner of the executable, or the program 
can be launched as a specific user manually. Some application-oriented access control 
schemes are based on this technique. Rainbow provides an “exec-wrapper” that can au-
tomate the creation of synthetic user accounts and launching of programs into those user 
accounts  [150].  Polaris  leverages  this  approach  to  confine  programs;  applications  are 
launched into restricted user accounts that are granted access to the user’s files only when 
the user selects a file via a Windows file selection dialog [18]. Access is granted via a 
mechanism that copies files into the application’s home directory, and subsequently cop-
ies changes back to the user’s home directory. The sub-identities scheme aims to allow 
users to arbitrarily create user accounts that are limited to a sub-set of the user’s rights 
[151]. 
 
Another approach is to divide the actions an application can be authorised to perform into 
simple coarsely grained privileges. Linux capabilities (also known as ‘POSIX capabili-
ties’, since they are based on a withdrawn POSIX standard draft) partition the very pow-
erful root privilege into a fixed set of distinct privileges: for example, the ability to send 
signals to processes owned by any user, or to listen on TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 
[152, 153]. Linux capabilities are not associated with any object, are represented as flag 
variables, and simply permit certain types of actions. Most other rule-based application-
oriented access controls take a finer grained approach that allows further control over ap-
plications, as does the security scheme proposed in this thesis. 
 
Some schemes combine overloaded user confinement with additional coarse privileges. 
BitFrost combines the previously described Rainbow scheme with coarsely grained privi-
leges that authorise additional restricted actions such as using the laptop microphone and 
camera [16]. Authors of software specify which privileges are required by their programs 
at installation. Certain BitFrost privileges cannot normally be combined, which is intend-
ed to limit the malicious activities possible. The Android platform creates separate user 
accounts for each application installed as part of its security scheme [86]. Applications 
run in a modified version of Java known as Dalvik, and additional controls are enforced 
by an application virtualisation layer. Authors specify all the mediated coarsely grained    29 
privileges they will require in an AndroidManifest.xml file, and once an application 
is installed it is prevented from exceeding these privileges. Native code is not subject to 
these additional controls.  
 
Program access control lists (PACLs) label resources with a list of programs, specifying 
the types of access allowed [154]. PACLs, first proposed by Wichers et al.  in 1990 [25], 
are likely to be the earliest form of application-oriented access control. Schemes such as 
Tivoli Access Control Facility (TACF) [155] and eTrust Access Control [156] provide 
PACLs that specify the names of the programs or shell scripts users must execute in order 
to access PACL protected resources. These controls typically only protect particular re-
sources, rather than specify all the resources available to applications. Proposed by Enck 
et al., PinUP provides a related form of restrictions; cryptographic hashes identify un-
modified applications that are allowed to access files [157, 158]. When files are created, 
detailed rules are used to automatically assign a list of applications that are allowed  ac-
cess to them, and users can manually authorise additional application-file interactions that 
occur. Other related approaches exist. FileMonster tags particular files as requiring user 
confirmation before applications can access them [159]. The SubOS scheme associates 
policies with files based on their origin, and processes are restricted by the policies of all 
the files they have accessed [160]. 
 
Type enforcement (TE) [161] is a non-discretionary table-based access control model that 
confines applications based on grouping subjects into domains, and objects into types by 
labelling them. Access decisions are then made based on the contents of a domain interac-
tion table (DIT) and a domain definition table (DDT). Domain and type enforcement 
(DTE) [84] is an access control model based on type enforcement that specifies a policy 
specification language, DTE language (DTEL), which replaces the DIT and DDT tables 
by describing what domain transitions can occur when executing programs and what in-
teractions are allowed between domains and types. Several DTE mechanisms exist, many 
of which deviate from the original model and policy language: DTE mechanisms have 
been developed for Linux [81] and FreeBSD [22, 162] among others. The Rule Set Based 
Access Control (RSBAC) framework for  Linux includes the role compatibility access 
control model, which is very similar to type enforcement [163]. Although termed ‘role 
compatibility’, it has much more in common with DTE than RBAC: the initial role is 
specified, one role is active at a time, role transitions are specified (by compatibility) and    30 
it may not be possible to return to the original role, objects are classified as types, and 
role-type interactions are mediated.  
 
SELinux, originally developed by the United States of America National Security Agency 
(NSA), provides mandatory controls for Linux [24, 79]. SELinux is arguably the most 
complete (and complex) mandatory access control scheme available in any operating sys-
tem. Access control decisions are made based on the security context resources are la-
belled with, implementing a combination of access control models such as RBAC, DTE, 
and  multilevel  security  (MLS)  [75].  DTE  forms  the  primary  basis  of  application  re-
strictions: rules specify when domain transitions occur, which determines the domain a 
program is associated with, and rules define how processes within particular domains can 
access  resources  labelled  with  specific  types.  SELinux  combines  DTE  with  a  non-
standard RBAC model to also provide user confinement in terms of domains. The new 
SELinux-Sandbox script provides a form of isolation-based application confinement; it 
allows users to restrict programs by launching them via a command that generates and 
applies an SELinux policy to isolate the program to the files specified as arguments [164]. 
 
A common approach to rule-based application confinement is to simply specify a list of 
all the resources each application is authorised to access. As proposed by Cowan et al. 
[25], SubDomain takes this approach, where an application profile defines all the files the 
confined program can access.  SubDomain is similar to the previously described TRON; 
the main differences being that SubDomain allows processes to “change hats” depending 
on the tasks they are carrying out, and SubDomain is mandatory; policy is defined by an 
administrator and enforced system wide. The SubDomain project has continued develop-
ment and is now known as AppArmor [165]. AppArmor is provided with a number of 
Linux distributions including the popular Ubuntu and SuSE. Official Novell AppArmor 
documentation presents it as a user-friendly alternative to SELinux [166]. AppArmor fo-
cuses on confining applications that are at a high risk of vulnerability (applications that 
are network-enabled) and confines them to only access the files they need to perform their 
tasks. Policies can also contain simple abstractions (common groups of privileges) and 
can be generated using a learning mode. Applications without policies are typically not 
confined. TOMOYO is a similar system that applies policies based on the process invoca-
tion ancestry [167]. TOMOYO also includes a learning mode to develop policies. 
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The PeaPod application-oriented access control takes a hybrid approach by combining an 
isolation-based  pod  (PrOcess  Domain),  which  provides  container-based  virtualisation, 
with peas (Protection and Encapsulation Abstraction), which specifies a list of all the re-
sources each process is authorised to access within a pod [168, 169]. Pea policies are sim-
ilar to the AppArmor policy language.  
2.4.6  Problems with Rule-based Application Restriction Schemes 
Rule-based  application  restrictions  can  greatly  mitigate  the  threat  posed  by  malicious 
code, and these approaches can avoid many of the previously discussed problems with 
isolation-based approaches. Notwithstanding the large number of rule-based application 
restriction schemes that have been developed, these schemes are rarely embraced by us-
ers. Despite the security advantages they provide, rule-based schemes have a number of 
drawbacks that hinder their use. Coarsely grained controls are less able to mitigate a di-
verse range of threats, while finely grained controls typically result in policy management 
complexity, which results in usability problems. This section discusses issues with previ-
ous rule-based schemes and explains the need for further work in this area. The model 
and techniques presented in this thesis provide fine-grained controls that overcome the 
majority of these problems. 
 
Simple coarsely grained policies can complement user-oriented access controls to reduce 
the risks associated with running programs with all of a users’ privileges: for example, 
Linux capabilities separate many of the root user’s special privileges. However, these re-
strictions typically only mediate access to specific resources, which often means that pol-
icy allows more access than is necessary for the application to function, and programs are 
allowed to act maliciously with resources that are not tightly controlled. For example, 
flag-based privileges such as Linux capabilities cannot mediate access to specific files or 
network ports, so programs are still free to misuse these resources. Coarsely grained poli-
cies such as currently used by the Mac OS X  sandbox practically provide an all-or-
nothing protection. Mac OS X  programs can state that they don’t require network con-
nectivity or that they don’t need write access to the file system; however programs cannot 
state what specific access they require, so a program that needs to write to any file is 
granted write access to all of the user’s files. This type of control is best suited to very    32 
simple programs that require very little privilege to run. For this reason these coarsely 
grained controls can be combined with finer grained rule-based controls.  
 
Sandboxes that enforce the same rule-based policy for every program effectively provide 
a limited form of isolation. Rather than providing controls that authorise the resources 
that particular programs need to function as expected, all programs are granted the same 
privileges. For example, since some iOS applications require sensitive permissions, all 
applications have been granted these privileges [149]. This demonstrates that each appli-
cation should be confined based on its specific purpose. 
 
Other schemes, such as those that overload user-oriented access controls or PACLs, also 
have drawbacks. User-oriented access controls are not designed to provide application 
confinement and, while simple to implement, introduce complications. For example, as 
Cowan et al. discuss [25], the Unix DAC security model allows all user accounts access 
to all files that permit access to “others”, which results in a complex management task to 
ensure that applications confined by synthetic user accounts cannot misuse these permis-
sions. In addition, all user accounts typically have permission to use resources such as the 
network. Overloading user-oriented control schemes also makes it difficult to simultane-
ously provide user restrictions and application confinement, therefore this technique is 
better suited for systems used by only one person. Also, having separate home directories 
for applications results in a form of isolation-based confinement with potentially complex 
or permissive file permissions used to specify exceptions to allow applications to share 
resources. The sub-identities scheme allows for multiple users, but introduces complexity 
since additional ACL policies need to be specified to allow sub-identities to access any 
resources that are not granted to every user. 
 
PACLs and related schemes can protect particular resources from malicious programs. 
However, labelling every resource with all the applications that require access is very 
complex and arguably impractical [19]. Adding a new program involves changing per-
missions for all the resources required, and creating new files involves a complex deci-
sion making process to specify every application that should be authorised to access the 
files. Due to this complexity, these schemes typically only protect particular files. There-
fore this approach cannot comprehensively mitigate the problem of programs running 
with too much authority. Related approaches pose similar concerns. SubOS is particularly    33 
complex since individual policies need to be specified for each remote host files come 
from, and processes are simultaneously subject to a myriad of policies from all of the  
files each process has accessed. As Provos points out [20], not all exploits are the result of 
accessing files, and it is sufficient to restrict processes based on the application’s needs 
rather than enforcing policies for all the files the application has accessed. 
 
Finely grained per-program policies can provide very powerful controls that can specify 
with precision the privileges granted to particular applications. This approach has the 
greatest control over individual programs, and can allow confined processes to interact 
with resources and other processes in authorised ways. However, fine grained application 
restrictions typically result in complex and low-level highly detailed policies that expose 
the complexity of applications and underlying platforms. Translating high level security 
goals into finely grained policies using previous schemes is problematic, typically requir-
ing expertise and knowledge of low level operations and interactions of programs. Also, 
once constructed, policies can be hard to verify for completeness and correctness [26, 
119, 170].  
 
System call interposition mechanisms typically specify fine grained rules in terms of al-
lowed system calls and system call arguments. System call interposition systems have 
been criticised for inherent complexity and design flaws [26, 171]. The main problem 
with these types of security policies is that they are so finely grained that the task of man-
aging them is especially complex. This is also partially due to the complexity of the sys-
tem call interface. In some cases one operation requires multiple system calls. This com-
plicates policy management and security system implementation as any nontrivial process 
utilises a vast number of system calls. This means that creating system call interposition 
policies using some schemes requires additional expert knowledge of low-level system 
call  semantics.  Arguably,  a  result  of  this  complexity  is  that  system-call  interposition 
schemes are not practical solutions, as most users would not have the expertise required 
to translate high level ideas into meaningful policies. Deferring enforcement to user-space 
also introduces design challenges, such as the risk of race conditions [171, 172].  
 
System call anomaly detection monitoring faces challenges similar to that of system call 
interposition. As a result of the complexity of system calls, anomaly classification is typi-
cally based on a simplified view of activity. For example, policy is often based on the sys-   34 
tem calls themselves (such as read, open, mmap) regardless of what the system calls are 
actually doing. Due to a simplified view of system activity, anomaly detection can be sub-
ject to mimicry attacks, where malicious activity can be disguised by interspersing nor-
mal-looking system call sequences [135]. Furthermore, policy generation faces challeng-
es. Static analysis of binary or source code can produce policy that does not detect mali-
cious activity that follows existing code paths, regardless of the security implications. For 
example, programs that include logic flaws or have been misconfigured can be exploited 
without corrupting the code of the executable, and therefore static analysis policies con-
sider  this  to  be  normal  behaviour.  Additionally,  static  analysis  requires  access  to  all 
source or binary code, which is not always practical in the case of dynamically linked li-
braries and plug-ins. Learning modes can produce policy that is incomplete, since un-
common code paths may not be profiled, and limited protections are in place while initial-
ly profiling. Due to the high rate of false positives, system call anomaly detection systems 
are often passive and do not enforce policy [131]. 
 
Type enforcement (TE) and similar models such as role compatibility (RC) define rules 
that specify the domains that are used to confine programs, the types accessible to do-
mains, and the types associated with files. Although these concepts provide forms of ab-
straction, policies remain complex, and these concepts are arguably not intuitive. Alt-
hough domains serve as policy abstractions that associate rules with programs, each ap-
plication is typically assigned a unique domain consisting of complex rules specifying al-
lowed file and domain transitions and interactions with types (similarly labelled objects). 
SELinux also includes m4 macros, which are typically very low level abstractions that 
grant a number of access rules to specified resources. SELinux policy is complex, hard to 
comprehend, and despite the maturity of SELinux, few graphical tools have been devel-
oped to ease policy management. SELinux is frequently criticised for its complexity [111, 
119, 166, 167, 170, 173]. 
 
Many finely grained rule-based application-oriented access controls simply specify a list 
of all the resources programs require. As previously discussed, these include sandboxes 
such as TRON, higher-level system call interposition schemes such as Software Wrappers 
and system wide controls such as AppArmor and PeaPod. All of these systems entail 
complex  and  typically  lengthy  policies  to  restrict  applications.  Because  these  policies 
specify all the low level resources programs require, they expose the complexity of the    35 
operating environment and the resource needs of applications. As previously discussed, 
the resource requirements of typical applications can be extremely complicated [120]. 
Creating, managing or reviewing these policies therefore generally requires a relatively 
high level of expertise beyond many end users. Some of these systems include simple 
policy abstractions that group lists of rules, which can be included in policies. However, 
due to the low level nature of the rules and the complexity of the needs of application, 
these abstractions represent low level attributes of programs. For example, AppArmor in-
cludes abstractions such as ‘fonts’, ‘bash’, ‘nameservice’, ‘dbus’, ‘orbit2’, and ‘aspell’, 
which still require expertise to understand and utilise. Application virtualization schemes 
use similar methods to define what programs are authorised to perform, with the addition-
al complexity of intra-component rules and source based rules. 
 
MAPbox makes the important contribution of the use of behavioural classes to create re-
usable associations between fine grained rules and programs [30, 31]. The model present-
ed in this thesis builds on this basic idea and overcomes a number of shortcomings of the 
MAPbox model. Programs that exhibit multiple behaviours (such as most web browsers) 
are unable to be defined using MAPbox, since applications are limited to a single behav-
iour class (14 classes are identified). Also, although it was acknowledged that overlap be-
tween classes exists, each policy is defined individually. Although author-influenced pol-
icies may be useful for simplifying policy management for users and may reduce the 
threat of vulnerabilities by ensuring that the application behaves as expected by the au-
thor, untrustworthy authors cannot be expected to enforce least privilege, as an untrusted 
author will likely choose the most liberal class and parameters that users will accept. Al-
so, allowing the user to arbitrarily specify the privileges assigned to behaviours means 
that even authors who specify the behavioural class of applications do not know what 
privileges they will be authorised.  
2.4.7  Policy Complexity of Rule-based Approaches 
As discusses in the previous section, many existing application-confinement schemes suf-
fer from policy complexity. Due to this complexity, using these systems it is impractical 
to specify policy a priori; that is, without analysing the activity of each application. For 
this reason many fine grained rule-based mechanisms rely on learning modes to generate 
policy based on the observation of programs operating. The program to be confined is ex-   36 
ecuted and all security sensitive actions are logged. These logged activities are then con-
sidered standard behaviour and are used to create a policy for confining the application. 
Since only primitive policy abstractions are used (if any), resulting policies are often 
large, very fine grained and difficult to review, especially with system call interposition 
schemes. As previously mentioned, examples of security mechanisms that include learn-
ing modes include: AppArmor [165], Systrace [20], LIDS [174], SELinux (audit2allow 
tool) [175], TOMOYO [167] and grsecurity [74]. 
 
Learning modes develop policies either while the program is confined or when it is un-
confined. Using systems such as AppArmor, incrementally building policy while the pro-
gram is confined by the rules being developed can involve a large number of iterations 
due to program failures where the program is unable to continue without access to re-
quired privileges. Building policy while the program is not confined poses security risks 
if the software is not trusted to perform correctly and benevolently during this process. 
Dynamic policy authorisation, such as used by PULSE [176], can alleviate this risk by 
waiting for user confirmation before authorising the program access to each resource. 
 
Although learning modes can make policy generation easier, the policy requires review to 
ensure that the logged behaviour does in fact represent the behaviour expected. However, 
review requires expertise and scrupulous inspection of the generated policy, and even 
simple applications can involve a very large number of rules. If the application is carrying 
out malicious behaviour at the time of logging, and this is not detected at review, then the 
application confinement will not restrict the application from continuing these malicious 
activities. Also, if the application does not access all the resources it requires, it may be 
restricted from carrying out its legitimate tasks, or require excessive user interaction and 
policy refinement. This makes it difficult to learn behaviour without exposing the applica-
tion  to  the  production  environment,  and  possibly  exploitation  during  use  in  learning 
mode. 
 
Using previous fine grained application restrictions, individual application confinement 
policies typically apply primarily to only one specific application or program. The work 
involved in constructing policies for all applications utilised is considerable; the man-
agement task generally increases more or less in proportion to the number of applications 
being confined.    37 
 
Furthermore, previous schemes either provide user-specified policies (DAC), administra-
tor-specified  policies  (MAC),  author-specified  policies,  or  software-specified  policies. 
Each system can address one of these security goals; however, these are all valid re-
strictions that should be capable of being combined to provide defence-in-depth to en-
force the security goals of each of these parties. Using existing schemes, enforcing these 
goals simultaneously requires the management of multiple security systems. 
2.4.8  Application Restrictions and Usability 
The result of all these limitations is primarily a usability problem. Despite the fact that 
usability has long been acknowledged as an important aspect in the design of security sys-
tems [177], usability received little attention in the literature until the importance of ap-
plying human-computer interaction (HCI) techniques to the field of computer security 
was emphasised by studies that demonstrated that poorly designed security user interfaces 
resulted in degraded protection [178, 179]. Although awareness of the importance of usa-
bility in security design has improved [180], and the literature now contains numerous 
publications related to computer security usability, very little research has investigated or 
addressed the usability issues associated with application-oriented access controls.  
 
Research has explored usability within the wider field of access control and policy speci-
fication. A number of publications have identified general problems with existing user-
oriented schemes [181]. The problem of usability and policy complexity within access 
controls has been acknowledged a number of times, and methods for improving the usa-
bility of policy specification have been explored [182-190]. The following are examples 
of policy authoring techniques developed by usable security researchers to overcome usa-
bility and policy complexity problems: the Adage [183] and MAP [184] projects were de-
signed to provide usable RBAC for distributed organisations, SPARCLE is a natural lan-
guage policy management tool that guides users through the task of specifying policy 
[185, 186], Expandable Grids is a graphical method of managing and viewing policy us-
ing  a  hierarchical  matrix  [187],  and  Intentional  Access  Management  produces  user-
oriented DAC ACL policy rules based on low-level access goals of end users [188]. Very 
recently Maritza Johnson et al. have proposed techniques for improving the usability of 
guided natural language policy specification using policy templates [189, 190]. Findings    38 
of studies such as these have supported the idea that abstraction improves the usability of 
access controls and eases policy specification.  
 
However little research has explored the usability of application-oriented access controls. 
The isolation-based Apiary scheme and the data-centric FileMonster scheme have been 
the subjects of limited usability studies [93, 159]. A simple user study, with 24 partici-
pants, was conducted that evaluated the ability of users to use applications in the Apiary 
environment [191]. The use of the Apiary desktop was compared with Xfce, a lightweight 
Linux desktop environment.  Usability evaluation was simply measured by time-on-task 
and participants were “asked to rate their perceived ease of use of each environment”. It is 
not clear what tool they used to collect this data. Participants were also asked a some oth-
er questions “including, would the Apiary environment be an environment they could im-
agine using full time and would it be an environment they would prefer to use full time if 
it would keep their desktop secure”. These additional questions do not appear to be neu-
tral: asking someone if they can imagine something, and whether they would chose to use 
something that was more secure. Results were reported as affirmative, although no infer-
ential statistics were employed. The FileMonster paper reports a simple study that meas-
ured the number of times the tool required user interaction [192]. 
 
A study by DeWitt and Kuljis [193] assessed the usability of the Polaris security mecha-
nism [18], an application-oriented access control system for Windows designed with usa-
bility in mind. The Polaris study involved 10 participants utilising the security system to 
carry out a number of tasks. Like the usability study described in Chapter 10, which as-
sesses the new model presented in this thesis, their success at the tasks was evaluated and 
perceived usability was measured. After using Polaris to attempt a number of tasks, par-
ticipants on average rated the system 44.2 out of 100 using the System Usability Scale 
(SUS) [194], and the study concluded that further work was necessary to improve the us-
ability of Polaris.  
 
This thesis contends that the usability problems with rule-based application oriented ac-
cess controls can be overcome using reusable policy abstractions representing high-level 
goals. Previous approaches either lacked policy abstractions entirely, or utilised abstrac-
tions that do not provide the flexibility and reusability necessary to represent high-level 
goals and abstract low-level details from application restriction policies. The model pre-   39 
sented in this thesis facilitates the development of policies a priori using high-level secu-
rity concepts, alleviating the need for learning modes, and enforces mandatory and discre-
tionary policy defined by a number of parties. 
2.4.9  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced many concepts related to the research presented in this thesis, 
explored existing schemes, and revealed how the model and techniques presented in this 
thesis fit into the existing literature. Rule-based application restrictions can provide pow-
erful controls to limit the authority granted to programs; however, they have complexity 
and usability problems that the remainder of this thesis addresses. The next chapter gives 
a brief overview of previous research by the author that is related to the model and tech-
niques presented in this thesis.    40 
Chapter 3  Previous Work 
 
“ 
Although the world is full of suffering, it is full also of the overcoming of it. 
Helen Keller, American blind and deaf educator (1880 - 1968)  ” 
 
 
3.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter describes previous work by the author, and describes how it is related to the 
access control model presented in this thesis. In an honours research project, the author 
previously proposed a theoretical application confinement model named ‘role-based exe-
cution environment’ (RBEE) [195]. The research described in this thesis improves, com-
pletes, and extends RBEE, to present a new model: ‘functionality-based application con-
finement’ (FBAC). This thesis presents significant progress from the initial idea formu-
lated  as  RBEE.  FBAC  incorporates  elements  of  RBEE,  in  order  to  leverage  the  ad-
vantages RBEE was expected to provide, evaluates these assertions and provides many 
security features and benefits RBEE was not designed to provide. Additionally, in this 
thesis automation techniques are presented to complement FBAC, the new model is im-
plemented for Linux, and policy expression and usability are analysed and evaluated. This 
chapter describes RBEE, how it was designed, its main design features, and how the re-
mainder of the thesis relates to this previous work. 
3.2  Role-Based Execution Environment (RBEE) 
The RBEE scheme was designed to leverage benefits from the RBAC model to the spe-
cific problem of improving the usability of discretionary system call interposition. Noting 
the need for improved usability, manageability and scalability of application-oriented ac-
cess control models, it was recognised that there is a notional similarity between tradi-
tional user-oriented access control (which restricts what users are able to do on a system) 
and discretionary application confinement (which typically restricts processes or applica-
tions access to a user’s privileges). It was contended that the RBAC model mitigated sim-
ilar problems within the user confinement discipline. The RBAC model was therefore 
adapted to the context of application confinement. By adapting RBAC, a behaviour based    41 
scheme that overcomes limitations in existing behaviour based application confinement 
schemes was proposed. 
 
Although in this previous research the policy abstractions were termed ‘roles’ (in recogni-
tion of the RBAC model from which they where inspired), the FBAC model names these 
abstractions ‘functionalities’, highlighting the differences in intent and context. To simpli-
fy exposition RBEE roles are herein called functionalities. 
 
RBEE was designed by systematically adapting the RBAC model to address the problem 
of application confinement by identifying correlations between RBAC elements and re-
stricted execution constructs, adapting RBAC functionality and by developing a set of 
operations based on Unix system calls [196]. While many elements and constructs in the 
NIST/ANSI INCITS RBAC specification have direct equivalents in relation to applica-
tion confinement, others needed to be specially adapted for this new purpose and these 
are also described below. 
3.3  Adaptation of RBAC Elements 
Correlations were identified between each element of RBAC and a corresponding con-
ceptual element in the application confinement context. As a result, RBAC and RBEE are 
structurally very similar. As already noted, users in RBAC have similar abstract seman-
tics to applications in process confinement models, since access control models restrict 
users just as an application confinement environment restricts applications. Therefore, in 
RBEE applications are the unit of confinement rather than users. 
 
Sessions in RBAC define instances of a user within a system: for example, an instance of 
a user logged into the system. Each instance of a user is only allowed access to the per-
missions currently assigned to that active session. Similarly RBEE confines processes as 
instances of executing applications and each process is only granted access to the privi-
leges assigned to it.  
 
RBAC defines a user’s privileges, called ‘permissions’, in terms of the objects they may 
access and the operations that can be performed on these. These elements are abstract 
constructs that are used in RBEE to mediate access between applications and resources.    42 
In RBEE, objects can represent any system resource. Operations are abstractions repre-
senting types of access to be applied to resources. 
 
RBEE operations were proposed to represent one or more system calls that had been 
grouped together. As a step towards implementation of RBEE, some specific Unix system 
calls were analysed to produce a set of abstractions designed to simplify the privilege 
granularity of system call interposition. For example, the operation Read-File was de-
signed to provide an abstraction that could be implemented in Unix by allowing the open, 
openat, read and readv system calls when applied to opening the specified file with read 
permission. 
 
RBAC roles and RBEE functionalities serve conceptually similar, yet nonetheless dis-
tinct, functions within the two models. RBAC roles represent a user’s organisational re-
sponsibility or duties within an organisation, whereas functionalities in RBEE symbolise 
the expected functional behaviour associated with an application. All access decisions are 
based on the roles that have been assigned to the user’s session in RBAC or the function-
alities assigned to an application’s process in RBEE. Finally, in addition to the converted 
elements of RBAC, an element representing individual binaries was added to facilitate the 
mapping of multiple binaries to a single application. 
3.4  Adapting RBAC Functionality 
As described in Chapter 2, NIST RBAC functionality is defined by distinct functional 
packages: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, Static Separation of Duty and Dynamic Sep-
aration of Duty. Of these, Core RBAC describes the basic features of RBAC and was 
adapted, as described in the previous section, to be included in RBEE. 
 
Hierarchical RBAC defines role-role relationships so as to reduce redundancy when mul-
tiple roles contain duplicate permissions. RBEE provides general hierarchies, which allow 
multiple inheritances. This means that functionalities can be defined in terms of a number 
of other functionalities. For example, a functionality created for web browsers might in-
clude  separate  functionalities  for  accessing  certain  files  and  directories  and  particular 
network resources. Hierarchies also facilitate the creation of multiple layers of abstrac-   43 
tion, which increases the scalability of the model, reduces redundancy and was expected 
to make policies easier to create and manage. 
 
Separation of duty was incorporated into the RBEE model to separate privileges that, 
when combined, could cause a violation of security policy. The properties of both static 
and dynamic separation of duty are included to allow functionalities to be mutually exclu-
sive at both association and activation. This feature prevents the user from accidentally 
creating policies that contradict higher level policies. Static separation of duty allows sets 
of conflicting privileges to be defined as mutually exclusive; thus theoretically preventing 
conflicting functionalities from being assigned to the same application. For example, the 
privileges that can be used to access a highly confidential file could be made mutually ex-
clusive with network access privileges. This would mean that no application could be as-
signed a policy that allowed network communication and access to the secret data, there-
by preventing an application from sending this file over the network. Dynamic separation 
of duty was also included and works in a similar way but allows an application to be as-
signed two conflicting functionalities while preventing these from being activated simul-
taneously. 
3.5  Execution and Process Ancestry 
A  major  difference  between  traditional  user-oriented  access  control  and  application-
oriented access controls is that application confinement models such as RBEE must allow 
applications to start other applications. There is no equivalent concept in RBAC since a 
session cannot establish new sessions owned by other users. RBEE proposed a simple, 
but incomplete, solution. 
 
RBEE includes an operation used to specify which applications or executable binaries an 
application is permitted to execute. When executing another application, a new process is 
created and this is normally limited to the subset of privileges belonging to both applica-
tions. For example, when program A starts program B, program B will only have access 
to the intersection of A and B’s privileges. Any programs that B starts are further limited. 
This design prevents privilege elevation from normal application-application interactions: 
Program B cannot be used by Program A to do anything that it wasn't authorised to do in 
the first place.    44 
 
However, in order to provide flexibility and ensure that the principle of least privilege is 
maintained, it is necessary in certain circumstances to trust specific applications to start 
processes with the full set of privileges associated with the invoked application. This fea-
ture allows a policy to be defined that allows a program such as a shell or file manager to 
launch a program with a dissimilar set of privileges. For this reason an additional opera-
tion was included to execute specified applications with their full set of privileges. 
3.6  Functionality Parameterisation 
Although RBAC roles are well suited to most organisational situations where everyone 
with the same duties requires access to the same resources, applications performing the 
same tasks require access to similar yet non-identical resources. For example, each appli-
cation typically stores its configuration files to a different directory. Therefore, based on 
the results of previous research that explored the use of parameterisation for application 
sandboxes [30],  RBEE parameterises  its  policy  abstractions.  RBEE  functionalities  are 
passed arguments when assigned to applications in a fashion similar to subroutines in 
programming languages. Parameterisation allows the policy abstraction to easily adapt to 
the differing details of applications proving related features. This design avoids the situa-
tion, discussed in Chapter 2, with existing models such as TE where each application is 
typically assigned a separately configured domain. 
 
RBEE functionalities may contain other parameterised functionalities and parameterised 
privileges, where the resulting privileges are computed at run-time based on the argu-
ments passed to parameterised privileges. This hierarchical relationship between func-
tionalities allows arguments to propagate to any contained functionality. 
 
RBEE could therefore theoretically confine applications based on simply assigning func-
tionalities to applications that describe the general features provided by the applications, 
and by specifying any required parameters, such as the location of specific resources. 
Functionalities can represent high-level behavioural classes of applications, such as Web 
Browser or Web Server, and can inherit lower level functionalities that represent applica-
tion functionality: for example, HTTP Client, and FTP Client. These functionalities are in 
turn associated with privileges that are made up of operations on objects. It was contend-   45 
ed that the abstractions provided by functionalities and functionality hierarchies could be 
used to define complex, finely-grained policies in terms of high level abstractions. 
 
Unlike previous application-oriented models, the hierarchical nature of a RBEE policy al-
lows layers of abstraction and encapsulation to be built. High-level functionalities can de-
scribe the purposes of the application, and can contain lower-level functionalities that 
provide the authorisation necessary to perform required tasks. These in turn can contain 
very low-level abstractions, which group finely grained privileges needed to access re-
sources. Hierarchical functionality levels improve manageability of policy by encapsulat-
ing details. Although not tested, it was argued that this scheme could allow flexible ab-
stractions to be created that could be fine-tuned to suit the diverse implementation details 
of related applications. 
3.7  Comparing RBAC and RBEE 
Figure  3.1  illustrates  the  structural  similarity  between  the  RBAC  and  RBEE  models. 
However, as mentioned previously, despite the similarity the purpose of each is quite dis-
tinct. RBAC restricts what users can do on a system, while RBEE was designed to be 
used at a user’s discretion to restrict the applications the user runs. RBAC is a user-
oriented access control model restricting users based on their organisational role within an 
enterprise, while RBEE is an application-oriented access restriction scheme restricting 
applications based on the functionalities they perform. 
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Figure 3.1: RBAC - RBEE Comparison. a) The Role-Based Access Control Model. b) The Role-Based 
Execution Environment Model. 
3.8  Proposed Advantages and the Limitations of RBEE 
The author’s honours thesis contended that by leveraging RBAC concepts, RBEE could 
provide benefits to application restrictions similar to those RBAC provides to user re-
strictions. Although RBEE was not tested, some conceptual case studies were explored 
that indicated the model showed potential to provide improvements in scalability, man-
ageability and usability. 
 
Although RBEE presented the promising idea of using an RBAC-like structure to perform 
functionality-based application restrictions, due to a limited project scope the model itself 
was incomplete, and was not evaluated to see if it could provide the expected benefits. 
RBEE presented a compelling, yet untested and unverified, concept. 
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Many details, such as how policy would be represented, what administrative operations 
for policy management would be required, and the logic for making access control deci-
sions were incomplete or non-existent. Also, although deemed necessary, the parameteri-
sation proposed was not incorporated into a complete description of the model; the meth-
od for providing and enforcing parameterisation was also not defined. Similarly, although 
the problem of privilege propagation across process invocations was identified and a solu-
tion suggested (as previously described in Section 3.5) this solution was not complete or 
sufficient, as programs such as shells (for example, bash) are often found in process an-
cestries, which when used to calculate children’s privileges based on intersections would 
result in a non-functioning application. 
 
The goal of RBEE was to improve discretionary application restrictions, used by users to 
restrict the actions of their applications. Specifically the model was designed to be im-
plemented as a system call interposition scheme. Applying a similar scheme to provide 
mandatory controls was not considered. 
3.9  FBAC’s relation to RBEE 
The new model proposed in this thesis has more ambitious goals than RBEE, it aims to 
address the limitations of RBEE, and also to evaluate the practicality of the concepts pro-
posed by RBEE. RBEE serves as the conceptual basis for FBAC, which also incorporates 
a functionality-based RBAC-like structure. 
 
The FBAC model is designed to be implementation independent and provides mandatory 
and discretionary controls, in contrast to RBEE’s focus on improving system call interpo-
sition  to  provide  a  discretionary  control.  Unlike  other  application-oriented  restriction 
models (including RBEE), FBAC simultaneously provides mandatory and discretionary 
controls, leveraging the reusability of functionality-based policy to do so with reduced 
management overhead.  
 
The FBAC model addresses the incompleteness of the RBEE model by specifying the 
form of privilege propagation and the parameterisation of policy. These concepts have 
been further developed and are presented herein. Furthermore, a policy language for spec-   48 
ifying functionality-based policy is introduced, administrative operations for policy man-
agement are defined, and the logic for making access control decisions is presented. 
 
An implementation of FBAC called FBAC-LSM (a Linux security module with policy 
management tools) is used to evaluate the advantages provided by the FBAC model and 
consequently the functionality-based approach first proposed in the RBEE model. 
3.10  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the concept of constructing application restriction policies based 
on policy abstractions known as functionalities, which was proposed in the author’s pre-
vious honours work. This idea forms the basis of the new model, FBAC, which is pre-
sented in the next chapter. This chapter has described how the thesis is related to the pre-
vious work, and how the model, techniques and evaluation presented in this thesis present 
significant progress from the initial presentation of the underlying idea. 
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We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the 
seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing 
strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, 
we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we 
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we 
shall never surrender.  
Sir Winston Churchill to the House of Commons of the British  




4.1  Chapter Introduction 
Functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) is a new application-oriented access 
control model proposed and defined in this chapter. The chapter starts by defining the 
aims of the scheme and the threats it mitigates, then an overview of FBAC is presented. 
Following that, each of the five components of the FBAC model are described separately 
and related to previous research and security models. The components combine to form 
the complete FBAC model, which is illustrated in Section 4.10, Figure 4.11. The func-
tional aspects of FBAC are described in Appendix C, including how privileges are propa-
gated across process invocation and how access decisions are made. Subsequent chapters 
explore and evaluate the practical implications of the model presented in this chapter. 
4.2  Access Control Aims 
The goal of the FBAC model is to provide rule-based application-oriented access controls 
that overcome the problems with previous schemes that were identified in Chapter 2. That 
is, the model aims to: provide reusable policy abstractions, provide manageability and us-
ability benefits, simultaneously enforce application restrictions defined by users and ad-
ministrators, and provide the ability to dynamically deactivate and reactivate portions of 
policy. The model aims to be compatible with existing applications that are unaware of 
security mechanisms.     50 
 
The FBAC model presented in this chapter is capable of applying mandatory and discre-
tionary controls to enforce the expectations of users and administrators, and is also able to 
activate or deactivate portions of policy based on the policy abstractions used. The re-
maining chapters of this thesis assess the FBAC model and its success regarding the other 
aims: a Linux implementation serves as a proof of concept and was used to evaluate the 
ability of the model to confine applications and express reusable policies that are compat-
ible with existing applications, and a comparative usability study assessed the usability of 
the scheme.  
4.3  Threats FBAC Mitigates 
In general the threat that FBAC mitigates is that an executed process can act beyond the 
expected behaviour of the process and thus violate security goals concerning resource us-
age. As explored in Chapter 2, threats that typically lead to processes violating their secu-
rity expectations include malicious code due to software vulnerabilities and malware. Due 
to their differing security goals (as described below) separate users and administrators 
have diverse expectations of executed programs and consider different actions as legiti-
mate. Although existing mechanisms and models typically consider threats from either 
the perspective of a single user or an administrator, but not both (as described in Section 
2.4.1), FBAC is designed to mitigate the threats faced by both users and administrators. 
What constitutes legitimate usage is therefore defined as behaviour that is expected from 
all relevant users and administrators. 
 
From a user’s perspective, a process using their identity should be acting on their behalf: 
only accessing the resources necessary to perform the tasks they expect the process to 
perform. The technical expertise of the user may be limited and they may be unqualified 
to define every action that should be authorised. However, the user expects the program 
to only perform certain functions. The threat is that software may act maliciously and be-
yond these expectations. The user’s security goal in this case is to protect themselves 
from misbehaving programs by restricting programs to only perform the functions they 
expect the programs to carry out.  
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The administrator of a system may face a number of threats depending on their security 
goals. They may intend to protect users of the system from the threats facing individual 
users by using a mandatory access control scheme. In this case the threats are similar to 
those described above: malicious programs may act beyond the expected behaviour of the 
programs. 
 
Administrators may also intend to confine users in terms of what applications they can 
run and what they can do using them – in which case users themselves may be considered 
a threat to system security. Also the failure of certain applications to behave as expected 
could violate system security policy, such as with a misbehaving setuid program. In addi-
tion, the administrator may apply policies from third parties such as software developer-
supplied policies. 
4.4  Access Control Model Overview 
The FBAC model enforces access control decisions based on the identity of processes, re-
stricting each application to the privileges necessary to carry out its authorised tasks. Us-
ers can restrict the programs they execute using discretionary controls and users can also 
be selectively restricted in application-oriented terms by mandatory controls: for example, 
rules can specify which applications users can use and what those applications are al-
lowed to do when particular users are using them. FBAC can be combined with a user-
oriented access control model such as traditional DAC or MAC to ensure other user-
oriented access goals are also enforced: for example, to specify which resources users are 
allowed to access. 
 
FBAC restricts applications based on policy abstractions known as functionalities that de-
scribe the functions each application provides. Each functionality can be made up of other 
functionalities in a hierarchical structure. Functionalities are also reusable and can be ad-
justed through parameterisation to suit the needs of related applications. FBAC can en-
force multiple security goals simultaneously by confining users’ applications with discre-
tionary and mandatory controls defined by the users or others respectively. Users can dy-
namically activate or deactivate functionalities of processes. FBAC also allows processes 
to further confine themselves to the functions they are currently performing. 
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The FBAC model is divided into five components that combine to form the complete 
FBAC  model:  the  functionality-based  component  (which  forms  the  foundation  of  the 
model), the hierarchical component, the parameterised component, the user-confinements 
component, and the process-functionality activation component. Unlike the RBAC model 
standard (as described in Chapter 2), which separates parts of the model that can be op-
tionally combined when designing a RBAC mechanism, FBAC components depend on 
each other and are separated primarily to simplify the description and discussion of the 
model.  
 
FBAC is based on the concepts proposed in the authors previous model, RBEE (described 
in Chapter 3), which was based on the structure of the RBAC model. However, FBAC 
deviates significantly from the RBAC and RBEE model structures.  
 
The key shown in Figure 4.1 defines the notation used in the following model diagrams. 









One-to-one mapping between elements A and B
One-to-many mapping (one A to many B)
Many-to-many mapping
For each element A an instance B may exist
which inherits the properties of A  
Figure 4.1: Model Diagram Notation 
4.5  Functionality-based Component 
The foundation of the FBAC model is the functionality-based component. FBAC is based 
on the paradigm of restricting or auditing applications based on the functionalities associ-   53 
ated with each application. This component of FBAC is a fundamental aspect of the mod-
el and is the basis for all the other components. The term functionality-based is coined, 
not only to describe this component of the FBAC model, but to also describe any subse-
quent model based on this paradigm. 
 
The functionality policy construct is designed to represent a function or behaviour an ap-
plication may be authorised to carry out. Functionalities can describe high level features 
such as ‘web browser’, ‘email client’, ‘web server’ or ‘file manager’, or can describe 
lower level application tasks such as ‘HTTP client’. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, each application policy is associated with one or more func-
tionalities in a many-to-many relationship. Functionalities are associated with the privi-
leges required to provide those functions. Privileges are therefore not directly associated 
with individual applications, but rather via abstract constructs, designed to minimise the 
management task of assigning privileges to applications. 
 
Figure 4.2: The Paradigm: Functionality-based 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, a privilege in the FBAC model is made up of a single opera-
tion associated with zero or more resource descriptors. An operation either describes the 
type of access to the resources defined by the resource descriptors, or describes a self-
contained boolean ability, such as the authorisation to hold a particular Linux capability, 
in which case no resources descriptors would be specified.    54 
 
Figure 4.3: An FBAC Privilege 
An FBAC resource descriptor represents mediated resources or, in access control terms, it 
can represent a set of objects. As shown in Figure 4.4, a resource can be described by 






Figure 4.4: Resource Descriptors 
In implementations of the model, descriptors may be expressed in various ways. The im-
plementation developed for this research, named FBAC-LSM, is discussed at length in 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. For clarification of the concept it is sufficient at this 
point to simply review some options the model allows. An FBAC resource descriptor may 
be implemented as label-based or name-based. That is, resource descriptors can be analo-
gous to types in domain and type enforcement (DTE), where one or more resources are 
labelled with a type that is then used to represent those resources in policy. Alternatively, 
the resource can be referred to by a name or string pattern that can identify resources: for 
example, the pattern “/home/*” can represent any file in the home directory of a Unix 
system. In either case the resource descriptor can be used to identify resources to the fin-   55 
est granularity of the way resources are distinguished on the system and can also provide 
some limited abstraction to describe related resources. 
 
An executable file is a stored program that can be executed. Each application has one or 
more executables (as shown in Figure 4.5) that are considered part of that application. 
Processes executing those executables are therefore restricted (as described in subsequent 
sections) based on the application and the functionalities available to the application.  
 
Figure 4.5: Executables Associated with an Application Policy 
This concludes the description of the primary component of FBAC. The functionality-
based component, which combines the elements discussed in this section, is shown in 
Figure 4.6. Each of the elements and relationships illustrated in the diagram have been 
described in descriptions of previous figures. This component describes how, through 
functionalities, privileges are associated with applications. For the sake of clarity, the way 
these associations are related to users and processes are described in separate components 
of the FBAC model. Also, the way the model makes access decisions is covered in detail 
in later sections and in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 4.6: FBAC Component – Functionality-Based    56 
4.5.1  Discussion of the Functionality-based Component  
As established in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, other application-oriented restrictions are gen-
erally monolithic in nature, where each process has one large detailed policy that applies 
to it at a time. In contrast FBAC application policy is made up of multiple reusable ab-
stractions. The functionality-based component, establishes the foundation of the FBAC 
model, and describes how application policies are granted privileges via the ‘functionali-
ty’ abstraction. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the functionality-based paradigm (as first proposed in the au-
thor’s previous model, RBEE) was inspired by an attempt to apply the structure of the us-
er-oriented RBAC model to the context of restricting applications. The abstract nature of 
roles, which form associations between users and privileges in RBAC, led to the concept 
of applying an abstract relationship between applications and the privileges they require.  
 
This component is comparable to ANSI INCITS/NIST Core RBAC [197] in that it pro-
vides the basis of the model. However, in addition to the different aim of the model, this 
FBAC component does not include a concept that represents the policy associated with an 
instance of the subject (represented by sessions in RBAC), as this is left to another FBAC 
component. The user-confinement FBAC  component that provides this aspect takes a 
very different approach and has a different structure to the one used in RBAC. Also the 
‘executable’ element has no correlation in the RBAC model, as user authentication is out-
side the scope of RBAC. However, the notionally analogous process-application identifi-
cation is within the scope of the FBAC model. 
 
The paradigm of confining applications based on the functionalities they perform is relat-
ed to the concept of behaviour-based sandboxing [31, 198]. The main distinguishing fea-
ture being that functionality-based restrictions specify multiple functionalities that apply 
to an application, rather than restricting each program to a single behavioural class. The 
subsequent  components  of  the  FBAC  model  add  substantial  improvements  to  the  re-
strictions provided by this paradigm. As previously mentioned, aspects of the model are 
separated into components to simplify explanation.    57 
4.6  Hierarchical FBAC Component 
The  hierarchical  FBAC  component  describes  functionality-functionality  relationships, 
where a functionality may contain other functionalities. This is shown in Figure 4.7 as an 
arrow from the functionality element back to itself. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: FBAC Component – Hierarchical FBAC 
The hierarchical nature of an FBAC policy allows layers of abstraction and encapsulation  
to be built. High-level functionalities that describe the purposes of applications (such as 
Web_Browser,  Email_Client  and  Web_Server)  are  constructed  using  lower-
level functionalities that provide the authorisation necessary to perform required tasks 
(such as http_client, ftp_client and POP3_client). These in turn are made 
up of very low-level abstractions that group finely grained privileges needed to access re-
sources (such as file_r, and file_w).  
4.6.1  Discussion of the Hierarchical Component 
Unlike other application-oriented models, the hierarchical nature of FBAC policy allows 
detailed application-oriented policies to be formed from layers of policy abstractions. Pol-
icy abstractions are typically self-contained, have limited reusability or adaptability, and 
are compiled into a single set of rules that are applied at run-time. This level of abstrac-
tion and reuse of policy has not been incorporated into the access control model of previ-
ous application-oriented schemes. Some schemes, such AppArmor, have policy languages 
that can convert from simple hierarchically contained abstractions to a flat list of rules to 
be enforced. However, unlike these schemes, FBAC can make access decisions based on    58 
these hierarchies, which means they can be activated or deactivated dynamically, as for-
malised in the process-functionality activation component. 
 
The hierarchical FBAC component is similar in concept to the hierarchical RBAC com-
ponent in its “general hierarchies” form. General RBAC hierarchies also allow multiple 
inheritance/containment of policy abstractions. FBAC hierarchies are distinct in that they 
use containment, where a functionality contains another in terms of privileges, and con-
tained functionalities can be deactivated (the method of activating and deactivating func-
tionalities is described later in Section 4.9). Whereas RBAC hierarchies can only be deac-
tivated from the highest level roles that are associated with users, contained roles cannot 
typically be deactivated individually. For this reason it is possible to describe RBAC hier-
archies as inheritance, since all the attributes of inherited roles are effectively transferred 
to the parent roles, whereas FBAC hierarchies are contained not inherited. This is a devia-
tion from the RBAC structure incorporated into the RBEE model, so as to allow greater 
run-time control over the functionality hierarchy. 
4.7  Parameterised FBAC Component 
FBAC is parameterised, allowing functionalities to adjust the resource descriptors of con-
tained privileges to adapt to application specific requirements and therefore allow access 
to resources required by particular applications. As illustrated in Figure 4.8, functionali-
ties can have multiple parameters. Application policies can then send arguments to those 
parameters when functionalities are assigned. Parameter arguments hold literal values, 
which are specified in an application policy or functionality. These values can be assigned 
to a parameter of a functionality in the application policy or to a contained functionality 
within a parent functionally. Functionalities can then use parameters in place of literal 
values as resource descriptors. Functionalities can therefore grant access to resources that 
can be defined when the functionality is assigned, allowing functionalities to be reused to 
grant access to different resources as needed.    59 
 
Figure 4.8: FBAC Component – Parameterised FBAC 
For example, a functionality named Standard_Graphical_Application could 
have a parameter called peruser_directory. The application policy firefox would then 
have the literal value “/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/” describing the resource requirements of 
that application, which it sends to Standard_Graphical_Application when it is 
associated  with  the  application.  Standard_Graphical_Application  can  then 
grant access to the parameter peruser_directory using a privilege that uses the parameter 
as a resource descriptor. Other functionalities such as Web_Browser would also be used 
and sent parameter arguments to customise these functionalities to the application. 
 
If functionality hierarchies are present (where functionalities contain other functionali-
ties), then parameters can also form hierarchical structures. This is shown in Figure 4.8 as 
dashed lines. Functionalities that contain other functionalities can send their parameters as 
arguments to contained functionalities’ parameters. So in the above example the Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application functionality can use another functionality such as 
dir_full_access  to  grant  the  necessary  access  by  passing  the  parameter  perus-
er_directory  as  a  parameter  argument  to  the  contained  functionality 
dir_full_access. These hierarchical functionality levels encapsulate details while 
providing flexible abstractions that can be fine-tuned to suit the diverse implementation 
details of related applications. 
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FBAC functionalities are therefore passed arguments in a fashion similar to subroutines in 
programming languages. This allows the policy abstraction to easily adapt to the differing 
details of applications providing related features. Functionalities contain other parameter-
ised functionalities and parameterised privileges; where privileges are computed at run-
time based on the arguments passed to privileges via functionalities. This hierarchical re-
lationship between functionalities allows arguments to propagate to any contained func-
tionality. 
4.7.1  Discussion of the Parameterised Component 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has demonstrated that the resource needs of 
programs can be related to behavioural classes and that applications can be restricted with 
some success based on the class of program along with parameters that describe the spe-
cific needs of a program [30]. FBAC combines this general approach with the functionali-
ty-based scheme described in the previous sections to provide a model that can restrict a 
process using multiple behavioural classes. Hierarchies improve policy by abstracting de-
tails while these abstractions are themselves parameterised to allow them to also adapt to 
the specific needs of the situation.  
 
While in RBAC it is usually adequate for all users in a specific role to have access to the 
exact same resources, it is not sufficient for all applications performing the same function 
to have access to the exact same resources. For example, applications typically store their 
configuration files in separate directories. The addition of parameterisation is therefore 
necessary in order to apply an RBAC-like structure to the context of behaviour-based re-
strictions. A few RBAC schemes have been proposed that incorporate some form of role 
parameterisation, such as those proposed by Giuri and Iglio [199] and by Yao et al. [200]. 
However, these schemes focus on using environmental constraints and object contents to 
limit the availability of privileges or roles to users. FBAC takes a new approach that is 
designed for the specific needs of application confinement, where abstractions can be 
used to grant different privileges based on the needs of applications, and can be layered to 
encapsulate details so that applications can be confined based on their high level features. 
Which are, in turn, modelled by parameterised lower level features. 
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Parameterisation significantly changes the semantics of the restriction and resolution of 
access decisions, and as such differentiates the RBAC and FBAC models substantially. 
RBAC roles are normally omnidirectional in the sense that it is equally demanding to de-
termine which users are assigned to a role and what permissions a role grants [73]. On the 
other hand, FBAC functionalities are unidirectional in the sense that it is easier to deter-
mine which functionalities are available to applications than to determine what privileges 
a functionality will grant. This design enables FBAC functionalities to be adjusted to the 
specific  needs  of  applications,  whereas  RBAC  roles  generally  only  provide  the  exact 
same privileges to each user assigned. 
 
This component has some notional similarities with subsequent work on access control 
policy  templates  [189],  where  policy  templates/abstractions  are  developed  separately 
from policy specification. However, the models, methods, and aims of the schemes are 
distinct. The scheme proposed by Johnson et al. aims to assist in generating domain spe-
cific structured lists for guided policy authoring, where as FBAC focuses on providing 
usable application-oriented controls and takes a different approach to policy development 
and specification (as described in subsequent chapters).  
4.8  FBAC User-Confinements Component 
The FBAC model is capable of simultaneously enforcing multiple application-oriented 
policies that apply to specific users. This is achieved by the FBAC User-Confinements 
Component described in this section. 
 
Using FBAC, mandatory controls can restrict users in terms of the applications they are 
allowed to execute and what those applications can subsequently do. Furthermore, by al-
lowing users to have discretion over some policies pertaining to their own applications, 
the model can also enforce discretionary controls that users can utilise to restrict their 
own processes. 
 
An FBAC confinement represents application restrictions that apply to specific users. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.9, each user can have multiple confinements that apply to them 
(shown as the right-side connection between User and Confinement). Each confinement 
also has users who are authorised to maintain the application policies, which involves ap-   62 
plication specification and association with functionalities. This is represented on the dia-
gram by the left-side connection between confinements and users. 
 
Figure 4.9: FBAC Component – User-Confinements 
Each confinement has a list of application policies that use functionalities available to the 
confinement. That is, the applications associated with a confinement can only be associat-
ed with functionalities from that confinement. Due to the reusability of functionalities, 
functionalities can be made available to multiple confinements and hence the many-to-
many relationship between the functionality and confinement element. 
 
As shown as a dashed rectangle in Figure 4.9, each confinement also has an attribute val-
ue applies_to_type; this allows the confinement to apply to all the users associated with 
the confinement (the value only), to all other users (except), or to all users (everyone). 
Each confinement also allows configuration of the policy that is to apply to processes that 
do not have a matching executable. This is specified using the no_profile value, which 
can take on of the following values: unconfined, confine_with_restricted_profile, or de-
ny_execution. In the unconfined case a child process is restricted by its parent’s policy.  
 
Creating mandatory restrictions involves creating confinements that apply to users whom 
are not also maintainers of that confinement. In terms of the previous figure, there is an    63 
‘applies to’ relationship between a User and a Confinement, but not a ‘maintained by’ re-
lationship. Usually mandatory confinements would be maintained by a security adminis-
trator, although other less likely configurations are possible such as allowing one normal 
user to specify the application restrictions of another user (such as for a colleague with 
less technical knowledge). Creating a discretionary control involves creating a confine-
ment that applies to a user who is also authorised to maintain the confinement. The user 
can then add application policies to that confinement to restrict programs. 
4.8.1  Discussion of the User-Confinements Component 
The  FBAC  user-confinements  component  describes  a  significant  aspect  of  the  FBAC 
model that is unique within the field of application-oriented access control: the simulta-
neous enforcement of multiple policies defined by multiple people with distinct security 
goals for the same process. The applies_to_type and the no_profile confinement attributes 
enable the administrator to configure a number of different types of restrictions. For ex-
ample, sets of users can be confined to using only particular programs. Other programs 
can  either  be  off  limits  (deny_execution),  or  severely  restricted  (con-
fine_with_restricted_profile).  Alternatively  a  more  targeted  approach  can  also  be 
achieved, where programs without policies are unconfined. The ‘maintained by’ relation-
ship between users and confinements allows administrators to authorise users to configure 
the application policies to also enforce their own security goals. These constructs can be 
utilised to enforce a number of diverse security policies, and can represent rules not easily 
enforced using previous schemes. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous application-oriented models were designed to enforce 
one policy, which is specified to enforce a particular security goal, for each process or 
program. Mechanisms are therefore designed to either provide a mandatory or a discre-
tionary control. For example, systems such as Janus [21], Systrace [20], and TRON [19] 
provide enforcement of discretionary user-defined process restrictions, and systems such 
as AppArmor [25], SELinux [24], and Linux DTE [81] are system-wide mandatory con-
trols defined by an administrator. These systems are therefore used to enforce separate 
goals. Discretionary application-oriented controls are used by users to protect their own 
resources from a malicious program. This ensures the program only accesses resources 
required to carry out the tasks the user wants it to. In contrast, mandatory controls are    64 
used by administrators to enforce system-wide security goals, ensuring that processes do 
not access resources that could lead to these goals being subverted: for example, the re-
striction of certain shared services such as web, ftp or local setuid programs. Both ap-
proaches have security benefits. However, providing both types of restrictions using pre-
vious models requires two separate mechanisms to be maintained. Even if the same model 
(for example, DTE) was implemented as both a mandatory and discretionary control, it 
would involve the redundancy of maintaining both types of controls entirely separately. 
 
On the other hand, FBAC is designed to provide both types of controls, and does so while 
reducing the overhead of enforcing multiple policies for a single process. The main policy 
unit (functionality) is reusable across confinements, which makes the task of maintaining 
low-level policy scale well to this situation. Users and administrators can reuse these ab-
stractions in any of the confinements they maintain to enforce their own security goals. 
Enforcement is achieved through the one model in one access decision procedure. 
 
Most application-oriented models and mechanisms do not consider the user identity when 
confining a process. Discretionary application-oriented controls typically only apply to a 
single user maintaining the restriction, while mandatory application-oriented controls typ-
ically apply the same set of rules for a program regardless of user-identity. The main ex-
ception to this is SELinux, which is a framework that combines multiple security models, 
including non-standard versions of RBAC and DTE. Roles define which domains users 
are authorised to transition into. SELinux policy takes the form of an extremely complex 
combination of a number of security models, which makes it hard to verify for correct-
ness and maintain [170]. FBAC provides user-specific restrictions using a single applica-
tion-oriented access control model that is designed to be easier to administer. 
4.9  FBAC Process-Functionality Activation Component 
Figure 4.10 shows the FBAC process-functionality activation component. Included in this 
figure are the process and task confinement elements, which associate policy with a run-
ning process. As shown in the figure, a user can run multiple processes. Each process is 
confined by all the task confinements that correspond (one-to-one) to any confinements 
that apply to the user. For example, if a user is restricted by two confinements (such as a 
mandatory and a discretionary confinement), then any process owned by that user would    65 
have two active corresponding task confinements. That is, each confinement that applies 
to a user is instantiated as a task confinement for each of their processes, and inherits the 
values of the confinement (applies_to_type and no_profile). If the process corresponds to 
an executable that matches an application policy that is associated with one of its task 
confinements,  then  the  task  confinement  has  a  one-to-one  association  with  the  corre-
sponding application policy (shown in the figure by the connection between Task Con-
finement and Application). 
 
Confinement process ancestry is represented by mapping task confinements to task con-
finements (children to parents). This relationship is shown in Figure 4.10 as the connec-
tion between the Task Confinement element and itself. This parent-child relationship is 
used to calculate privilege propagation and used in access control decision logic, as de-
scribed in subsequent sections.   
 
Figure 4.10: FBAC Component – Process-Functionality Activation    66 
 
For each task confinement, each of the functionalities associated with the application pol-
icy  are  instantiated  as  functionality  instances.  The  associations  between  task  confine-
ments and functionality instances represent which functionalities are active for a task con-
finement. By default, when a process is started, all its functionalities for each task con-
finement that apply to it are activated. However, this behaviour could be altered in the 
application’s policy to require manual user activation. Functionalities directly assigned to 
applications are activated by mapping functionality instances to task confinements (la-
belled in Figure 4.10 as “Active high level functionalities”). Inherited functionalities are 
activated by mapping functionality instances to other functionality instances (labelled as 
“Active hierarchical functionalities”). By default, when a functionality is activated, all in-
herited functionalities are also activated. Functionalities can be deactivated by severing 
these relationships, and reactivated by re-instantiating functionalities. Processes are only 
granted access to privileges via functionalities that are active.   
 
The functionalities associated with a task confinement can be dynamically activated and 
deactivated. Users who have discretion over policy (that is, they have a ‘maintained by’ 
relationship with the confinement, as described in the FBAC User-Confinements compo-
nent) can activate or deactivate them, while security aware software (i.e. the process it-
self) can only deactivate functionalities. This allows the rights of a process to be altered at 
run time by dynamic interaction. Users can limit the software to the behaviour the user 
wants the application to carry out at a point in time, while software can make itself resili-
ent to software vulnerabilities by restricting itself to only the functionalities it is currently 
performing. 
 
Users who have discretion over policy can deactivate functionalities associated with the 
corresponding task confinements. The functionalities may then be reactivated only by fur-
ther user intervention. Processes may also deactivate functionalities if they are FBAC-
aware. Although a process can drop functionalities, it can never reactivate them. Software 
authors can therefore limit the impact of vulnerabilities by dropping all functionalities 
other than those that represent the task a process is currently performing. For example, a 
program that can both act as an email client and a web browser could fork a process for 
performing web browsing and then deactivate the email client functionality. This behav-
iour would limit the impact of malicious code to within the permissions associated with    67 
web browsing and would not allow the browser to send emails if the browser component 
of the software was compromised. 
4.9.1  Discussion  of  the  Process-Functionality  Activation 
Component 
By allowing processes to further restrict themselves, FBAC enforces yet another type of 
restriction, application security, without introducing any management overhead to users 
or administrators. This restriction is another form of discretionary control, but from the 
perspective of the processes rather than the user. Other such restriction schemes include 
FreeBSD Jails, and chroot() [12], both of which allow a process to initiate one-way 
privilege declination. FBAC provides the functionality abstraction to processes, which 
makes managing privileges much simpler for the process than managing each privilege 
independently. FBAC also provides much greater control over privileges than namespace 
scope-limiting schemes such as Jails and chroot()or coarsely grained schemes such as 
Linux capabilities [152] or the Mac OS X sandbox API [88 pp. 156-178]. 
 
FBAC’s hierarchy of functionalities allows run-time intervention to dynamically deacti-
vate or activate branches of functionalities. This is similar to the concept of users restrict-
ed by an RBAC scheme, who may only wish to activate the roles that describe the part of 
their job description they are performing in order to mitigate the security risks involved in 
holding excess privileges. 
 
Although related to the idea of active roles in RBAC, the scheme for providing active 
functionalities in FBAC is distinctly different to the structure used by RBAC. RBAC uses 
the concept of sessions, a simple mapping between users and the roles they have activated 
[27]. Rather than simply providing a mapping between task confinements and functionali-
ties, FBAC introduces the concept of functionality instances, which allows functionalities 
to be dropped or activated from within a hierarchy. This level of dynamic control is not 
possible using RBAC. So although the FBAC model was developed in part from the 
RBAC model, FBAC allows greater dynamic control of policy than the RBAC model al-
lows. For example, a ‘Web Browser’ functionality could contain other functionalities that 
allow HTTP and FTP network access. Using FBAC, a web browser process could drop    68 
the ability to use FTP while still using HTTP. Using RBAC, only roles directly associated 
with a user can be activated, and any inherited roles are automatically also active. 
 
Because FBAC’s policy abstractions are hierarchical, small or large parts of the policy 
can be activated or deactivated at run time. This is not possible using existing application-
oriented access control models, such as DTE [83]/SELinux [24], RC [163], or AppArmor 
[25], as privileges are contained in a monolithic abstraction associated with the security 
context. Changing privileges using these models requires transitioning into another com-
plete set of privileges (domain, role, or profile respectively). FBAC provides greater dy-
namic control of active policy than any previous application-oriented access control. 
4.10  Complete FBAC Model Structure 
The FBAC model as a whole is made up of the previously described components and is 
shown in Figure 4.11. The following example demonstrates how the FBAC model ele-
ments relate to each other. The example also refers to the decision making process that 
the element relationships are used for; this aspect of the model is described more formally 
in Appendix C.     69 
 
Figure 4.11: The Complete FBAC Model 
The user Alice may have two confinements that apply to her: one that she maintains 
called “Alice’s_Discretionary”, and one that her system administrator put in place called 
“Staff_Mandatory”,  which  is  non-discretionary  and  applies  to  all  staff.  These  user-
confinement relationships – the confinements that apply and who manages them – are 
shown as the two arrows between Confinement and User. 
 
Alice and her administrator may have both created policies for the program Firefox. The 
application policies specify which executable files form part of the application (the arrow 
from Application policy to Executable) and which functionalities the program performs 
(the arrow to Functionality). By specifying parameters for functionalities (the arrow to    70 
Parameter Argument, which is for a particular Parameter), the administrator ensures that 
the program will only write to Alice’s home directory: so that if the program is exposed to 
malicious code it cannot alter other shared resources Alice has access to. Alice restricts 
the application further, granting access to particular directories within her home directory, 
such as a download directory and the applications configuration directory. 
 
When Alice executes the program, it’s path matches an executable specified in applica-
tion policies in both confinements and a process is created and the program starts. Two 
task confinements that correspond to the confinements that apply to Alice are created for 
that process. Each task confinement links to the application policy that it is confining the 
process as (the line between Task Confinement and Application policy). These task con-
finements represent the restrictions that are enforced for the process. The functionalities 
that apply to the application are associated with the task confinement when those func-
tionalities are active. If a functionality is deactivated, it is removed from this relationship 
and is no longer used to calculate what that process can do. 
 
When that process attempts to access a mediated resource (for example, it tries to write a 
file to disk), each task confinement is queried. Each task confinement authorises the ac-
tion based on the functionalities that are active and the process’s ancestry. If every task 
confinement allows the action then the request is allowed, otherwise it is rejected. 
4.11  Process Ancestry and Authority Propagation 
The FBAC model controls authority propagation between processes based on process an-
cestry and associated privileges. The FBAC model does not allow processes to discre-
tionarily delegate privileges to arbitrary processes.  
 
Each task confinement that applies to a process restricts propagation independently and, 
for an action to be allowed, every task confinement must permit the action. This section 
describes the propagation of authority within a single task confinement across processes. 
The way in which task confinements are combined to form the final authorisations for ap-
plications is described in Appendix C. 
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The FBAC model does not specify a complete list of operations, as operations can be im-
plementation-dependent so that implementations can take advantage of the granularity of 
the available security mediation interface. The complete list of operations defined by the 
FBAC-LSM mechanism is presented in Chapter 5. However, the FBAC model does spec-
ify a small number of operations, presented here, for controlling authority propagation. 
These operations are considered necessary for the model as they are involved in the deci-
sion logic for controlling authority based on process ancestry. 
 
In order for a process (A) to execute another (B) it must have a privilege that explicitly al-
lows this. An execute privilege is specified using one of the operations shown in Table 
4.1, along with a resource descriptor that specifies the programs that can be executed. The 
amount of authority granted to the executed program B depends on the operation used to 
grant the permission. 
 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the operations that control authority propagation. The pre-
fix “file_” simply denotes that the operations work on resources that are files, while 
those prefixed with “application_” operate on applications, allowing execution of any 
file that is an executable of the specified application. The resource descriptors used with 
any of these operations form privileges that specify the executable files or the other appli-
cation that the application is authorised to execute. 
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Table 4.1: FBAC Authority Propagation and Execute Operations 
Operations  Description 
Propagation of Authority When 




Normal case, where an application 
A executes another application B to 
help perform the functionalities the 
application performs. For example, 
using helper programs to perform 
subtasks. 
Subtractive propagation: 
A ¾ B 
file_execute_load_profile 
application_execute_load_profile 
When application A executes an-
other application B to perform other 






When application A executes a shell 
such as bash to execute other pro-
grams to help perform the function-
alities the application performs. 
Context copy: 
A 
Special case: the next propagation is 
always subtractive. 
file_execute_as_current_app 
Can be used when no profile exists 
for program B to allow B to run as 
A. This is equivalent to adding exe-
cutable B to application A, except 
that executable B is only considered 
part of application A when executed 





The way process task confinement privileges are combined is given in the right hand col-
umn, where A is the set of privileges that apply to the previous process task confinement. 
For example, if Firefox, a web browser, starts with its full application policy permissions 
(via  *_execute_load_profile)  and  uses  rm,  which  deletes  files  on  Unix,  (via 
*_execute) to remove a file, then rm has the permissions, Firefox ¾ rm. In the unlikely 
scenario that rm was authorised to run mv (via *_execute) then the previous permis-
sions A (Firefox ¾ rm) would be intersected with mv, giving Firefox ¾ rm ¾ mv. The re-
sult in this example is that Firefox can use rm to remove files that Firefox is authorised to 
remove, and rm could not use other programs (via *_execute) to do anything but re-
move files that Firefox is authorised to remove. 
 
The *_execute operations are used for the frequent situation where an application A ex-
ecutes another application B to help it carry out its features. In other words the subsequent 
application B acts within the bounds of what the first application A is allowed to do, but 
since the application B exists, application A uses it rather than reprogramming the task 
involved. Application B is restricted using subtractive propagation, where application B is 
restricted to an intersection of the permissions allowed to application A (the result of pre-   73 
vious propagation) and the policy allocated to application B. This propagation is safe and 
always further restrictive, never permissive. This allows an application policy for a pro-
gram such as rm to allow all file unlinks. However, when it is used by another application 
to remove files, it can only remove files that application could have removed itself. 
 
The *_execute_load_profile operations are used when an application needs to start 
a dissimilar application, that is, an application whose resource needs are distinctly differ-
ent. Application B is allowed the full permissions afforded to the corresponding applica-
tion policy. This is roughly analogous to allowing a domain transition in DTE. There is an 
inherent security risk involved as propagation is not necessarily restrictive: propagation 
can grant program B authority that program A does not have. Therefore these operations 
should be used with caution and with well thought out security goals. Examples of when 
these operations would be used are for a launcher program, which starts applications with 
their full policies, and for a web browser that is allowed to start a program such as a word 
processor to view downloaded files. In each case the interactions that are authorised be-
tween applications using these operations need to be carefully considered.  
 
The file_execute_as_current_app operation restricts the subsequent application B 
to the same security context as the parent application A. This is similar to adding an exe-
cutable to an application, except that the executable file B is only considered as part of 
application A when an executable from application A executes it. 
 
The  *_execute_shell  operations  are  used  for  the  special  case  of  an  application 
launching a shell through which other programs are executed to carry out the tasks of the 
first application. This is a common occurrence on Linux systems as programs often start 
other helper programs via the bash shell. The shell is restricted using the policy of appli-
cation A, similar to the behaviour resulting from the file_execute_as_current_app 
operation. However, a special condition applies: when the shell starts another application, 
propagation is always restrictive. That is, in this case *_execute_load_profile is 
treated as *_execute. This design allows the policy for a shell to authorise full profile 
loading of applications when run as a launcher via *_execute_load_profile, and 
when used by other applications with *_execute_shell it acts as a helper, which is a 
safe and restrictive approach.    74 
 
Figure 4.12 illustrates some example process ancestries (including the Firefox → rm → 
mv example above) and the resulting authorised permissions. 
 
When granted multiple privileges to execute the same program, the following order of 
predominance applies. 
1.  file_execute_as_current_app 
2.  file_execute_shell or application_execute_shell 
3.  file_execute_load_profile or application_execute_load_profile 
4.  file_execute or application_execute 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Hypothetical Authority Propagation Example 
This ordering allows special cases (with higher privilege) to overwrite general cases. For 
example,  an  application  may  be  allowed  to  run  any  program  in  “/bin/*”  with 
file_execute,  except  in  the  special  case  of  “/bin/bash”,  which  is  run  with 
file_execute_shell. This order is designed to simplify policy specification as special 
cases override common cases. Otherwise in the example above the file_execute oper-
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cutable would have to be specified separately because the “/bin/bash” special case would 
otherwise  be  overridden.  Similarly  the  file_execute_as_current_app  and 
*_execute_load_profile operations are special cases, which are to be used seldom 
with careful consideration. 
 
On modern systems, programs are not always in the form of natively executable files. 
Scripted and interpreted languages such as bash scripts, Perl and Python, and frameworks 
such as Java and .NET often have a process interpreting and working on behalf of a sepa-
rately stored program. For this reason FBAC includes an additional operation that grants a 
program the right to work on behalf of another. The interpreter (A) can then assume the 
privileges of an application (B) in one of two ways: the interpreter can signal to the access 
control mechanism that it wishes to do so, or the interpreter can access the file with exe-
cute permission. Doing the latter automatically initiates the procedure. The resulting priv-
ilege is still subject to the privilege propagation rules previously described. 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the privilege granted to the interpreter’s application policy is the 
operation  file_execute_as_interpreted  or  applica-
tion_execute_as_interpreted with a resource descriptor that defines the file or 
application that is to be interpreted.  
Table 4.2: FBAC privilege interpreter operation 
Operations  Description 
Resulting Privilege When Applica-
tion A Interprets Application B 
file_execute_as_interpreted 
application_execute_as_interpreted 
Allows  application  A  to  interpret 
and act using to privileges of appli-
cation B. 
Additive 
A ¿ B 
 
For example, Java may be given the permission to interpret all .class files. An rm.class 
Java program that deletes files could be created and that class file could be added to the 
executables of the rm application policy. Then, when Java accessed the rm.class file, Java 
would assume the privileges of the rm application and be allowed to delete files. Howev-
er, the process ancestry that led to the execution of Java would restrict which files Java 
could delete. Returning to the Firefox example, if Firefox executed Java via *_execute, 
then Java could only access the .class files that Firefox could execute. When Java exe-
cutes rm.class its privileges would become Java ¿ rm, which when combined with the    76 
fact Java was started by Firefox, becomes Firefox ¾ (Java ¿ rm). Consequently the in-
terpreted rm program may still only delete files that Firefox can delete. Note that the 
Linux kernel is aware of certain interpreters, and is therefore able to identify a process in 
terms of the file being  interpreted. Therefore, the FBAC-LSM implementation avoids 
having to implement this part of the FBAC model, and instead assigns additional func-
tionalities to interpreted programs, which enable the interpreters to function. 
4.11.1  Discussion of FBAC Privilege Propagation 
The FBAC scheme for privilege propagation and process ancestry is unique within the 
field of application-oriented access controls. As discussed in Chapter 2, isolation-based 
schemes typically do not perform security context changes and consequently all children 
are isolated to the same resources. Rule-based controls typically allow different applica-
tions to be restricted using separate policies that are applied when they are executed. 
When processes start, most rule-based application-oriented access control schemes (for 
example, AppArmor, SELinux, and DTE) consult the active policy and either keep the 
parent’s security context for the new process or transition to being confined by a separate 
policy. Unfortunately, with discrete policies it is difficult to verify that all the authorised 
policy transitions are safe [201]. Transitions can lead to the confused deputy problem, 
where a program can launch and influence another more privileged program in order to 
exceed its own authority [121]. The FBAC-LSM scheme simplifies the security sensitivi-
ty of many of these interactions by preferring an intersection approach, where each helper 
process (such as one of the common Unix commands) is confined to the intersection of its 
own authority and that of the program(s) it is acting on the behalf of. In this case it is safe 
to allow the parent processes to influence the child process, and the child can be confined 
to specific behaviour, rather than allowing it the excess authority of either the parent or 
child policy. This concept was illustrated by the Firefox/rm example in the previous sec-
tion. 
 
The  FBAC-LSM  privilege  propagation  approach  is  related  to  stack  inspection,  a  lan-
guage-based security feature of Java and .NET. Stack inspection is used in the context of 
application virtualisation to restrict the actions of untrusted code modules within a virtual 
machine [202, 203]. Access rights are the intersection of the authority of all the frames on 
the stack. Therefore a malicious module cannot perform operations it is not authorised to.    77 
Trusted code can optionally assert responsibility for use of some permissions, thus over-
riding the inspection of its callers: for example, to grant additional privileges [204]. Stack 
tracing has some notional similarities with the FBAC-LSM privilege propagation scheme. 
In both schemes intersection is performed by inspecting the invocation history; in the case 
of stack inspection this is the method call history, for FBAC-LSM it is the process ances-
try history. Also in both schemes intersection is overridden when necessary; for stack in-
spection this involves enabling privileges, for FBAC-LSM this involves making exe-
cute_as_current_app transitions. Although the work is related and therefore note-
worthy, the specifics and purpose are distinct. 
 
The Singularity operating system incorporates process invocation history in its system-
wide access control scheme [205]. Process identities are represented using text strings, 
which include the complete process ancestry, and can be used in access decisions to con-
fine applications by pattern matching against the invocation history. TOMOYO provides 
an invocation history-based application-oriented access  control for  Linux. However, a 
separate policy is defined for each different invocation string that is allowed, meaning a 
single program may require many separate policies if it is executed by a number of sepa-
rate programs [167]. Neither of these systems currently enforce the intersection of poli-
cies for separate programs. 
4.12  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a novel rule-based application-oriented access control model, 
FBAC, that confines processes based on application policies constructed using reusable 
and adaptable policy abstractions known as functionalities. Processes can simultaneously 
be subject to restrictions, known as confinements, that can enforce mandatory and discre-
tionary application policies specified by separate users.  
 
As discussed, the FBAC model has many features unique within the field of application-
oriented access controls, including: 
·  hierarchical policy primitives; 
·  parameterised policy abstractions that can be combined and layered; 
·  simultaneous enforcement of multiple security goals/sets of policies, which can 
enforce a diverse range of types of application restrictions;    78 
·  dynamic activation and deactivation of logically grouped portions of a processes 
authority; 
·  process invocation history intersection-based privilege propagation. 
 
FBAC is designed to provide application confinement that is functionality-based in na-
ture, capable of modelling high level security goals for application restrictions, with ab-
stractions that encapsulate low level policy details. This design separates the task of spec-
ifying application-functionality associations from the more involved task of specifying 
security rules for classes of programs.  
 
The remainder of this thesis presents an implementation of the FBAC model, including 
techniques for providing this type of access control, and evaluates the success of the 
model and mechanism, analysing its ability to model and enforce the needs of applica-
tions and studying the usability benefits of the scheme. Chapter 5 introduces the Linux 
implementation, FBAC-LSM.    79 
Chapter 5  The FBAC-LSM Mechanism: Goals, 
Design, and Implementation 
 
“ 
Talk is cheap. Show me the code.  
Linus Torvalds to the Linux kernel mailinglist, 2000 [206]  ” 
 
 
5.1  Chapter Introduction 
A prototype mechanism implementing the FBAC model has been designed and built. The 
mechanism is known as FBAC-LSM and is implemented for the Linux operating system. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe the implementation in some detail. The implementation is, 
in and of itself, an artefact of this research intended to be a contribution to the field. 
FBAC-LSM  is  available  as  free  open  source  software  at  http://schreuders.org/FBAC-
LSM [207]. 
 
This chapter describes the scope and goals of the implementation, as well as major design 
and implementation details. These include the way privileges are represented within the 
FBAC-LSM access control mechanism, such as the choice of name-based pattern match-
ing for resource descriptors, the operations available to grant privileges, and how the 
FBAC model structure is represented internally within FBAC-LSM. 
5.2  Scope and Goals 
The goal of the implementation is to act as a proof of concept and to facilitate evaluation 
of the FBAC model. FBAC-LSM therefore aims to implement the FBAC model, such 
that it restricts existing programs to authorised actions and prevents malicious behaviour. 
As improved usability is a major objective of this research, the user interface aims to lev-
erage the FBAC model constructs to provide policy construction with ease of use. 
 
Due to time constraints, the implementation does not aim to provide complete coverage, 
is not fully optimised for performance, and is not verified to be error free. Although most    80 
aspects of the FBAC model were implemented, some less important aspects were not. 
Support for security-aware applications to drop functionalities has not yet been fully im-
plemented. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 4, program interpreter support was not imple-
mented since the Linux kernel provided features that made this operation unessential. 
FBAC-LSM was limited to protecting files, directories and networking resources. Devel-
opment  of  FBAC-LSM  continues,  and  in  many  cases  completing  omitted  features  is 
straightforward; however, these continuing developments are, for the most part, outside 
the scope of this thesis
9. 
5.3  Platform Design Decisions 
This section briefly describes the platform design decisions leading to development and 
lays the foundation of the description of how FBAC-LSM works and how it is imple-
mented.  
5.3.1  Operating System, Kernel, and Access Control Extensions 
FBAC-LSM, is implemented for the Linux operating system and, as the name implies, a 
main component is a Linux security module (LSM). Linux was chosen as the deployment 
platform because it is an open source platform that is security-extendable, and is a widely 
used feature-rich operating system with many deployed applications.  
 
Although other operating systems also allow third party security additions, these typically 
impose restrictions in the type and method of addition. For example, security additions to 
Windows are limited to the capabilities allowed by the development interfaces such as fil-
ter  drivers,  and  access  to  kernel  internals  is  restricted
10.  Experimental,  research,  and 
teaching kernels – such as Minix [208, 209], Hurd [135], Coyotos [210], L4 [211], and 
Singularity [205] – were not chosen because they have limited application ecosystems, 
often do not provide a stable platform for application testing and profiling, and because 
mainstream operating systems require and benefit from security enhancements [212].  
 
                                                 
9 Some of these are discussed in the Future Work section of Chapter 13. 
10 Also, at the time development of FBAC-LSM began, Windows Vista had not yet been released (or the 
subsequent Windows releases). The prospect of changing development environments to keep up with the 
impending Windows architecture changes was avoided, as this could have slowed development.    81 
Being open source, Linux enables great freedom in development of novel security tech-
niques, and is a popular choice for research in the area of application-oriented restrictions 
[81, 93, 112, 157, 173, 176, 213]. A number of security frameworks exist that can serve 
as a development interface for the addition of new access control models for Linux. These 
include SELinux, an LSM which makes its decisions based on a combination of models 
[172], Rule-Set Based Access Control (RSBAC), which is an out-of-tree kernel modifica-
tion that also combines access control models [214], and the LSM interface itself, which 
can be used by new security modules directly [215]. Extending existing frameworks and 
adding new security features directly into the kernel via modification are also possible. 
 
The  LSM  interface  was  chosen  over  the  alternative  methods  for  developing  security 
mechanisms for Linux for the following reasons. Although SELinux and RSBAC can be 
extended with additional security models, the goals of FBAC intersect with SELinux’s 
use of DTE and RSBAC’s use of RC, for confining particular programs. Adding models 
to these systems increases their complexity, and this would particularly be the case if the 
goals of the models they already enforce are similar. Also SELinux does not support 
name-based access controls, which is a major aspect of this implementation.  
 
Having to make extensive changes to the main kernel code to add access controls is a 
complex task, and is not encouraged. The LSM interface was designed specifically to re-
duce the need for access control mechanisms to make modifications to existing kernel 
code. LSM provides hooks that are called from points in the kernel code to check whether 
the Linux security module (LSM) that is in effect allows particular actions to take place. 
As the FBAC model is structurally substantially different from those used in other LSMs 
(such as AppArmor, SELinux, SMACK and TOMOYO) development was implemented 
as a new LSM. The LSM extensions provided by AppArmor were used to provide name-
based mediation. 
5.3.2  Programming Languages and Design Paradigms 
The programming languages used to implement FBAC-LSM were largely determined by 
the platform. All Linux kernel code, including LSM modules, is written in C. As C is a 
naturally procedural language, the FBAC-LSM module is mostly procedural, although    82 
some minimal object-orientation was achieved by including pointers to functions in struc-
tures that also contain data. 
 
The elements of the FBAC model are represented in C code using structures (struct). 
Pointers form an efficient yet programmatically complex relationship between structures 
that hold data pertaining to elements in the model. Relationships between elements are 
mapped  using  pointers  to  related  structures.  This  internal  policy  representation  is  de-
scribed later in Appendix D.2. An alternative approach using a relational database would 
have added too much overhead to have in the kernel and to rely on for security, and 
would not allow the flexibility to perform the parameterisation optimisations described 
later in Section 5.6. 
 
Numerous frameworks exist for creating GUIs in Linux [131, 132, 135, 216]. The Qt 
framework is used for all the graphical elements of the FBAC-LSM mechanism. Qt appli-
cations are programmed primarily in C++. The ‘policy manager’ GUI program, which is a 
part of FBAC-LSM, exists as a user-land policy tool. The front-end is coded in object-
oriented C++, while the back-end is coded in C.  
5.4  Name-Based Pattern Matching 
As described in Chapter 4, the FBAC model may be implemented as either label-based or 
name-based. The FBAC-LSM implementation mediates access by means of name-based 
controls. Using name-based mediation, resources are protected based on their names ra-
ther than via labels attached to objects. For example, access to files is mediated in terms 
of their pathnames rather than the names of labels associated with the files. Examples of 
other name-based mechanisms are AppArmor [25] and TOMOYO [217], while SELinux 
[218] and SMACK [219] are examples of label-based LSMs. Some access control model 
specifications, such as traditional MAC [11] and DTE [161], specify that they are imple-
mented as label-based mechanisms. FBAC allows the model to be implemented either 
way; the type of mediation used by the FBAC model is not defined by the FBAC specifi-
cation in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the two methods. Part a shows label-based mediation where a label 
is applied to each resource. Access to an object is restricted based on the label that has    83 
been applied. Therefore, to access the resource, the subject must have permission to ac-
cess the corresponding label name. Multiple objects can be labelled with the same label 
name, in which case they are treated the same way by the access control. Typically each 
resource is assigned a single label. Part b shows name-based mediation, where each re-
source has at least one name that identifies it. Access is restricted based on the name, 
where the subject must be authorised to access a pattern that matches the name of the ob-
ject the subject is attempting to access. As illustrated in the figure by the arrow between 
‘Name’ and ‘Resource’, with name-based controls a resource may have multiple names. 
Access is mediated based on the name used to access the resource. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Object Mediation – a) Label-based b) Name-based 
Name-based mediation is used by FBAC-LSM because it provides conceptual simplicity, 
as security is defined in terms of concepts users are familiar with, rather than associations 
with labels, which are less familiar to users. Using pathnames allows access to be granted 
based on pathname patterns such as “/home/bob/**.html”, which would grant access to 
any HTML files in Bob’s home directory. The syntax for FBAC-LSM pattern matching is 
described later in this section. Granting the same access via labels is a considerably more 
complex task; all HTML files would need to be assigned an identical label, and the crea-
tion of new files or the renaming of files would require files to be relabelled. Therefore, 
due  to  these  management  advantages,  name  patterns  are  used  as  FBAC  resource  de-
scriptors in FBAC-LSM. The granularity of these resource descriptors thus ranges from a 
group of files matching a pattern down to that of an individual file name. 
 
Name-based protection also provides the flexibility of centrally managed access control 
policy, as distinct from the management of files. Also, the needs of specific applications    84 
can be described in terms of resources that overlap with the needs of other applications, 
and policies can be defined by multiple users, without the overhead of managing multiple 
labels for each resource. For these reasons, FBAC is believed to be well suited to a name-
based implementation. However, a label-based implementation (although more complex) 
would also be possible. 
5.4.1  Resource Pattern Matching 
Resource descriptors in FBAC-LSM take the form of simple patterns that describe re-
sources.  The  types  of  patterns  currently  available  in  FBAC-LSM  are  protocols,  path-
names, IPs, and ports. The implemented wildcard patterns are described in Table 5.1. 
These provide support for describing multiple files, directories, IPv4 IPs, and ports using 
pattern matching techniques.  
Table 5.1: FBAC-LSM Wildcard Pattern Matching 
Pathname Wildcard Pattern  Matches 
*  Any sequence of valid characters excluding “/” 
**  Any sequence of valid characters including “/” 
#  Any sequence of integers 
 
IPv4 Wildcard Pattern  Matches 
*  Any integer 1-255. Eg 192.168.0.* 
 
Port Wildcard/Range Pattern  Matches 
*  Any port 1-65535 
x-y  Any  port  within  the  range  x-y.  E.g.  “5-7”  would  match 
ports: 5, 6, 7. 
 
Briefly, these patterns can describe resources in the following ways. Files and directories 
can have asterisks to match any valid characters in a pathname. “**” allows “/” to be in-
cluded, which means that subdirectories can be included, while “*” does not. For exam-
ple, “/home/user/*.html” would match any .html files in the user’s home directory, but 
not in subdirectories, while “/home/user/**.html” also matches any .html files in any sub-
directories such as “/home/user/web/index.html”. This is designed to be similar to Ap-
pArmor’s wildcard file matching. IP matching is very simple where a direct IPv4 address 
can be used, or an octet can be replaced with an asterisk, which can represent any num-
ber. Ports can either be a particular number, all “*”, or a range such as “6667-7000”. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows an example of patterns that match the names that mediate access to a file. 










Figure 5.2:  Name-based File Mediation 
The way these name-based resource descriptors are specified in the FBAC-LSM policy 
language is defined later in Chapter 7. 
5.4.2  Advantages and Weaknesses of Name-based Mediation 
As  described  earlier,  the  advantages  of  name-based  mediation  are  that  policy  can  be 
maintained centrally, it is defined in terms of concepts that are familiar to most users, and 
groups of resources can be described using wildcards. Using label-based mediation re-
quires every protected resource to be labelled with security information, which must be 
updated whenever a security policy is changed and when a file is created or altered (and 
depending on your security goals, when the file is moved)
11. Name-based mediation poli-
cy therefore can be maintained with less overhead. A potential disadvantage of name-
based mediation is that deny rules cannot guarantee that an object cannot be accessed, 
since typically it is possible for multiple names to refer to a single object. FBAC only us-
es positive permissions, which is consistent with the fail-safe defaults design principle 
[177] and avoids this potential problem as deny rules are not used. Also, to avoid renam-
ing that could circumvent the policies in place, in order to create links to files or directo-
ries FBAC-LSM requires programs to have write privileges to both the old name and new 
name, and that they also have create privileges to the new name. 
                                                 
11 The overheads of label-based mediation may be justified in situations that require information flow guar-
antees, such as military use.    86 
5.5  Operations and Coverage 
As described in Chapter 4, FBAC operations are used to grant access to resource de-
scriptors and are implementation dependent. The granularity of FBAC-LSM’s operations 
corresponds to the granularity of the LSM interface. This provides finely grained control 
over resources with individual operations for types of resources and types of access. Ta-
ble 5.2 lists all the operations included in FBAC-LSM. The “Resource Type” column 
shows which of the previously described resource pattern matches are applied for each 
operation. Due to time constraints, some of the operations less important for evaluation 
were not completed and are currently still in development as noted in the “status” column. 
Currently FBAC-LSM operations mediate access to files, directories and the network.  
 
Read access to directories is not restricted for the following reasons. FBAC-LSM aims to 
restrict malicious code from making writes or reads to files or the network, but is not fo-
cused on enforcing information flow properties or completely isolating applications. Also, 
many programs with graphical interfaces require access to directory reads. Therefore the 
threat posed by directory reads is considered negligible, and mediation is unnecessary. 
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Table 5.2: FBAC-LSM Operations 
Operation 
Resource 
Type  Descriptors  Mediates access to the ability to:  Status 
file_read  file  File to read  Read access to the file  Implemented 
file_write  file  File to write  Write access to the file  Implemented 
file_create  file  Files to create  Allows the creation of files with the-
se names  Implemented 
file_append  file  File to append to  Append to a file  Implemented 
file_unlink  file  File to delete (unlink)  Delete a file  Implemented 
file_rename  file, file  "File to rename", "al-
lowed new names"  Rename a file  Implemented 
file_setattr  file or di-
rectory  File to set attributes  Set the attributes of a file such as 
owner, and DAC permissions  Implemented 
file_lock  file  File to lock  Lock a file  Implemented 
file_execute  file 
File to execute with the 
intersection of privileges 
of load profile and cur-
rent app 
Execute with subtractive propaga-
tion  Implemented 
file_execute_load_profile  file  File to execute with their 
full policies  Execute with context transition  Implemented 
file_execute_as_current_app  file  File to execute within the 
current app profile  Execute with context copy  Implemented 
file_execute_shell  file 
File to execute as a shell, 
which is used to launch 
programs 
Execute with context copy, with the 
special case that the next propaga-
tion is always subtractive. 
Implemented 
file_mmap  file  File to memory map as 
executable  Map file into memory and execute  Implemented 
fs_mount  none  N/A  Mount filesystems  Implemented 
fs_umount  none  N/A  Unmount filesystems  Implemented 
system_control  none  N/A  Examine and dynamically change 
kernel parameters  Implemented 
dir_write  directory  Directory to write  Write to directory  Implemented 
dir_rmdir  directory  Directory to delete  Delete directory  Implemented 





"Protocol in", "remote 
hosts", "remote ports 
(number format)", "local 
ports (number format)" 
Network connects that are initiated 





"Protocol out", "remote 
hosts", "remote ports 
(number format)", "local 
ports (number format)" 
Network connects that are initiated 
locally  Implemented 
file_ioctl  file  File representing the de-
vice to control  Manage devices  Incomplete 
file_getattr  file or di-
rectory  File to access attributes  Read the attributes of a file  Incomplete 
network_share_socket_with_app  pattern  Application (name) to 
share sockets with 
Share network sockets with another 
application  Incomplete 
communicate_with_application  pattern  Applications to send sig-
nals to 
Inter-Process Communication (IPC) 
with another application  Incomplete 
 
 
Currently network access is restricted based on stateful packet filters. FBAC-LSM could 
be improved by extending its capabilities with third generation firewall features like ap-
plication layer protocol analysis and filtering, to detect whether the traffic on particular 
ports corresponds with the expected protocol and that the protocol is being used correctly.    88 
5.6  Functionality Parameters and Arguments 
As discussed earlier in the description of the FBAC model in Chapter 4, when a function-
ality is associated with an application or another functionality, functionalities can be used 
to grant access to resources defined via parameters. To achieve this, parameters can be 
defined in a functionality’s definition. Rather than using literal string patterns, parameters 
can be used to describe the resources to grant. A parameter can be used in place of a lit-
eral resource descriptor for a privilege, to grant access to the resources described by the 
arguments “passed” to the functionality. A parameter can also be used as an argument to 
another  functionality’s  parameter,  in  which  case  the  value  passed  to  the  functionality 
propagates from its parameter to another functionality’s parameter.  
 
The FBAC model logic presented in Appendix C includes an algorithm for resolving pa-
rameters  individually.  The  FBAC-LSM  implementation  takes  an  optimised  approach 
where, when a process starts, all parameters are resolved
12. This approach is taken so that 
these computationally expensive queries do not occur for every parameterised privilege 
for every access decision. When a confined process starts, the literal values specified in 
the application policy are propagated into the associated functionalities, and recursively 
any parameters of contained functionalities are used to transform privileges, which are 
defined in terms of parameters, into literal resource descriptors. Thereafter access deci-
sions simply involve matching against privileges. This is further described later in Chap-
ter 6 in the description of the FBAC-LSM module. 
5.7  Functionality Levels 
FBAC-LSM categorises functionalities into levels for ease of use and management. These 
levels are high-level, base-level, and low-level. High level functionalities describe high 
level goals of applications; that is, what applications are supposed to do. Examples of 
high  level  functionalities  include:  Web_Browser,  Web_Server,  and  Mu-
sic_Player. Base-level functionalities describe the way the application interacts with 
users:  for  example,  Standard_Graphical_Application,  or  Sim-
ple_Commandline_Program.  High-level  and  base-level  functionalities  typically 
contain low-level functionalities. 
                                                 
12 This could be further optimised by pre-calculating propagation before processes start.    89 
 
Low-level functionalities group related operations and are used to describe lower level 
features  or  access.  This  can  include  functionalities  such  as  http_client  and 
ftp_client that define tasks performed by the program and would typically contain 
other low-level functionalities to define the actual access to resources. Rather than direct-
ly containing all the necessary privileges within a functionality, privileges are typically 
assigned via the use of low-level functionalities that group related privileges. For exam-
ple, the file_r functionality grants read access to file contents and attributes by con-
taining the file_read and file_getattr operations that are applied to a parameter. Other low 
level  functionalities  such  as  file_rw  contain  other  low  level  functionalities:  in  this 
case, file_r and file_w functionalities. In this way, low-level functionalities can act 
as abbreviated ACLs, a list of accesses that are allowed on a specific resource. 
 
There are no restrictions that prohibit high-level or base-level functionalities from directly 
including privileges. However, the layered hierarchy described here takes advantage of 
the ability of FBAC to abstract and encapsulate policy details by using lower level func-
tionalities. Also functionality levels are used to make functionalities easier for users to 
use, and are used to simplify user interaction when managing policy. 
5.8  Shared Code 
As alluded to earlier, components of FBAC-LSM share code in common. The most im-
portant aspect of this shared code is the way in which policy is represented internally. The 
fbac.h file contains C structures (structs), many of which represent FBAC model ele-
ments. The mapping between elements is represented with pointers to the contained ele-
ments. Many-to-many relationships are represented with arrays of pointers, typically with 
an accompanying integer that keeps track of the length of the array used. These structures 
form the basis of internal policy representation. Appendix D describes the way that policy 
is represented internally by FBAC-LSM and also gives a brief overview of the organisa-
tion of the shared code.    90 
5.9  Additional Non-Model Features 
Except for the scope limitations described at the beginning of this chapter, FBAC-LSM 
stays faithful to the FBAC model. However, a slight addition to the implementation al-
lows application policies to include privileges directly. This allows flat, non-hierarchical 
policies to also be constructed for FBAC-LSM such as those used by alternative schemes 
such as AppArmor, and enables additional privileges to complement those granted by 
functionalities. The degree to which direct privileges are required in the construction of 
application policies is used in Chapter 8 as a metric for assessing the ability of FBAC to 
model the resource requirements of applications using functionalities. 
 
FBAC-LSM also allows the same application policies to be configured to be included in 
multiple confinements by specifying the same application policy location for confine-
ments. This technique is used to reuse functionalities, a characteristic described in the 
FBAC model, which is a useful feature. However, reusing the same application policies 
multiple times for a single process is unlikely to be useful and the possibility is merely an 
artefact of the fact that policy is stored in files on disk. 
5.10  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a number of aspects of the design of FBAC-LSM, which is an 
implementation of the FBAC model created as a proof of concept and to assess the FBAC 
model. The description has included the scope and goals of FBAC-LSM, the platform 
employed, privilege modelling details such as pattern matching and operations, and im-
plementation details of functionality hierarchies and parameterisation. 
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 6, the software components that make up FBAC-LSM are 
discussed. Subsequently, Chapter 7 completes the description of the FBAC-LSM mecha-
nism by discussing policy representation.    91 
Chapter 6  FBAC-LSM Software Components: 
The Trusted Computing Base 
 
“ 
What a thing was this, too, which that mighty man wrought and endured in 
the carven horse, wherein all we chiefs of the Argives were sitting, bearing 
to the Trojans death and fate!  
Homer, Odyssey: Book 4, 7th or 8th Century BCE [216]  ” 
 
 
6.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter describes the FBAC-LSM trusted computing base (TCB)
13. The TCB is re-
sponsible for managing and enforcing the FBAC model security scheme and is made up 
of a number of privileged software components: a Linux security module (LSM) residing 
in kernel-space and some tools in user-space. This chapter describes these components of 
FBAC-LSM, including their purposes, relation to one another, use, and implementation. 
6.2  Components Overview 
FBAC-LSM is made up of the following software components: the LSM module, policy 
server, and policy manager. Figure 6.1 illustrates the interaction between these compo-
nents. 
 
Briefly, the purposes of these components are as follows. The policy manager is respon-
sible for feeding the policy, which is stored on disk, into the LSM. The policy manager is 
a graphical tool for users and administrators to manage policy, it affects the stored policy, 
and can also feed policy into the LSM. When a process attempts to access a resource (via 
a system call to the kernel), the LSM is queried and it makes and enforces the access con-
trol decision. In the following sections, each of these components is described in more de-
tail, followed by an explanation of the way policy is represented internally within the 
components. 
                                                 
13 The entire Linux kernel is technically a part of the TCB. However, only the software components of 
FBAC-LSM are considered relevant to this description.    92 
 
 
Figure 6.1: FBAC-LSM architecture 
6.3  Policy Server 
The policy server is responsible for reading in all configuration and policy files, parsing 
those files, and sending policy to the LSM. This is necessary because the kernel does not 
directly access files on a filesystem. The policy server therefore sends policy as com-
mands sent via a securityfs virtual file system (VFS) created by the LSM. The policy 
server is included in system start-up and can be re-run whenever policy needs to be re-
loaded. 
6.3.1  FBAC-LSM Virtual File System (FBAC-LSM-VFS) 
The FBAC-LSM virtual filesystem (FBAC-LSM-VFS) is mounted by the policy server at 
“/sys/kernel/security/fbac-lsm”. The FBAC-LSM-VFS is made up of a number of files, 
some of which, when written to, send information to the LSM. Others receive information 
from the LSM. The files that are used to send commands to the LSM are: ‘load_type’, 
‘load_command’,  ‘load_line’,  ‘load_applies_to’,  ‘load_confinement_name’,  and 
‘load_commit’. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the purpose of each. These commands are 
used to load policy into the LSM.    93 
Table 6.1: FBAC-LSM-VFS Files for Receiving Policy 
Filename  Description 
load_type 
Sets the type of information and command being sent. When sending policy 
information it refers to either a “confinement”, “application” or “functionali-
ty”. 
load_command  The command that defines what to do. The complete list of commands is de-
fined in Table 6.2 to Table 6.4. 
load_line  Provides the information used to carry out the command.  
load_applies_to  If the command sets information about an existing policy element then the 
name of the confinement, application or functionality is sent to this file. 
load_confinement_name  If load_type is application or functionality then the confinement that contains 
them is specified here. 
load_commit  Either “commit” or “reset”. Applies or resets the command. 
 
For  example,  to  create  a  new  application  with  the  name  “apple”  in  the  confinement 
“Fruit_DAC” the policy server would send: 
·  load_type:      “application” 
·  load_command:    “new_application” 
·  load_line:      “apple” 
·  load_applies_to:    “ ” 
·  load_confinement_name:  “Fruit_DAC” 
·  load_commit:      “commit” 
 
To add an executable, “/bin/apple”, to that application, the policy server would send: 
·  load_type:      “application” 
·  load_command:    “executablepaths” 
·  load_line:      “/bin/apple” 
·  load_applies_to:    “apple” 
·  load_confinement_name:  “Fruit_DAC” 
·  load_commit:      “commit” 
 
The list of commands used to load profiles is presented from Table 6.2 to Table 6.4. The-
se same commands are also used internally within the policy server and policy manager to 
maintain internal state. In addition to access authorisation policy, these commands there-
fore also load aspects of policy to do with policy maintenance. 
 
As  the  policy  server  reads  policy  in,  it  sends  the  appropriate  commands  via  the 
send_command function, which has the following interface:    94 
void send_command(char *type, char *command, char *line,  
char *applies_to, char *confinement_name); 
 
Table 6.2: Confinement Building Commands 
Command  Description 
new application_confinement  Creates a new confinement. 
active_state  Sets the active state of a confinement. 
application_profiles  Sets the file or directory location of application policies. 
functionality_profiles  Sets the file or directory location of functionality profiles. 
only_applies_to_users  Sets the users the confinement applies to (overwrites 
does_not_apply_to_users or applies_to_everyone). 
does_not_apply_to_users  Sets the users the confinement does not apply to (overwrites on-
ly_applies_to_users or applies_to_everyone). 
applies_to_everyone  Sets the confinement to apply to all users (overwrites on-
ly_applies_to_users  or does_not_apply_to_users). 
settings_maintained_by  Sets the users who are authorised to maintain application policies. 
task_with_no_profile  Sets the restrictions that apply if there is no matching application 
policy for a process. 
audit  Sets when to audit events. 
Table 6.3: Application Building Commands 
Command  Description 
new application  Creates a new application. 
executablepaths  Sets the paths of executables that make up the application. 
functionality  Contains  an  already  loaded  functionality.  Parameters  are  also 
passed. 
privilege  Creates a privilege. 
macro  Adds a macro. 
location  Sets the file location of the application policy. 
Table 6.4: Functionality Building Commands 
Command  Description 
new functionality  Creates a new functionality. 
functionality_description  Sets a description of the functionality. 
parameter  Creates a parameter and sets its suggested value. 
parameter_description  Sets the description of a parameter. 
parameter_type  Sets the type of a parameter. 
parameter_automate  Sets how the values of arguments can be automatically suggested. 
functionality  Contains an already loaded functionality. Parameters are also 
passed. 
privilege  Creates a privilege. 
category  Sets the category of the functionality. 
macro  Adds a macro. 
location  Sets the file location of the application policy. 
suggest_functionality  Sets when the functionality should be automatically suggested for 
an application. 
lowlevel, highlevel, baselevel  Sets the functionality level. 
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This function filters out commands not required by the LSM and pushes the argument 
strings through the FBAC-LSM-VFS, then processes a copy of the command internally to 
maintain its internal policy state using the process_command function: 
void process_command (char *type, char *command, char *line,  
char *applies_to, char *confinement_name); 
 
The process_command function is also used within the LSM to process the command 
that  was  sent  through  the  FBAC-LSM-VFS.  If  the  command  was  valid,  pro-
cess_command  then  calls  the  function  process_confinement_command,  pro-
cess_application_command, or process_functionality_command, which car-
ries out the instruction to alter the internal policy state. 
6.3.2  Policy Server Algorithm 
The high level design of the main task of the policy server is straightforward: 
Mount FBAC-LSM-VFS 
Load and send confinement profiles 
Load and send the functionalities  associated with each confine-
ment 
Load and send the applications associated with each confinement 
 
Any process already running maintains the policy it had before the LSM policy state 
changed.  
6.3.3  Simulation Features 
The policy server also has a number of ways of analysing policy using a command line 
context menu interface to simulate task activity. The menu interface is accessed by using 
“-m” as a command line argument when starting the policy server. Once the policy is 
loaded, an initial menu is displayed with the options shown in Table 6.5.    96 
Table 6.5: Policy Server - Interactive Menu 
Option  Description 
a: reload policy  Clears and reloads the policy into the LSM 
b: show all application policies  Displays the application policies for all confinements 
loaded 
c: simulate tasks  Simulates task activity 
q: quit  Exits the program 
 
The “simulate tasks” option can be used to test whether the policies in place allow tasks 
to perform specific actions. Unlike the query features in the FBAC-LSM policy manager 
(described in the Section 6.4.4), which only consider an application policy in isolation, 
this feature takes into account process ancestry and all the confinements that apply to a 
program. These decisions are made as described in the FBAC model description in Chap-
ter 4 and the access control logic presented in Appendix C. 
 
The simulation starts by requesting the absolute path name of the initial program that is 
launched. This first program is launched without a parent and is therefore free from pro-
cess ancestry considerations. A context menu for the first task (simulated process) is dis-
played. The options in the task menu are shown in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Policy Server - Task Context Menu 
Option  Description 
a: test access right  Simulates the decision process used by the LSM to de-
cide whether the task can perform certain actions. 
b: disable functionality  Disable a functionality associated with the task. 
c: reactivate functionality  Reactivate a functionality associated with the task. 
d: launch child  Start another task (if allowed) as a child to the current 
task. 
e: show application policies  Display all the policies that apply to the current task. 
f: show confinements overview  Show an overview of the confinements that apply to the 
current task. 
g: show confinements details  Display the details of all the confinements and associat-
ed applications and functionalities. 
h: show task ancestry  Display the process ancestry of the current task. 
i: end task  End the task and return to parents task menu. 
q: quit  Exit the policy server. 
 
From this menu it is possible to simulate starting another program using the  “launch 
child” option. If the current task is allowed to start the new program, a new task is created 
and a context menu for the new task is displayed. The “show task ancestry” option dis-
plays the simulated process ancestry for every confinement that applies to the task. The    97 
process ancestry information includes the propagation type, which influences how ances-
try is considered when deciding what the task is authorised to do.  
 
The “test access right” option uses the same logic as the LSM to decide whether the task 
has adequate rights to access a particular resource. A list of all the possible operations is 
displayed and the user is prompted to enter the operation to be performed. The arguments 
to the operation are then requested. For example, if the user chooses to attempt to perform 
the “unlink” operation (to simulate deleting files), the user is prompted to enter the name 
of the file to delete. The user is then advised whether the simulated task is allowed to per-
form the action specified. Other options can deactivate and reactivate functionalities, and 
display policy information. Ending a task returns the user to the parent task’s context 
menu. 
6.4  Policy Manager GUI 
The policy manager is a privileged program for users to create, edit or delete the applica-
tion policies for confinements they are authorised to maintain. The policy manager has a 
graphical interface and incorporates features that leverage FBAC model constructs to ease 
the management of policy. 
6.4.1  Privilege Requirements and Controlled Policy Access 
The policy manager and policy server need to be able to access the policy files, and to ac-
cess the FBAC-LSM-VFS. The policy manager needs write access to the policy files (so 
that users can configure policies for applications), and access to the VFS allows the poli-
cy manger to initiate loading of policy into the LSM (alternatively the policy server can 
be used manually to load policy). The policy server requires read access to the policy 
files, and access to the VFS, to load policy into the LSM.  
 
Due to the potential need to mount the VFS, these programs are run as the superuser (us-
ing the setuid mechanism). FBAC-LSM policies can ensure that these programs do not 
act beyond the privileges required to carry out these tasks. Synthetic user accounts could 
also be used to restrict these privileged components of the FBAC-LSM TCB. 
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Normal users typically cannot alter policy files directly. The policy manager provides the 
means for users to maintain FBAC-LSM policy. Based on the real user identity (uid) of 
the user who has run policy manager, the policy manager only allows the user to modify 
application policies related to confinements the user is authorised to maintain.  Like the 
majority of rule-based application-oriented access controls, FBAC-LSM relies on the fact 
that policy files are adequately protected from malicious users. 
 
The confinements.fbac file, which the security administrator maintains, specifies 
the location of each confinement’s application policies. This can either be a directory con-
taining multiple policy files with the .fbac extension, or a single file that contains all the 
application policies for a confinement. A protected directory only accessible to the policy 
manager would normally be created for each confinement’s applications. 
 
Although not recommended, it is also possible to make a policy directory accessible to 
the appropriate users so that they can alter the policy files directly without use of the 
graphical policy manager tool. However, this method could result in policy files that are 
incorrectly formatted. Although FBAC-LSM does some verification of the policy format, 
exposing this interface to users increases the attack surface. The threat of maliciously 
formatted policy or configuration files is considered outside the scope of this project to 
mitigate entirely. 
6.4.2  Policy Management Dialogs 
The policy manager provides three windows for managing policy. The main dialog shows 
the confinements. For each confinement the application policies, functionalities and an 
overview of the configuration of the confinement is accessible. Users who are authorised 
to maintain a confinement can remove, add or edit application policies in that confine-
ment. The application dialog is a wizard-style interface that steps the user through the 
process of creating or editing a policy to restrict an application. The learning dialog can 
be used if a policy created using the application dialog is too restrictive. The learning 
mode suggests rules to add to a policy based on what an application tries to do. 
 
The policy manager is primarily designed for users to specify policies to restrict pro-
grams. Therefore, the policy manager does not currently provide interfaces to configure    99 
confinements  or  create  functionalities.  Configuring  confinements  is  an  administrative 
task, which is straightforward and involves editing a simple configuration file, while cre-
ating functionalities is a security-sensitive task that requires expertise generally best left 
to a security specialist. Some functionalities have been developed and are included with 
the implementation and are described later in Chapter 8. The following sections describe 
the interface of the policy manager in detail. This detailed description demonstrates how 
FBAC can be managed using a graphical interface. The usability of FBAC-LSM is as-
sessed using a usability study described in Chapter 10, Chapter 11, and Chapter 12. 
6.4.3  The Main Window 
After the program has loaded and the splash screen has been displayed, the main window 
(Figure 6.2) shows a list of all the confinements to the left of the dialog. When a user se-
lects a confinement, the program advises the user what type of control the user has over 
the policy and whether the confinement affects the user’s processes. If the user can alter 
the policy and it restricts the user’s programs, then the confinement is discretionary and 
no message is displayed. Otherwise the user is informed which of the following cases is 
true: 
·  the confinement restricts the user’s programs but it is mandatory and policy is 
maintained by another user; 
·  the confinement does not restrict the user, but the user is authorised to maintain 
policy that restricts other user(s); or, 
·  the confinement has no effect on the user and the user cannot alter the policy. 
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Figure 6.2: Policy Manager - Main Dialog 
The tabbed view to the right of the confinements list allows the user to see which applica-
tion policies, functionalities, and settings apply to the selected confinement. The View ª 
Show Advanced Views menu checkbox toggles whether information about applications 
and functionalities is displayed when they are selected. If advanced views are enabled and 
an application policy is selected, information about the application is shown that includes 
the paths of executables and the location of the policy. This view also displays as a tree 
the contained hierarchy of functionalities that the application is assigned, and the parame-
ter arguments that are passed to functionalities are displayed. As illustrated in Figure 6.3, 
by browsing the tree one can view the parameter arguments as they are passed to subse-
quent functionalities, and these may flow from high-level through to low-level functional-
ities. The privileges that are assigned to functionalities are also shown. In this example 
the Web_Files_Viewer functionality is passed arguments defining a directory con-
taining  web  files  to  view  and  the  extensions  to  use.  These  details  are  passed  to  the 
File_Viewer functionality and on to the low-level dir_read_access functionali-
ty, which contains the resulting privileges. Likewise, the advanced view for functionali-
ties shows the hierarchy and privileges assigned to functionalities. 
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Figure 6.3: Policy Manager - Main Dialog - Advanced Application Policy View 
If the user is authorised to maintain policies for the current confinement, buttons are 
available for managing application policies to: 
·  add application policies; 
·  edit application policies; 
·  remove application policies; 
·  toggle enforcement mode; or, 
·  learn rules based on program behaviour. 
Additionally users can review and query policies to see what a policy allows an applica-
tion to do, and to view various other advanced information about an application policy. 
Adding, editing and reviewing policies are performed via the application dialog. Adding 
to an application policy using the learning feature is performed via the learning dialog. 
Both of these dialog windows are described in detail in following sections. The “Toggle 
Enforce” button can be used to disable or enable application policies. These features are 
all also available from the main windows’ menu or the context menu by clicking the right 
mouse button on the application in the list. The buttons can be hidden using a menu op-
tion. 
 
Changes to policy are not made permanent until they are saved to the policy files on disk. 
This can be initiated, via menu item, keyboard shortcut or when prompted upon exiting 
the policy manager. For each policy file, if it already exists it is cleared and the new con-    102 
tents are created and written to disk based on the internal policy representation within pol-
icy manager. 
 
The policy manager can also be used to start the FBAC-LSM module and load or reload 
policy from disk into the module. These features are accessible via the “Security Module” 
menu. Loading the policy using the policy manager is performed the same way the policy 
server works.  
6.4.4  The Application Dialog 
The application policy dialog window is used to create, edit and review application poli-
cies. It is made up of a number of pages, which are used to step the user through the pro-
cess of defining an application policy using a wizard-style interface. Pages are navigated 
using the “back” and “next” buttons. Page order is non-linear; the order and repetition of 
pages depends on the options selected. To the left of each page a descriptive textbox de-
scribes the purpose of each item on the page. There is a button to hide this textbox if de-
sired. 
 
The application policy being created or edited is stored temporarily and, unless the user 
finishes the process by reaching the last page and clicking “finish”, the process can be 
cancelled and no changes will be made to the FBAC policy. 
 
In general the page order and the information that each page gathers are as follows, alt-
hough steps are skipped or repeated as necessary: 
·  Name: the name of the application and options for the policy process; 
·  Path: the paths of executables; 
·  Base: the type of interface the application has with the user; 
·  Functionalities: the high level features that describe the use of the application; 
·  Parameter arguments: application specific information required by functionalities; 
·  Privileges: optionally extra direct privileges; 
·  Policy Location: filename to use when storing policy within a predefined directo-
ry; and, 
·  Review: various ways of viewing and querying the policy. 
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Figure 6.4: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Setting Application Name 
As shown in Figure 6.4, the ‘name page’ sets the name of the application profile. The 
name specified is used when attempting to automate subsequent attempts. The user can 
choose whether advanced pages and options are shown, and whether the policy manager 
should attempt to automate steps when possible. For most users the recommended and de-
fault setting is not to display advanced options and to automate when possible. 
 
The ‘path page’ acquires the paths of executables that compose the application. As shown 
in Figure 6.5, paths can be entered manually or chosen with a file dialog. This process can 
also be automated, in which case the filenames of executables that are stored in directo-
ries specified in the $PATH environment variable are searched for matches with the ap-
plication  name.  For  example,  for  the  application  named  “opera”  the  paths 
/usr/bin/opera,  and  /usr/bin/X11/opera  are  suggested.  If  no  matches  are 
found, the user is advised that specifying the name used to start the program from a con-
sole facilitates automation of some aspects of policy generation. All automation leads to 
suggestions that the user is asked to review. 
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Figure 6.5: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Setting Executable Paths 
 
The next policy decision when restricting an application is the way the program interacts 
with users. On the ‘base page’ the user chooses between the available base functionalities. 
These base functionalities describe the basic needs of various types of applications. In 
general applications are categorised into command line console based applications, or 
those with graphical user interfaces (GUI). Further distinctions are also made based on 
whether the application is very simple (just executables) or has configuration settings. 
These distinctions are described later in Chapter 8. As illustrated in Figure 6.6, at this step 
in application policy specification the user simply selects the type from a list.  
 
This can also be automated; the executables associated with the application are analysed 
in a simple manner. The programs’ dependencies are examined, either through dynami-
cally linked shared libraries or, if not available for an executable, rpm package manage-
ment dependencies. If any of these dependencies rely on GUI components such as KDE, 
QT, GTK, GNOME, or X11, then a GUI base functionality is suggested. 
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Figure 6.6: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Setting the Base Functionality 
The primary task when creating policy, and the paradigm around which policy is built, is 
selecting the functionalities that describe what each application is authorised to do. Using 
the ‘functionality selection page’ shown in Figure 6.7, the user can select the appropriate 
functionalities from the list of those available, and add them to the list of selected func-
tionalities. There are a number of ways the user can choose to view the available func-
tionalities. By default only high level functionalities are displayed and they are sorted into 
categories such as ‘file viewer’, ‘game’, ‘network client’, or ‘network server’. Categories 
group similar functionalities. They exist solely to ease the selection of high-level func-
tionalities. Other functionality views can show all functionalities, high-level functionali-
ties, or only low-level functionalities. Functionalities can be added to the application poli-
cy by selecting them and clicking the add button, or by double clicking an available func-
tionality. They can be removed by selecting an added functionality and clicking the re-
move button. 
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Figure 6.7: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Adding Functionalities 
A rudimentary functionality suggestion option has been implemented. The .desktop files 
that contain information about installed applications are analysed. If a .desktop file corre-
sponds to the application policy, then functionalities are suggested based on iconcategory 
fields in the file. The iconcategory field is used to sort applications into categories in the 
menu launch systems of kde and gnome. Some iconcategories map directly to FBAC-
LSM functionalities. For example, the .desktop iconcategory “WebBrowser” maps to the 
FBAC functionality Web_Browser. Suggestions can also be made based on program 
dependencies, which are based on the use of dynamic libraries or rpm dependencies as 
described previously for the base functionality selection. For example, if a program uses 
the library libogg, the Audio_Player and Audio_Editor functionalities are sug-
gested. As shown in Figure 6.8, when a functionality is suggested it is highlighted in the 
list of those available and the user is asked to review the suggestions. 
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Figure 6.8: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Functionalities Suggestion 
The ‘parameter arguments page’ is shown for each parameter in any of the functionalities 
assigned to the application. Here the user is asked to provide application-specific infor-
mation required by the assigned functionalities. The parameter arguments page is shown 
in Figure 6.9. Values can be entered manually either using the text edit box or using 
widgets that appear depending on the type of argument value expected. For example, if 
the parameter is of type ‘directory’, a ‘browse to directory’ button is available. Likewise 
files can also be browsed to. Ports and protocols can be selected from a dropdown list. If 
the parameter is of type “port”, then the port number can be specified by its service name 
(such as http), which is resolved and stored as its numerical value. As previously dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, currently only IPv4 addresses are supported. Each parameter has 
fixed suggested values. Using buttons on the dialog they may be added to the list of val-
ues or used unaltered. 
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Figure 6.9: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Argument Specification 
The task of specifying parameter arguments is likely the most complicated task in the 
process  of  creating  application  policies.  Automating  this  process  lowers  the  required 
knowledge of the application needed to create a policy. Supplementing the fixed sugges-
tions  for  each  parameter,  the  automation  implemented  can  search  the  filesystem  for 
matching resources. For example, the per-user directory can be identified by searching the 
user home directories for a directory name that contains the name of the application. 
Opera,  for  instance,  uses  the  directory  /home/user/.opera.  As  shown  in  Figure 
6.10, the automated process finds the .opera directory and suggests it as the value to use 
for the parameter. If the option to do so was selected at the start of policy specification, 
the suggested values are automatically added. FBAC-LSM automation is discussed and 
assessed in Chapter 9. 
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Figure 6.10: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Argument Automation 
If the ‘show advanced’ option, which is disabled by default, was enabled on the first page 
then the ‘privilege page’ will be displayed. As shown in Figure 6.11, this allows the user 
to add additional low-level privileges directly to the application. This is not recommended 
for  typical  users  and  exists  to  allow  unique  requirements  to  be  added  or  flat  (non-
hierarchical) application policies to be created for comparison purposes. To add a privi-
lege, an operation is selected via the dropdown list, and the resource descriptor values are 
specified below, then the add privilege button is clicked. Direct privileges to be added can 
be selected from the list on the right and deleted using the remove privilege button. 
 
If the confinement is configured to store application policies to a directory, the policy lo-
cation page, shown in Figure 6.12, specifies which file the policy is stored in within the 
directory. If all application policies are configured to be stored in a single file this page is 
not shown. The user can select an existing file from the list to store the policy with other 
related policies, or a new filename can be specified in the textbox, in which case the file 
will be created when the policy is saved to disk. 
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Figure 6.11: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Adding Privileges 
 
Figure 6.12: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Setting the Location to Store the Policy 
Using the ‘review page’, the created policy can be reviewed in a number of ways, includ-
ing simple view, privileges, and query tabs. If “View Advanced Review Options” is ena-    111 
bled then another two tabs are also available, the hierarchical view tab and the policy lan-
guage tab. The simple view tab gives a basic overview of the created policy.  
 
The privileges tab, shown in Figure 6.13, displays a list of all the low-level privileges 
contained in the policy either directly or via functionalities. The privileges shown are the 
result  of  parameter  argument  propagation,  where  all  parameter  arguments  have  been 
passed to contained functionalities. A filter is provided that allows the privileges to be 
easily searched and enumerated. For example, searching for “file_write” displays all the 
filenames the application can write to, and searching “/home/” would show any privileges 
that specified the home directory in a resource descriptor. It also supports simple wild-
cards  where  “*”  can  represent  any  sequence  of  characters.  For  example, 




Figure 6.13: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Review Privileges 
The query tab, shown in Figure 6.14, performs a more comprehensive query on the creat-
ed policy, using the actual access control decision making code to check if the application 
would be allowed to access a particular resource. Unlike the policy server’s simulation     112 
mode, in order to be more assessable this test only considers the policy just created, and 
does not consider process ancestry or other application policies in other confinements, 
such as those specified by other users. In practice the application would also be restricted 
by these factors as well as other security controls on the system such as DAC. The opera-
tion describing the type of access, such as file_write, is selected from the dropdown list, 
and the resource descriptors are specified either in the textbox or using the resource de-
scriptor type-specific widgets that appear, such as the ‘browse for file’ button. Once the 
type of access requested and the resources to access have been specified, pressing the 
query button will advise whether the action would be “DENIED” or “PERMITTED”. The 
code used to make this decision is the same code that is used by the LSM. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Policy Manager - Application Dialog – Review Query 
 
The hierarchical view tab, shown in Figure 6.15, displays the details of the policy in a hi-
erarchical tree. The contained functionalities can be browsed, and parameter arguments 
flowing between the application and contained functionalities can be viewed. This allows 
the policy to be viewed from high-level abstractions and users can drill down to the low-
level functionalities and the privileges contained within them. 
 
The policy language tab shows the policy as it will be written to disk. This is a representa-
tion of the internal state of the construction of the current application policy that has not     113 
yet been added to the current confinement. The way policy is expressed is described later 
in Chapter 7.  
 
 
Figure 6.15: Policy Manager - Application Dialog - Review Hierarchy 
Once the policy has been reviewed, the last page displays a finish button that writes the 
changes in policy to the main dialog’s internal representation of policy. 
6.4.5  The Learning Dialog 
The learning dialog can add privileges to an application policy based on what the program 
tries to do. If a program is attempting to act beyond the privileges granted by the created 
application policy, the learning dialog can be used to review the access requested and, if 
appropriate, add privileges to the policy. 
 
The learning dialog has a wizard style interface with a small number of pages, which are 
accessed in a linear order. As shown in Figure 6.16, the first page asks the user to choose 
a learning mode. The options available are enforcing mode or complaining mode. Enforc-
ing mode restricts the program as per usual while in learning mode and all denied access 
attempts are logged. Complaining mode, on the other hand, allows the program to run un-
confined by the current confinement and logs attempts that would have otherwise been     114 
denied. The user is reminded that complaining mode can be dangerous, as the program 
runs unconfined.  
 
 
Figure 6.16: Policy Manager - Learn Dialog - Select Mode 
The policy manager then sends a command to the FBAC-LSM module to set the enforc-
ing mode for the application policy. A pseudo-random number is sent to the LSM to flag 
the logs so as to only consider subsequent audit messages. This allows the learning mode 
to ignore previous audit messages, which could be the cause of confusion if the policy has 
been changed. The user is then prompted to start, and use, the program. 
 
After the user has finished logging access attempts, they click ‘next’ and the audit logs 
generated by the FBAC-LSM module are analysed. For each logged attempt the applica-
tion policy is consulted to check that the privilege is still required – in case privileges 
have been added that negate the need for the addition. As shown in Figure 6.17, a page is 
shown for each logged access attempt the application policy does not allow. Particularly 
hazardous  operations  (such  as  file_write,  file_unlink,  fs_mount,  fs_umount,  net-
work_incoming and system_control) are shown in red. If the program tried to execute an-
other  program,  then  the  operation  is  shown  in  orange  and  the  user  can  select  the 
*_execute operation used to execute the program. The values required to satisfy the re-    115 
source descriptors for the specific requested access are shown in the value list. These val-
ues can easily be generalised using the ‘wildcard generalise’ button. For example, if the 
program tries to access the image “/test/test.jpg” then, by clicking the generalise button, 
“/test/*.jpg” will be suggested to allow access to all jpg images in the directory. Clicking 
the ‘revert value’ button will undo all changes made to the value. 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Policy Manager - Learn Dialog – Reviewing Access Attempts 
After reviewing the need for additional permissions, there are currently two ways the 
permission can be added to the application profile. Values can be assigned to functionali-
ty parameters, or the privilege can be added directly to the application. In the first case, 
the available parameters can be selected from a drop down list. A description of the pa-
rameter is shown in a text box. Then the ‘add selected value as argument to this parame-
ter’ button is clicked. The user then has the option to add the other values and click the 
‘next’ button that appears when using this method. Alternatively clicking the ‘add as priv-
ilege’ button adds a privilege directly to the policy. 
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After each of the logged attempts has been processed as described above, the user has the 
option to finalise the changes to the application policy by clicking the ‘finish’ button. The 
application policy then returns to enforcing mode. 
6.5  The FBAC-LSM Module 
The FBAC-LSM module is a security module that loads into the Linux kernel and attach-
es itself to the security hooks provided by the Linux security module (LSM) interface. 
The LSM module implements methods for the hooks, which in turn use the functions de-
fined in decide.h to make security decisions. As described previously in the description of 
the policy server, the LSM provides a virtual filesystem, termed FBAC-LSM-VFS, that 
provides an interface for receiving policy from the policy server. This interface and the 
commands available were described in Section 6.3.1. The LSM builds the internal policy 
as commands are passed into the FBAC-LSM-VFS. Subsequently, when a process starts, 
the LSM builds a tree structure representing the individual task’s task confinements, and 
the contained application policies, which in turn contain functionalities. 
6.5.1  Representing a Task’s Policy 
When a process attempts to start a new task, the FBAC-LSM module first checks the user 
is allowed to start the process in question. This involves walking the confinements that 
apply to the user to check that the user has the required privilege. If the user is authorised 
to start the new process, the following steps take place. The LSM first copies each con-
finement that applies to the user to a task confinement assigned to the process. Then, for 
each confinement, if an application policy that describes the program is identified, its de-
tails are copied to a task confinement. In turn, all contents of the application policy are al-
so copied, including contained functionalities and recursively the contents of functionali-
ties. The result is a tree structure that contains the policy for the process. Each task con-
finement contains a pointer to the parent process’s corresponding task confinement. Ref-
erence counting is used to ensure that so long as a child requires a parent’s policy to make 
its access decisions, the policy is kept in memory after the parent’s process ends. Once all 
children who required access and the parent itself have all ended, the policy is freed from 
memory. 
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To avoid having to calculate parameter argument propagation for every access decision, 
the arguments are then propagated throughout the tree structure. This is achieved by also 
making copies of the privileges, which can be altered for each process. Parameter names, 
which have been used to describe resources in functionality instances, are replaced with 
the argument values that are passed to the functionalities. This occurs recursively from 
applications to contained functionality instances and through to hierarchically contained 
functionality instances and finally to privilege instances. So, for example, if a functionali-
ty  contained  the  file_r  low  level  functionality  and  passed  in  the  argument  value 
“/dev/null” for the parameter ‘file’, then the privileges in file_r using the parameter would 
be replaced with their literal values. That is, privilege file_read file would become privi-
lege file_read “/dev/null”. The functions used to build this structure and propagate the 
arguments are defined in buildapptree.h.  
 
There are two main advantages to this approach: access decision making is optimised as 
arguments have been propagated, and race conditions resulting from policy reloading are 
avoided as processes have their own persistent policy. As defined in the FBAC model, it 
is necessary for each process to have instances of its functionalities so that they can be 
dynamically deactivated. 
6.5.2  FBAC-LSM Security Decision and Enforcement 
When a process attempts to perform a security sensitive action, the corresponding LSM 
interface function hook call is performed. If the security module has implemented the 
hook, its decision making code is executed. The LSM can return the value 0 to allow the 
action or an error code to deny the action. To make these decisions FBAC-LSM imple-
ments the decision logic that is presented in Appendix C. 
 
Each confinement is traversed to search for operations that match the type of action re-
quested, and each matching privilege is checked to see if it allows access to the requested 
resource. The result of this task confinement’s access decision is intersected as necessary 
with the task confinements in the process ancestry to decide if the process is allowed to 
carry out the requested action. Each task confinement must authorise the action in order 
for it to be permitted. If the action is denied an appropriate error code is returned.     118 
6.6  Chapter Conclusion 
This  completes  the  description  of  the  FBAC-LSM  software  components.  The  FBAC-
LSM TCB comprises of a number of components:  
·  a policy server, which feeds policy into the LSM; 
·  a policy manager program with a graphical user interface (GUI), which acts as a 
privileged mechanism for users to maintain policy; 
·  the FBAC-LSM module, a Linux security module (LSM), which makes and en-
forces access control decisions. 
In this chapter, each of these components, their interfaces, and their interactions have 
been described. The next chapter describes the policy language used to represent FBAC 
policies. 
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Chapter 7  FBAC Policy Language 
 
“ 
A different language is a different vision of life.  
Federico Fellini, Italian film director (1920-1993)  ” 
 
 
7.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter presents and describes the FBAC policy language (FBAC-PL), which de-
fines how FBAC-LSM policy is expressed on disk. This chapter starts by giving an over-
view of the language, and presenting the policy language specification. Subsequently, 
each of the major parts of the language are described and examples are presented. Finally, 
FBAC-PL is briefly compared to the policy languages of other rule-based application-
oriented access controls. 
7.2  FBAC Policy Language Overview 
FBAC-PL  is  capable  of  representing  functionality-based  policies,  as  specified  by  the 
FBAC model presented in Chapter 4. As described in Chapter 5, the FBAC-LSM imple-
mentation is name-based; that is, it authorises access based on the names of resources. 
Consequently, FBAC-PL is a name-based policy language.  
 
FBAC-PL expresses FBAC policies in three different types of policy files:  
·  confinements, which specify the sets of application restrictions that apply to users 
and who is authorised to make changes to application policies; this defines the 
system wide configuration; 
·  application policies, which specify how applications are identified and how they 
are restricted; and, 
·  functionalities, which are used as modules for specifying application policies. 
 
FBAC-LSM policy is centrally managed. Multiple users can modify the FBAC-PL appli-
cation policies via the policy manager, if they are authorised to do so in the confinements 
policy file.     120 
7.3  Specification Key 
FBAC-PL is specified using Backus-Naur Form (BNF) [220]. BNF is a common method 
for describing programming language syntax and the format of files or information. Many 
variations of BNF exist [221, 222]. The specific style used here is a form of Extended 
Backus-Naur Form (EBNF), similar to that used in the XML standard published by the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [222], and is used as follows: 
·  Policies are defined as sets of rules in the form: symbol ::= expression. Where the 
symbol is nonterminal (variable) and the expression is defined in terms of symbols 
or terminals (literal values). 
·  Literal values that appear in expressions are underlined and italicised. The ‘￿’ 
character represents a line feed. 
·  A ‘|’ in an expression specifies an alternative valid value. 
·  Square brackets, ‘[’ and ‘]’, are used to group together parts of an expression to 
define the scope and precedence of alternatives and quantifiers. 
·  The following regular expression characters can be used to denote quantification. 
The characters ‘*’, ‘+’ or ‘?’ can follow groups, literals, or symbols. The ‘*’ char-
acter specifies they can occur zero or more times, ‘+’ indicates one or more times, 
and ‘?’ indicates zero or one time. 
·  Symbols and literals in expressions are concatenated. Space and white space in 
policy is explicitly stated using the ‘s’ or ‘ws’ symbols, which are defined within 
the specification. 
 
Following the language specification given in the next section, confinements, applications 
and functionalities will be discussed separately and examples of policy will be presented. 
7.4  FBAC-PL Specification in BNF 
The specification of FBAC-PL using BNF is as follows: 
 
confinements_policy_file ::= conf_policy* 
conf_policy  ::=  application_confinement  s  confinement_name￿{￿    ws?  ac-
tive_default￿    ws?  application_policy_location￿    ws?  functionali-
ty_policy_location￿    ws?  applies_to￿  ws?  maintained_by￿  ws? 
task_with_no_profile￿}￿ 
confinement_name ::= astr     121 
active_default ::= active_state s active 
active ::= active | inactive 
application_policy_location ::= application_policies s [file | directory] 
functionality_policy_location ::= functionality_policies s [file | directory] 
applies_to  ::= [only_applies_to_users s user_list | does_not_apply_to_users s 
user_list | applies_to_all_users] 
maintained_by ::= application_policies_maintained_by s user_list 
task_with_no_profile ::= task_with_no_profile s no_profile_action 
no_profile_action  ::=  unconfined  |  confine_with_restricted_profile  |  de-
ny_execution 
audit ::= ws? audit s audit_when 
audit_when ::= all | denied | none 
user_list ::= i1, i2, …, in 
 
functionality_policy_file ::= func_policy* 
func_policy  ::=  functionality  s  functionality_name￿  {  ￿  [ws?  functionali-
ty_level￿]?  [ws?  functionality_description￿]?  [ws?  functionality_category￿]? 
[ws?  functionality_suggest_when￿]?  [ws?  parameter_definition￿]+  [ws?  con-
tained_functionality￿]* [ws? contained_privilege￿]* [ws? macro￿]* }￿ 
functionality_name ::= astr 
functionality_level ::= highlevel; | lowlevel; | baselevel; 
functionality_description ::= "str"; 
functionality_catagory  ::= category s [misc | file_editor | file_viewer | game | 
network_client | network_server | system_tools | platform]; 
functionality_suggest_when  ::=  suggest_functionality  s  [in_iconcategory  |  us-
es_lib]; 
in_iconcategory ::= iconcategory s "str" 
uses_lib ::= uses_library s "str" 
parameter_definition ::= parameter_declaration￿ [parameter_type￿]? [parame-
ter_automation￿]? 
parameter_declaration ::= parameter s parameter_name s suggested_value; 
parameter_type ::= ws? parameter_type s directory; 
parameter_automation ::= ws? parameter_automate s [find_path | usedefault]; 
parameter_name ::= astr 
find_path ::= (searchforpathmatching  | searchfordircontaining) s string_pattern 
suggested_value ::= resource_list 
contained_functionality ::= functionality s functionality_name( arg* ); 
contained_privilege ::= privilege s operation [s objects]?; 
objects ::= resource_list1, resource_list2, ..., resource_listn; 
 
application_policy_file ::= app_policy* 
app_policy ::= application s application_name ￿{￿ [ws? executable_path￿]+ 
[ws? contained_functionality￿]* [ws? contained_privilege￿]* [ws? macro￿]*} 
application_name ::= astr 
executable_path ::= executablepaths path1:path2:…:pathn; 
path ::= nwsstr 
 
arg ::= ws? [parameter_name=]? argument 
argument ::= resource_list | <default>     122 
resource_list  ::=  "resource_descriptor"  |  {"resource_descriptor"1:  "re-
source_descriptor"2 :... : "resource_descriptor"n} 
resource_descriptor ::= file | directory | protocol | port | IPv4 | string_pattern 
macro ::= macro [permission_directory_path s operation_list, s directory_list, s 
path_rule_list | permission_ path s operation_list, s resource_list]; 
operation_list ::= "operation" | {"operation"1 : "operation"2 :... : "operation"n} 
directory_list ::= "directory" | {"directory"1: "directory"2: ... :"directory"n} 
path_rule_list ::= "str" | {"str"1:"str"2: ... :"str"n} 
operation ::= file_read | file_write ...
14 
file ::= /str[/str*]? | * 
directory ::= /str[/str*]?/ | * 
protocol ::= UDP | TCP | RAW 
port ::= porti | * | porti - porti 
IPv4 ::= oct.oct.oct.oct | * 
oct ::= ipi | * 
 
s ::=  (space) 
ws ::= [ ? (space) |   ? (tab) | ￿? (new line)] ws* 
 
str : String 
nwsstr : String with no whitespace 
astr : Alphanumerical String (a-z & A-Z & 1-9 & - & _) 
int : Integer 
porti : Integer (1 – 65353) 
ipi : Integer (1-255) 
 
Although white space indicated by the symbol ‘ws’ is optional, a tab is recommended for 
policy readability. In addition, after optional white space, any lines beginning with a hash 
(‘#’) are ignored and can be used to comment policy. FBAC-LSM is not strict about the 
order of the elements in the conf_policy, func_policy, and app_policy expressions as 
specified above. 
 
The files that store policy additionally include as their first line a confirmation of the pol-
icy format version they use. The policy format specified here is referred to as version 0. 
7.5  Confinements 
The confinements policy is stored in the directory /etc/fbac-lsm in the file con-
finements.fbac. This file is maintained manually by an administrator and defines 
and configures all the sets of rules that apply to the users specified within the file. This 
file is the system-wide configuration file for the FBAC-LSM mechanism. The locations 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 5, Section 5.5, for the full list of available operations     123 
of all other policy files are specified within the specification of individual confinements 
defined within the confinements policy file. As defined in the FBAC-PL specification, 






  active_state active 
   
  application_policies "/etc/fbac-lsm/applications/cliffes_dac/" 
  functionality_policies "/etc/fbac-lsm/functionalities/" 
   
  only_applies_to_users 1000 
  application_policies_maintained_by 1000 
 
  task_with_no_profile unconfined 
   





  active_state active 
   
  application_policies "/etc/fbac-lsm/applications/everyone_mac/" 
  functionality_policies "/etc/fbac-lsm/functionalities/" 
   
  applies_to_all_users 
  application_policies_maintained_by 1001 
 
  task_with_no_profile unconfined 
   
  audit denied 
} 
Figure 7.1: Example Confinements Policy File 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates a possible confinements.fbac file. In this example two 
confinements are specified: a discretionary control and a mandatory control. The discre-
tionary control applies to the user whose user identity (uid) is 1000 (which in this case 
corresponds to the user ‘cliffe’) and is maintained by that same user. The mandatory con-
trol applies to everyone, and only the user whose uid is 1001 (the security administrator) 
can modify application policies. Both confinements are active, meaning that they are en-
forced. They store application policies in separate directories, but reuse the same func-
tionalities. Both confinements are targeted, in that they only restrict programs that match 
specified applications, and they both log events when the LSM denies access to a re-
source.     124 
7.6  Applications 
The policies for restricting applications are stored in the file or in the directory specified 
in a confinement policy. If a directory is specified, then policy can be located in multiple 
.fbac files within. Otherwise all the application policies for a confinement are defined in a 
single file. Users specified via the ‘application_policies_maintained_by’ value in a con-
finement are authorised to add, edit or remove these application policies. Users are not 
required to be familiar with the FBAC-PL syntax as they specify policy using the policy 
manager. As described in Chapter 6, the policy manager is a graphical tool that creates 
the FBAC-PL policy and writes the policy files on the behalf of authorised users. Users 
are not allowed direct access to the application policy files.  
 
Figure 7.2 shows an example application policy file, kwrite.fbac, which was gener-
ated by the policy manager. Although an application policy file can contain multiple ap-
plication policies, this example file only holds one, a policy to restrict the application 
KWrite. KWrite is a simple graphical text file editor. The paths to its executables are 
specified, then the functionalities describing the security goals of the application are spec-
ified  and  parameterised.  The  two  functionalities  specified  are  Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application, which is the base-level functionality automatically 
suggested by the policy manager, and the File_Editor functionality, which was au-
tomatically suggested by the policy manager based on the iconcategory specified in the 
kwrite.desktop file. As described in Chapter 6, functionalities for applications can 
also be specified by users based on their expectations of the features provided by applica-
tions. 
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FBAC-LSM_applications_format_version 0 
 




  executablepaths /usr/bin/kwrite:/usr/bin/X11/kwrite:      
  /opt/kde3/bin/kwrite; 
  functionality Standard_Graphical_Application  
    (peruser_directory="", 
  peruser_files={"/home/*/.kde/share/config/kwriterc":      
    "/home/*/.kde/share/config/session/kwrite*":        
  "/home/*/.kde4/share/config/kwriterc"}, 
    application_libraries_directory="", 
    libraries_fileextension=<default>, 
    config_directory="", 
    config_files="", 
    read_only_directory="/opt/kde3/share/apps/kwrite"); 
  functionality File_Editor (file_directory="/home/cliffe/**", 
    file_extension="*"); 
} 
Figure 7.2: Example Application Policy for KWrite 
The parameters specified for the File_Editor functionality authorise KWrite to edit 
any files in the home directory of user “cliffe” with any file extension. As shown in Fig-
ure 7.2, FBAC-LSM functionalities are passed arguments in a fashion similar to subrou-
tines in programming languages. This allows the policy abstraction to easily adapt to the 
differing details of applications providing related features. The parameter arguments are 
passed in the order they appear in the functionality definition. To improve readability, the 
name of the parameter that arguments are passed to can be optionally presented in the 
form [parameter_name=]? argument. To specify that a parameter does not apply to an 
application, or that no extra privileges should be assigned as a result of a functionality pa-
rameter, an empty string ("") is used as the argument value. The default typically value 
of a parameter can be used by using <default> as the argument. 
 
The values passed to parameters are in the form of strings that define the resources related 
to application specific needs. These resources are described using the name-based scheme 
described previously in Chapter 5, using pattern matching as described in Section 5.4. For 
example, patterns used to match filenames can include wildcards to match related files. 
The ‘*’ wildcard is used to match any characters in a directory or filename, and ‘**’ can 
also include directory separators (‘/’).     126 
7.7  Functionalities 
Functionalities are the building blocks of policy and are reused for multiple confinements 
and  applications.  Functionalities  are  stored  in  the  source  specified  in  the  confine-
ments.fbac file. Functionalities can either be stored in .fbac files in a specified direc-
tory or in a single file. The names functionalities use follow a naming convention, where 
high level and base functionalities use mixed case. For example, Web_Browser, and all 
lower  level  functionalities  use  all  lower  case,  such  as  file_r.  As  specified  in  the 
FBAC-PL  specification  in  Section  7.4,  all  functionality,  application  and  confinement 
names are alphanumeric strings with optional underscores and hyphens. 
 
As functionalities can contain other functionalities, the order in which functionalities are 
loaded is important. A functionality can only contain in its definition a child functionality 
that has already been loaded. For this reason, a naming convention has been employed for 
functionality policy filenames, where each filename is prefixed with a numerical digit, 
which effects the order in which the functionality policy files are loaded. The number ‘0’ 
is  used  for  low  level  common  functionalities  (including  those  that  act  as  abbreviated 
ACLs), ‘1’ and ‘2’ are used for other low-level functionalities, and numbers ‘3’ and high-
er are used for higher level functionalities. 
 
Figure 7.3 shows a low-level functionality, which is used to group related privileges, 
named file_r. The definition starts with a description, and includes the lowlevel di-
rective to specify, for the policy manager, that it is a low-level functionality. It grants ac-
cess to files using the parameter named files, which by default doesn’t grant access to any 
files unless they are stated as arguments to the parameter. The functionality includes the 
privileges to grant access to the file or files using the operations file_read or file_getattr. 
As specified in Section 7.4, the definition of an included privilege is in the form: privilege 
s operation [s objects]?;. In this case the object is defined in terms of the parameter 
name. The privileges grant access to whatever resource descriptors are passed as argu-
ments to the parameter when the functionality is used in a policy. 
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functionality file_r 
{ 
  functionality_description "read access to these files"; 
  lowlevel; 
  parameter files ""; 
  parameter_description "allows these files to be accessed as described"; 
  parameter_type file; 
  privilege file_read files; 
  privilege file_getattr files; 
} 
Figure 7.3: Example Low-Level Functionality Policy: file_r 
As shown in Figure 7.3, the definition of the parameter files also contains a default argu-
ment value that is used when the argument “<default>” is passed to a parameter. In this 
case the default is an empty string “”, which grants access to no resources. This is similar 
to a feature of programming languages such as Python, C++, and Windows PowerShell 
that allows subroutine parameters to have default values. This feature allows further ab-
straction in common cases without sacrificing flexibility. For example, a functionality 
that represents HTTP access can have a parameter to specify which hosts a client can 
connect to. The wildcard “*” can be set as the default value making the functionality easi-
ly usable, while the functionality can be fine-tuned by passing a new parameter value if 
necessary: for example, to only grant access to an intranet. Parameter arguments supplant 
default values; however, the policy manager enables users to edit the default values and 
use them as arguments. 
 
Figure 7.4 shows an example of a higher level functionality, Web_Browser. As shown 
in the figure, functionalities can include additional information used by the policy manag-
er to manage and automate application policy construction. In the figure, bold text de-
notes policy that can be enforced by the LSM, while the information in italics is only used 
by the policy manager.  
 
A category such as “network_client” can be used to organise functionalities according to 
their general purpose, easing the process of selecting appropriate functionalities. A “func-
tionality_suggest_when” line can be used to specify attributes of applications that are 
likely to use this functionality. For example, any application that has the “WebBrowser” 
icon category specified in its .desktop file would likely use the Web_Browser function-
ality. Therefore, when a policy is being created for an application, if the policy manager’s 
automation features are enabled and the application matches a .desktop file that has the     128 





  functionality_description "A web browser and ftp client.  
  View remote and local web files and download files."; 
  highlevel; 
  category network_client; 
  suggest_functionality iconcategory "WebBrowser"; 
 
  parameter plugins_and_extensions_directory    
  {"/home/*/.[APPLICATION_NAME]/plugins/": 
  "/usr/lib/[APPLICATION_NAME]/plugins/"}; 
  parameter_description "the directory the application keeps any app-specific 
  plugins or extensions"; 
  parameter_type directory; 
  parameter_automate searchforpathmatching 
  "/home/*/*[APPLICATION_NAME]*/plugins/"; 
  parameter_automate searchforpathmatching    
  "/usr/lib/*[APPLICATION_NAME]*/plugins/"; 
  parameter_automate searchforpathmatching 
  "/usr/lib/*[APPLICATION_NAME]*/extensions/"; 
  parameter_automate searchforpathmatching "/usr/lib/browser-plugins/"; 
  parameter_automate searchforpathmatching "/usr/lib/browser-
  plugins/*[APPLICATION_NAME]*/"; 
 
  parameter download_directory "/home/*/downloads"; 
  parameter_description "the directories downloads are stored to"; 
  parameter_type directory; 
 
  parameter allowed_hosts_to_connect_to "*"; 
  parameter_description "hosts the browser can connect to"; 
  parameter_type IP; 
  parameter_automate usedefault; 
 
  parameter view_web_files_in_directory "/home/**/"; 
  parameter_description "view web files in this dir (.htm, .jpg...)"; 
  parameter_type directory; 
  parameter_automate usedefault; 
 
  functionality general_network__connectivity_awareness_and_common_file_access 
  ( ); 
  functionality http_client (allowed_hosts_to_connect_to, <default>); 
   
  functionality save_downloads (download_directory); 
  functionality extensions_plugins (plugins_and_extensions_directory, "**"); 
  functionality extensions_plugins ("/usr/lib/browser-plugins/", "*"); 
   
  functionality mime_aware ( ); 
  functionality web_plugins_and_helpers ( ); 
   
  functionality Ftp_Client (allowed_hosts_to_connect_to, "", ""); 
  functionality Web_Files_Viewer (view_web_files_in_directory, <default>); 
} 
Figure 7.4: Example High-Level Functionality Policy: Web_Browser 
Parameters can also have methods for automating argument specification specified. For 
example, in the figure the line “parameter_automate searchforpathmatch-
ing  "/home/*/*[APPLICATION_NAME]*/plugins/";”  instructs  the  policy 
manager to look for directories containing the application’s name in any users’ home di-    129 
rectories that contain a subdirectory named plugins; if found, these are automatically add-
ed to the arguments for that parameter. 
 
As  described  in  previous  chapters,  the  hierarchical  containment  relationship  between 
functionalities enables arguments to propagate to contained functionalities. For example, 
in Figure 7.4 the parameter allowed_hosts_to_connect_to is used to specify the hosts the 
browser can connect to by sending this information to other functionalities. When an ap-
plication policy, such as a policy for Opera, includes the Web_Browser functionality, 
the value for this parameter is passed as an argument. If an IP address is specified in the 
application policy, the Web_Browser functionality will consequently only grant access 
to browse web resources on the named host. This is achieved as a result of this infor-
mation propagating from functionality to contained functionality until the information is 
used in the definition of a privilege. The parameter is passed to the http_client func-
tionality by name. The http_client functionality in turn passes its corresponding pa-
rameter by name to the tcp_outgoing functionality.  
 
As shown in Figure 7.5, in turn this low level functionality contains a privilege with the 
network_outgoing operation, which is defined in terms of the corresponding parameter 
hosts. When the application is started, the result is that the passing of these values are re-
solved and the tcp_outgoing functionality would then contain the privilege for net-
work_outgoing with the host defined as the value passed into the parent functionality, 
Web_Browser. Because many parameters values are not exposed by high level func-
tionalities, and many literal values defining the details are specified in lower level func-
tionalities, these layers act to encapsulate and abstract details away from the higher level 
functionalities.  
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functionality tcp_outgoing 
{ 
  functionality_description "makes tcp network connections"; 
  lowlevel; 
 
  parameter hosts "*"; 
  parameter_description "remote host names or ips the program can connect to"; 
  parameter_type IP; 
 
  parameter remote_ports ""; 
  parameter_description "remote ports (external); the program can connect to"; 
  parameter_type port; 
 
  parameter local_ports ""; 
  parameter_description "the local ports the program can connect to"; 
  parameter_type port; 
 
  privilege network_outgoing "TCP", hosts, remote_ports, local_ports; 
} 
Figure 7.5: Example Low-Level Functionality Policy: tcp_outgoing 
Functionalities can also include macros that expand to the Cartesian product of the sup-
plied values to create multiple privileges. The ‘macrotype’ specifies how many values are 
combined. For example, the ‘permission_directory_path’ macrotype combines three sets 
of values: operations, directories and filename patterns. The Cartesian product of these 
values gives all the possible combinations while retaining the value ordering; that is the 
order:  operation,  directory,  filename  pattern.  The  line:    “macro  permis-
sion_directory_path  {"file_read":"file_getattr"},  {"/etc/":"/bin/"}, 
{"passwd":"test"};” is therefore effectively expanded to the lines: 
privilege file_read "/etc/passwd"; 
privilege file_read "/etc/test"; 
privilege file_read "/bin/passwd"; 
privilege file_read "/bin/test"; 
privilege file_getattr "/etc/passwd"; 
privilege file_getattr "/etc/test"; 
privilege file_getattr "/bin/passwd"; 
privilege file_getattr "/bin/test"; 
 
Figure 7.6 shows an example of a functionality that uses this policy feature to grant read 
access using two operations to the resources matching parameterised filenames and direc-
tories.  
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functionality dir_read_access 
{ 
  functionality_description "read files and dirs in directories"; 
  lowlevel; 
 
  parameter directory ""; 
  parameter_description "the directory the libs are in"; 
  parameter_type directory; 
   
  parameter path_rules "*"; 
  parameter_description "path rules such as files extensions: for example *.so. 
  If a list of rules is used only one of these conditions needs to be met"; 
  parameter_type pattern; 
 
  macro permission_directory_path {"file_read":"file_getattr"}, directory, 
  path_rules; 
 
  functionality dir_rx (directory); 
} 
Figure 7.6: Example Macro Use 
7.8  Policy Language Comparison 
This section presents a brief comparison of FBAC-PL with the way policy is represented 
using other rule-based application-oriented access control schemes. For comparison pur-
poses, an example FBAC policy for the Firefox browser created with the graphical policy 
manager tool is shown in Figure 7.7. The Firefox policy in the figure begins by specifying 
the executables used to run the application. Next it identifies the two functionalities that 
this  application  encompasses:  Standard_Graphical_Application  and 
Web_Browser. These functionalities are parameterised to address the specifics of the 
application: for example, to specify where the various files it uses are located and the 
hosts to which it is permitted to connect. These parameters can easily be changed to grant 
the application access to different resources. For example, as discussed in the previous 
section, to restrict the web browser to only connect to particular servers (such as on an in-
tranet) the “allowed_hosts_to_connect_to” parameter value could be changed. 
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application firefox 
{ 
    executablepaths /usr/bin/firefox:/usr/bin/X11/firefox: 
           /usr/lib/firefox/firefox:/usr/lib/firefox/firefox.sh; 
    functionality Standard_Graphical_Application  
        (peruser_directory="/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/", 
        peruser_files="/home/*/.mozilla/appreg", 
        application_libraries_directory="/usr/lib/firefox/", 
        libraries_fileextension=<default>, 
        config_directory={"/home/*/.mozilla/":"/home/*/.gnome2_private/"}, 
        config_files="", 
        read_only_directory=""); 
    functionality Web_Browser 
        (plugins_and_extensions_directory={"/home/*/.mozilla/plugins/": 
            "/usr/lib/firefox/extensions/": 
            "/usr/lib/browser-plugins/firefox/"}, 
        download_directory={"/home/*/Desktop/":"/home/*/downloads/"}, 
        allowed_hosts_to_connect_to=<default>, 
        view_web_files_in_directory="/home/*/"); 
} 
Figure 7.7:  Entire FBAC-LSM application policy for Mozilla Firefox 
The resulting FBAC policy is relatively easy to understand (although end users are not 
expected to edit this policy directly), is constructed based on high level abstractions, and 
encapsulates low-level details.  
 
In contrast, a policy to confine a complex application such as Firefox using standard sys-
tem call interposition mechanisms such as Systrace or Janus results in a complex series of 
low level rules specifying which system calls are allowed and under what circumstances. 
This is illustrated by the excerpt from a Systrace policy given in Figure 7.8, which only 
represents a very small portion of the complete policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the re-
sulting policy for applications using system call interposition is generally extremely com-
plex and it is difficult to verify that policy is, in fact, correct. 
 
native-fsread: filename eq "/usr/libexec/ld.so" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/usr/sbin/suexec" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/var/run/ld.so.hints" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/var/www" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "<non-existent filename>" then deny[enoent] 
Figure 7.8: Excerpt from a Systrace policy 
Figure 7.9 demonstrates the complexity and inscrutability of a SELinux policy by provid-
ing a brief excerpt from an SELinux reference policy for Mozilla [223]. During the usa-
bility study – which is described later in Chapter 10 – a number of participants comment-
ed on how difficult it was to comprehend the rules generated for the type enforcement 
(.te) file. Most users in the usability study were uncomfortable manually vetting or mak-    133 
ing changes to these rules. Although this policy excerpt contains macro abstractions, they 












fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) 
allow $1_mozilla_t $2:process signull; 
domain_auto_trans($2, mozilla_exec_t, $1_mozilla_t) 
# Unrestricted inheritance from the caller. 
allow $2 $1_mozilla_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; 
Figure 7.9: Excerpt from Mozilla interface rules in the Tresys SELinux reference policy [223] 
AppArmor’s  policy  specification  format  lists  the  resources  an  application  may  access 
along with the type of access required [25]. This is illustrated in Figure 7.10, which shows 
an excerpt from a policy to confine Firefox. Although this format simplifies policy reada-
bility,  it  exposes  the  underlying  complexity  of  the  system.  As  a  result  an  in-depth 
knowledge of both the application being confined and low-level details of the operating 
system's shared resources and services are required in order to properly review policy, 
















/opt/gnome/lib64/lib*so* mr,  
Figure 7.10: Excerpt from AppArmor's Firefox profile 
MAPbox’s  designers  identified  14  program  classes  and  corresponding  restricted  envi-
ronments that are associated with applications based on these author-assigned classes [30, 
31]. These restricted environments are defined by complex finely-grained rules specified 
by the user. While the use of behavioural classes to create an association between policies     134 
and programs is an important contribution, policy management in MAPbox remains com-
plex for users. Furthermore, applications can only be associated with a single behavioural 
class, which is problematic given many contemporary applications provide a variety of 
functionality: for example, the Opera web browser. Like MAPbox, FBAC also restricts 
applications based upon parameterised classes. However, FBAC allows applications to be 
associated with multiple functionalities and its hierarchical approach to policy manage-
ment supports multiple levels of abstraction, bringing numerous advantages.  For exam-
ple, FBAC functionalities may be defined hierarchically, whereas MAPbox’s sandboxes 
are defined individually. Unlike MAPbox, FBAC allows users to easily restrict arbitrary 
applications to protect themselves from programs they do not trust. Furthermore, FBAC-
LSM’s use of the LSM interface avoids the problems inherent in MAPbox's use of the 
system call interface as a security layer [26]. 
 
In contrast to these other mechanisms, FBAC-LSM separates and abstracts the task of de-
veloping low-level policy rules from the task of defining the expected behaviour of a spe-
cific program. This allows users and administrators (or any combination of authorised 
policy sources) to restrict what an application can do using high-level abstractions, which 
can  then  be  easily  fine-tuned  via  parameterisation  to  suit  different  applications.  As 
demonstrated  in  the  above  example,  compared  to  alternative  rule-based  application-
oriented access control models, FBAC can be used to confine complex software packages 
such web browsers using a hierarchical policy that is far easier to manage. While the 
above confinement methods are either system wide and mandatory (SELinux/DTE, Ap-
pArmor) or per-user and discretionary (Janus/Systrace, MAPbox), FBAC-LSM simulta-
neously enforces mandatory and discretionary FBAC policies. Using FBAC, users can 
configure their own security policy to protect themselves, while administrators are able to 
define system-wide policies to protect system security, enforce organisation level security 
goals and, when necessary, administer policy to protect specific users. These restrictions 
on applications severely limit the impact from malware or exploitation of any software 
vulnerabilities. 
7.9  Chapter Conclusion 
This concludes the description of the FBAC-LSM mechanism. Chapter 5 introduced the 
mechanism and described its goals, design and naming scheme, Chapter 6 described the     135 
software components that make up FBAC-LSM, the policy manager, policy server and 
the LSM, and Chapter 7 has described the policy language known as FBAC-PL, which 
expresses FBAC policies that FBAC-LSM can  manage  and enforce. This chapter de-
scribed how FBAC policies are stored in application, functionality, and confinement files, 
and concluded with a comparison between FBAC-PL and other application-oriented ac-
cess control policy schemes. This implementation demonstrates a proof of concept of the 
FBAC model. 
 
The remainder of the thesis evaluates and discusses the success of the FBAC model and 
its implementation. The next chapter evaluates the efficacy of FBAC policy abstractions 
(‘functionalities’), in terms of their aptitude for modelling the resource requirements of 
existing applications. 
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In the development of the understanding of complex phenomena, the most 
powerful tool available to the human intellect is abstraction. Abstraction 
arises from the recognition of similarities between certain objects, situa-
tions, or processes in the real world and the decision to concentrate on 
these similarities and to ignore, for the time being, their differences.  
Sir Charles Antony Richard Hoare, Notes on Data Structuring, 1972 [224]  ” 
 
 
8.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter explores and evaluates the efficacy of the FBAC model in terms of the apti-
tude of the policy abstractions – functionalities – to represent the privilege needs of appli-
cations. As explored in Chapter 2, previous studies have shown that the privilege re-
quirements of applications can be complex [120], and that policies to confine programs 
using rule-based application-oriented access controls can be very complicated [201]. In-
spired by schemes that provide policy abstractions, such as RBAC [39] and MAPbox 
[30], the FBAC model aims to provide reusable and flexible policy abstractions based on 
the features that are provided by applications. This chapter aims to assess the reusability 
and flexibility of the functionality policy construct. 
 
The chapter starts by describing the method used to develop functionalities based on the 
analysis of a number of applications. The functionalities that were created are described, 
then the application policies created utilising these functionalities are explored. The ex-
tent to which additional direct privileges are required by application policies illustrates 
the encapsulation provided by functionalities. Subsequently some observations regarding 
the compatibility of existing software with application-oriented restrictions are also pre-
sented; such as how well programs perform when they are denied access to resources. Fi-
nally, this chapter makes conclusions regarding the efficacy of FBAC functionalities. 
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As mentioned in previous chapters, the task of creating functionalities (as described in 
this chapter) requires expertise and can be performed by researchers and security profes-
sionals. This is separate from the task of creating applications policies, which is designed 
to be performed by normal users. This chapter focuses on the development and use of 
functionalities, subsequent chapters describe the process and the usability of FBAC-LSM 
for creating application policies.  
8.2  Methodology 
One hundred and two applications were analysed in terms of resource usage and privilege 
requirements. Based on this analysis, policy abstractions were created and expressed us-
ing FBAC-PL, as described in Chapter 7. These functionalities were then used as a basis 
for constructing policies to restrict the applications to authorised behaviour using FBAC-
LSM. 
 
Applications were selected for analysis based on the features they provided and their 
availability on the development environment. Games, image editing and viewing pro-
grams, video and audio players, text editors, network clients (IRC chat clients, FTP cli-
ents,  bittorrent  clients,  and  web  browsers),  and  some  widely-used  command-line  pro-
grams were analysed. The applications that were analysed are listed, along with infor-
mation about their resource requirements, in Section 8.4. 
 
The environment used was the development environment for FBAC-LSM: version 10.3 
of the OpenSUSE Linux distribution. The desktop environment used was KDE 3.5.7. Ap-
plications were installed and updated using the YAST package-manager.  
 
Developing functionalities, which abstract common privilege requirements in terms of the 
features the application provides, involves a number of steps. Following this list, each of 
these steps is described in further detail: 
·  identifying the resources applications utilise; 
·  identifying the purpose of each of these resources; 
·  determining whether access to each resource is required for the application to per-
form the user’s intent; 
·  grouping required resources, based on features provided, into functionalities; and,     138 
·  abstracting away application-specific resources by replacing literal resource de-
scriptions with parameters. 
 
Identifying the resources that applications utilise was performed by executing the applica-
tions, exercising their primary features, and using various tools to analyse the resources 
and the type of access requested. While FBAC-LSM was in initial development, this was 
carried out using strace (which outputs the system calls used by programs), AppArmor 
profiling tools (which output file/type AppArmor rules matching accesses), and by ana-
lysing the open source application profiles that were available for AppArmor. Later in 
development the FBAC-LSM module included logging of resource assesses to the dmesg 
kernel circular output buffer. This feature, coupled with the developed user-space tools, 
was then also used to analyse the resources used by applications. The FBAC-LSM policy 
manger has a learning mode that interacts with the module and uses the output of the ker-
nel output buffer. The policy manager was used to interactively add to application poli-
cies. The resulting output was then analysed.  
 
Identifying the purpose of each of these resources and determining whether access to each 
resource is required was an iterative process. Examination of the context of use, source 
code inspection, the examination of resource contents, and web searches were used to 
identify the reason applications accessed these resources. This knowledge was used to 
make informed decisions about whether to authorise access to the resources. When access 
to a resource seemed unnecessary, the ability of the applications to function without ac-
cess to the resource was tested.  
 
FBAC-PL rules granting access to the required resources were grouped together based on 
the features provided by applications and the way programs interact with users. Each of 
these groups of privileges were either expressed as FBAC-PL high-level functionalities, 
representing program features, or base-level functionalities, representing types of pro-
grams. Application-specific resources were abstracted away by replacing these literal re-
sources  with  functionality  parameters.  As  described  in  Chapter  7,  these  application-
specific resources are specified for each application policy as arguments to parameters 
when  assigning  functionalities.  Required  privileges  that  were  not  appropriate  for  any 
functionalities were assigned directly to application policies. 
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Likewise, privileges within functionalities that describe components of high-level features 
– that is, groups of privileges that were reused in multiple functionalities or with logical 
relationships – were grouped into low-level functionalities. When appropriate for policy 
reuse,  the  parent-functionality-specific  details  were  abstracted  away  using  parameters. 
Thus, low-level functionalities can be reused within other functionalities, and when child 
functionalities have parameters, arguments can be specified by the parent-functionality to 
adapt contained functionalities to the needs of the parent-functionality. The resulting poli-
cy structure is a hierarchy of functionalities, starting with the functionalities directly as-
signed to applications where, for example, a high-level functionality can contain other 
high-level functionalities and low-level functionalities, which can in turn contain other 
functionalities, and so on. 
 
Techniques for suggesting functionalities and automating the specification of parameter 
arguments were developed during the process of constructing functionalities. These tech-
niques are discussed in Chapter 9. 
8.3  The Functionalities Created 
Using the methodology just described, 144 functionalities were created. Three of these 
are base-level (2.1%), 40 are high-level (27.8%), and 101 are low-level functionalities 
(70.1%). The functionalities created are available in full online [207]. 
8.3.1  Base-Level Functionalities 
Base-level functionalities were designed to represent the different ways programs inter-
face with users. Based on the programs analysed, the three base-level functionalities cre-
ated are:  
·  Simple_Commandline_Program; 
·  Standard_Commandline_Application; and, 
·  Standard_Graphical_Application.  
The number of parameters for each of these functionalities is shown in Table 8.1. The 
Simple_Commandline_Program  functionality  provides  the  privileges  required  to 
act as a standalone command line program (for example, for programs such as rm, ls, 
and ps) that does not depend on any configuration or non-standard library files. The     140 
Standard_Commandline_Application base-level functionality additionally pro-
vides the privileges to read the appropriate files the program depends on such as applica-
tion-specific libraries and configuration files as required by many applications. Further-
more,  the  Standard_Graphical_Application  functionality  additionally  pro-
vides  the  privileges  necessary  for  graphical  user  interfaces  (GUI).  The  Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application functionality grants the ability to exercise GUI fea-
tures using frameworks such as X11, Qt, GTK, KDE, and Gnome.  




Simple_Commandline_Program   0 
Standard_Commandline_Application  6 
Standard_Graphical_Application  7 
 
These  base-level  functionalities  contain  low-level  functionalities.  For  example,  the 
Standard_Graphical_Application functionality includes the functionalities: 
·  base 
·  gui 
·  audio 
·  common_console_helper_programs 
·  tmp_access 
·  printer 
·  IPC_system_aware-dbus_system_bus 
·  mime_aware 
·  and other functionalities that grant access to application-specific resources speci-
fied as parameters 
Most of these low-level functionalities are likewise made up of other low-level function-
alities. As shown in Figure 8.1, using the policy manager’s advanced views one can “drill 
down” from base or high-level functionalities though the hierarchy of contained function-
alities. 
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Usually only one base-level functionality is required for each application. In the future, 




Figure 8.1: The Policy Manager’s Advanced Functionality View 
8.3.2  High-Level Functionalities 
The high-level functionalities created were designed to provide the privileges necessary 
for programs to perform the high-level features identified during analysis. A small num-
ber of functionalities (such as PDF_Editor) were developed based on initial analysis of 
further programs that were not analysed in full due to project time constraints. 
 
As previously described in Chapter 7, high-level functionalities are assigned categories to 
group related functionalities for ease of use. Table 8.2 shows a list of the 40 high-level 
functionalities that were developed. The categories into which they are grouped, and the 
number of parameters for each, are also displayed.  
 
During analysis, some high-level functionalities were created representing the needs of 
applications that make use of specific frameworks beyond the general base-level func-
tionalities. In order to maintain the simple relationship of one base-level functionality per 
application policy, these additional functionalities were classed as high-level functionali-
ties and assigned the ‘platform’ category. These are listed in the last row in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: High-level Functionalities by Category 
























































































A mean of 1.9 parameters were defined per high-level functionality. Based on these re-
sults, only a small number of application-specific details are required to adapt high-level 
functionalities to specific applications. FBAC-PL was successfully able to represent fea-
ture-based  security  goals  for  applications  as  high-level  functionalities.  The  extent  to 
which these functionalities satisfy the needs of applications is discussed in Section 8.4. 
8.3.3  Low-Level Functionalities 
A myriad of low-level functionalities were created to encapsulate, abstract and reuse re-
lated privileges. Most low-level functionalities represent components of features, such as     143 
access to application-layer network protocols (for example, POP3 and IMAP, which are 
used to provide email functionality), or access to groups of files required to perform a 
task (for example, access to fonts, which are required by graphical programs). Many of 
these functionalities use parameters to receive information about the resources to grant 
access to, and may also pass these parameters as arguments to other functionalities. For 
example,  the  POP3  low-level  functionality  has  the  parameters  POP3_servers,  and 
POP3_remote_port.  The  high-level  functionality  Email_Client  passes  parameters 
(which happen to have the same names) to the POP3 functionality. The POP3 function-
ality,  in  turn,  passes  these  parameters  to  the  tcp_outgoing  functionality  and  also 
passes a literal value “*” to specify that the connection from this application can originate 
from any local port. As described in Chapter 7, some low-level functionalities, such as 
tcp_outgoing and file_rw, are used to grant various privileges to the resources de-
scribed by parameters. The low-level functionalities that were developed are available 
online [207]. 
8.4  Functionalities Applied 
Utilising the functionalities developed, policies were created for the applications. Of the 
102 applications studied, only four required privileges that were deemed unsuited to the 
functionalities and parameters developed. These additional privileges were applied direct-
ly to the applications and are discussed in some detail within this section.  
 
The tables from Table 8.3 to Table 8.10 give an overview of the application policies cre-
ated. Each table shows the application policy names (which, by convention, are named af-
ter the command used to start each application), the functionalities directly assigned to the 
application policy, and the number of privileges directly assigned to the application poli-
cy. Applications that are assigned the same functionalities with the same number of addi-
tional privileges are grouped into the same row. All the application policies, as expressed 
using FBAC-PL, are available online [207]. 
 
Table 8.3 shows an overview of the policies created for the file transfer programs that 
were studied. These programs include FTP, Bittorrent and HTTP/FTP tools. Most of the 
command-line  based  programs  were  assigned  the  Stand-    144 
ard_Commandline_Application base-level functionality. The ftp, wget and rtor-
rent programs are particularly independent (that is, they do not require access to configu-
ration  files)  and  therefore  can  alternatively  be  assigned  the  Sim-
ple_Commandline_Program  base-level  functionality.  For  these  programs,  since 
they only require the most restrictive base-level functionality, assigning any other base-
level functionality would also allow these programs to function. All the programs that 
have graphical interfaces were assigned the Standard_Graphical_Application 
base-level functionality. The deluge program is additionally assigned the Uses_Python 
platform high-level functionality as it utilises the Python framework. 
Table 8.3: Overview of FTP and Bittorrent Application Policies (file transfer.fbac) 
Applications   Functionalities 
Additional Direct 
Privileges 
gftp, filezilla  Standard_Graphical_Application 




BitTorrent_Client  0 
ftp  Simple_Commandline_Program Ftp_Client  0 
ncftp, yaftp  Standard_Commandline_Application 
Ftp_Client  0 
wget  Simple_Commandline_Program 






rtorrent  Simple_Commandline_Program 
BitTorrent_Client  0 
 
As demonstrated in Table 8.3, the functionalities created provide all the permissions re-
quired for these programs to function as intended. Therefore, no additional privileges 
were  assigned  directly  to  the  programs.  The  high-level  functionalities  Bit-
Torrent_Client, Downloader, and Ftp_Client are used to authorise these be-
haviours and are adapted to the needs of each application successfully. 
 
The FTP protocol includes two different approaches for communication between servers 
and clients, known as ‘active FTP’ and ‘passive FTP’ [225]. The Ftp_Client high-
level functionality includes privileges required for both active FTP and passive FTP. Due 
to the way active FTP clients interact with servers, this requires the client to allow incom-
ing connections on any local unprivileged port (ports numbers greater than 1023) when 
the remote port is 20. As FBAC-LSM network privileges act as simple stateful packet fil-    145 
ters, the effect of this privilege requirement is that the Ftp_Client functionality grants 
this fairly permissive network access to all FTP clients.  
 
There are a number of ways that this network exposure could be reduced. By incorporat-
ing third generation firewall features, such as application layer protocol analysis and fil-
tering, network exposure to port misuse could be minimised. Boolean functionality pa-
rameters could also be developed to allow components of high-level functionalities to be 
enabled or disabled: for example, in order to disable active FTP for particular applica-
tions. Potential future improvements are discussed further in Chapter 13.  
 
Table 8.4 gives an overview of the policies developed for the games that were analysed. 
As all of these games have graphical user interfaces, they are all assigned the Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application base-level functionality. Some are also assigned the 
platform functionalities Uses_Python, Uses_Orbit and Uses_Perl as they make 
use  of  these  frameworks.  The  high-level  functionalities  Game,  and  Network_Game 
were developed. Games that had multiplayer network features were allocated the Net-
work_Game functionality. The others were assigned the Game functionality. The privi-
lege needs of the majority of the games studied (approximately 80%) were satisfied with 
the Standard_Graphical_Application and Game functionality combination.  
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Table 8.4: Overview of Game Application Policies (games.fbac) 
Applications   Functionalities 
Additional Direct 
Privileges 
gnobots, gnometris, kasteroids, kfouleggs, 
kgoldrunner, ksirtet, ksmiletris, ksnake, 
kspaceduel, ktron, ktumberling, supertux, 
kenolaba, kbackgammon, kblackbox, gtali, 
kmahjongg, mahjongg, kreversi, blackjack, 
kpat, kpoker, sol, ksame, kbounce, 
konquest, kmines, gnomine, glines, gnotski, 
same-gnome, gnotravex, ksokoban, 
katomic, kjumpingcube, knetwalk, klines, 
kolf, brutalchess, xmoto, klickety 
Standard_Graphical_Application  













iagno, gnect, lskat, gnibbles, kwin4, 
kbattleship 
Standard_Graphical_Application  










Game  N/A 
 
Only one game required an additional privilege not covered by these functionalities. The 
glchess game essentially works as a graphical front-end for the chess engine gnome-
gnuchess  and  therefore  requires  permission  to  execute  /usr/bin/gnome-
gnuchess. In this case, a new functionality for providing a front-end for another pro-
gram could have been developed. Nevertheless, this additional privilege requirement was 
specified as a direct privilege, given that the fact that the program acts as a front-end was 
not clearly intuitive. The result of this type of additional privilege requirement is that us-
ers may need to take action to make lower-level access decisions; that is, to grant privi-
leges that the functionality abstraction has not encapsulated. However, in this case the 
functionalities have abstracted an enormous deal of detail away from the user and, of all 
the games studied, only one low level access decision would need to be made. This is in 
contrast to the potentially hundreds of details the user is exposed to for each program us-
ing other rule-based application-oriented access control schemes such as AppArmor or 
Systrace. The effect of these types of privilege requirements is discussed further in Sec-
tion 8.6. 
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During policy analysis, the lbreakout game corrupted its configuration files; the result 
being that even when no FBAC-LSM policy was in effect, the game crashed with a seg-
mentation fault. A simple reinstall of the program did not resolve the issue. The program 
reported an “Unexpected EOF in ‘/var/games/lbreakout2.hscr’”. However, removing that 
file resulted in a buffer overflow. Also, the iagno game hung when entering network 
play, even without FBAC-LSM restrictions in effect; this may have had a similar cause, 
corrupted configuration files. These could be considered examples of poor quality code 
that does not check for and recover from permission denials. Nevertheless, during policy 
analysis it was found that the majority of the programs studied handle denied access at-
tempts quite predictably; this is discussed further in Section 8.5.  
 
As shown in Table 8.5, the graphics applications studied are all (as naturally expected) 
assigned the Standard_Graphical_Application base-level functionality. Other 
than  gwenview,  they  are  all  assigned  the  Image_Editor  high-level  functionality, 
which allows the programs to edit images. The gwenview program, which does not 
modify images, is assigned the Image_Viewer functionality, which authorises the pro-
gram to read the images but not write to them. 
 
The Digikam application requires additional privileges. Digikam creates a database con-
taining information about the images that the user manages through the program. This is 
stored in a file named digikam3.db and was located in the /home/user/Pictures di-
rectory.  As  this  is  non-standard  behaviour,  two  privileges  (to  read  and  lock  the 
digikam3.db file) are assigned directly. As this file essentially stores configuration infor-
mation for the digikam program, according to the FHS standard this information should 
be stored in a file or within a directory for per-user information for that program [226]. 
For  example,  this  file  could  be  stored  in  the  
/home/USER/.kde/share/apps/digikam/  directory.  Digikam  can  be  config-
ured to store this file therein, which removes the need for these extra privileges.     148 
Table 8.5: Overview of Graphics Application Policies (graphics.fbac) 
Applications   Functionalities 
Additional Direct 
Privileges 
digikam  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Image_Editor  2 
eog, gimp, krita  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Image_Editor  0 
karbon  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Image_Editor 
0 
(2+ for parsing other file 
formats) 
gwenview  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Image_Viewer  0 
 
Utilising the privileges provided by the Standard_Graphical_Application and 
Image_Editor functionalities, the Karbon drawing program can provide its core fea-
tures. It can edit and save “.karbon” files, which is Karbon’s native file format. However, 
when working with other file types Karbon shares code, via libraries, with other KDE ap-
plications (such as Krita) and tries to access the configuration files for these other applica-
tions. As specified in the methodology, these ancillary features were considered outside 
the scope of the policy created, although these privilege requirements may warrant further 
exploration in the future. Developing the ability to allow Karbon to act as a front-end to 
the other programs may satisfy this privilege requirement. 
 
As  illustrated  in  Table  8.6,  of  the  IRC  applications  analysed,  one  was  allocated  the 
Standard_Commandline_Application base-level functionality. The others were 
assigned the Standard_Graphical_Application base-level functionality. Three 
were  assigned  the  Uses_Perl  platform  functionality.  They  all  use  the 
Irc_Chat_Client high-level functionality. Only one was assigned an additional priv-
ilege.  
 
The xchat-gnome program acts as an alternative to the xchat program. The xchat-
gnome program is in many ways independent from xchat. It uses separate libraries and 
separate resources, yet it shares the same peruser files. The xchat-gnome application 
policy  could  provide  this  privilege  requirement  by  simply  specifying  the  Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application  peruser_directory  parameter  argument  as 
“/home/USER/.xchat2”. In this case both application policies would use the same 
value for the peruser_directory parameter argument. However, since this configuration is     149 
somewhat counter-intuitive, this requirement was satisfied with an additional direct privi-
lege granting read access to the .xchat2 directory. 
Table 8.6: Overview of IRC Client Application Policies (irc clients.fbac) 









bitchx  Standard_Commandline_Application  
Irc_Chat_Client  0 
xchat  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Irc_Chat_Client  0 
xchat-gnome  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Irc_Chat_Client  1 
 
Table 8.7 shows an overview of the policies created for the media players studied. All 
were assigned the Standard_Graphical_Application base-level functionality. 
The Uses_Ruby and Uses_Mono platform functionalities were used once each. Most 
of these applications were allocated both the Audio_Player and the Video_Player 
high-level functionalities. Due to privilege requirements among many of these applica-
tions, the media functionality (which is included in both the Audio_Player and the 
Video_Player high-level functionalities) includes permission to access xine plugins 
and the ability to execute mplayer. None of these applications required additional direct 
privileges.  
Table 8.7: Overview of Audio and Video Players Application Policies (media players.fbac) 






















totem  Standard_Graphical_Application  
Video_Player  0 
 
As shown in Table 8.8, the text editors studied utilise the File_Editor high-level 
functionality. The gedit, kate, and kwrite programs were allocated the Stand-    150 
ard_Graphical_Application  base-level  functionality,  while  vi  was  allocated 
Standard_Commandline_Application. None of these programs required addi-
tional privileges. 
Table 8.8: Overview of File Editor Application Policies (text editors.fbac) 






File_Editor  0 
vi  Standard_Commandline_Application  
File_Editor  0 
 
Table 8.9 gives an overview of the policies created for the web browsers studied. Other 
than the lynx program, which has a command-line interface, they were allocated the 
Standard_Graphical_Application base-level functionality. Firefox makes use 
of the Uses_XulRunner functionality to provide Mozilla XUL framework features. 
These program policies all include the Web_Browser high-level functionality. Opera 
also  provides  a  number  of  other  Internet  client  features  and  was  also  assigned  the 
Email_Client,  Irc_Chat_Client,  BitTorrent_Client,  and 
News_Reader_Client functionalities. Despite the complex nature of web browsers, 
these functionalities successfully provide all the privileges required for these programs to 
perform typical browsing features. No additional privileges were assigned directly to the-
se applications. 
 
Table 8.9: Overview of Web Brower Application Policies (web browsers.fbac) 
Applications   Functionalities 
Additional Direct 
Privileges 
epiphany  Standard_Graphical_Application  






lynx  Standard_Commandline_Application  
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Table 8.10 shows an overview of the policies created for some of the command-line tools 
that were studied. Other than kcheckpass, all of these applications can be assigned the 
Simple_Commandline_Program base-level functionality as they do not have any 
configuration files. Kcheckpass requires the Standard_Graphical_Application 
base-level functionality as it depends on the KDE framework, despite the fact that it runs 
on the console. As discussed later in Chapter 9, although slightly counterintuitive
15, the 
decision to assign this base-level functionality can be reliably automated.  
Table 8.10: Overview of Common Console Application Policies (console.fbac) 
Applications   Functionalities 
Additional Direct 
Privileges 
rm  Simple_Commandline_Program  
Deleter  0 
cat, ls  Simple_Commandline_Program  
File_Viewer  0 
ps  Simple_Commandline_Program  
Process_Information  0 
mount  Simple_Commandline_Program  




System_Passwd_Management  0 
kcheckpass  Standard_Graphical_Application  
System_Passwd_Check  3 
 
The policies created for rm, cat, and ls are necessarily permissive, as these programs 
may be invoked by user interaction via a command-line shell to view and manage files. 
The policy for rm allows the program to unlink (delete) any files, while cat and ls are 
authorised to view any files. The Standard-_Commandline_Application and 
Standard_Graphical_Applica-tion base-level functionalities allow other ap-
plications to execute these programs (among others) to help them perform their tasks. In 
this case, the programs execute with an intersection of the policies for the helper pro-
grams and the applications. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, rm could be used by 
an application such as Firefox to delete the files that Firefox is authorised to delete, but 
rm cannot be used by Firefox to delete other files, even though the policy for the rm pro-
gram may allow it to delete any files. 
 
                                                 
15 Assigning the Standard_Graphical_Application functionality is slightly counterintuitive in this case in 
that the program runs at the command-line. However, the name kcheckpass uses the KDE naming conven-
tion of starting with a ‘k’, which hints that the program makes use of the KDE framework, which is used by 
many graphical programs.     152 
The File_Viewer functionality is used by both cat and ls to display files. The func-
tionality is abstract enough to represent the needs of both programs; cat displays the 
contents of files, while ls inspects files and reports its various attributes. 
 
The mount, passwd, expiry, gpasswd and kcheckpass programs are typically 
configured as setuid root. That is, these programs run with administrator rights and inter-
act with programs run by normal users. Administrators can mitigate the potential risk of a 
vulnerable setuid program granting root access to a normal user by restricting these pro-
grams to only access the resources they require to function. The kcheckpass policy 
demonstrates this: if a user is able to subvert the behaviour of the kcheckpass pro-
gram, the worst case scenario is that the user can gain read access to the shadow file, 
which contains hashes of passwords. Although this could still be considered a serious se-
curity incident, the attacking user doesn’t simply gain administrator access to the system, 
as would be the case without the additional security provided by FBAC-LSM. For this 
reason it is prudent to confine setuid programs using FBAC-LSM
16. 
 
The mount, passwd, expiry, and gpasswd programs require access to security sen-
sitive privileges that could lead to system compromise if misused by the programs. There-
fore,  confining  these  specific  programs  using  application-oriented  controls  such  as 
FBAC-LSM has limited benefits. Mounting filesystems is a security sensitive operation in 
a path-based security mechanism such as FBAC-LSM. Since version 2.4.0, the Linux 
kernel has included the feature known as bind mounting. Bind mounting allows part of 
the file hierarchy to be remounted somewhere else. For example, the command “mount 
--bind olddir newdir” can be used to access olddir from a new name newdir, 
which could potentially circumvent path-based security policy. It is therefore important to 
limit access to the ability to mount filesystems. As previously shown in Chapter 5 Table 
5.2,  FBAC-LSM  mediates  access  to  mounting  and  unmounting  via  the  fs_mount  and 
fs_umount privileges respectively. The passwd, expiry, and gpasswd programs re-
quire write access to the shadow file; therefore, if these programs are compromised they 
could change passwords on the system even if they are confined to only access the files 
they are required to access. These are examples of legitimate actions that are indistin-
                                                 
16 Normal users can also make use of the combination of FBAC with a setuid program, to grant access to 
their resources via a program that runs with their identity confined by their FBAC-LSM policy. This en-
sures that the program cannot inadvertently grant access to additional privileges.     153 
guishable from malicious actions. All existing application-oriented controls for Linux, in-
cluding FBAC-LSM, make file access decisions based on which file and type of access is 
requested. Further heuristic analysis and restrictions could be incorporated to enforce ad-
ditional control over program behaviour; this is further discussed in Chapter 13.  
 
Kcheckpass requires three direct privileges that grant access to temporary files created 
in /var/run/. These files are named “kcheckpass.” followed by a random integer. As 
only programs running as the root user are authorised to write to this directory [226], the 
Standard_Graphical_Application  functionality  is  not  designed  to  grant  this 
access.  An  additional  base-level  functionality  could  be  created,  with  a  parameter  that 
specifies files that can be created in this directory. As this was the only program studied 
that had this type of requirement, the privileges were added directly to the policy. It is ex-
pected that future research on the privilege needs of different types of applications (such 
as CGI scripts, init scripts, network servers, and system demons) will yield other base-
level functionalities that will fulfil the privilege needs of these other types of programs. 
8.5  Linux Applications and Restricted Access 
This section explores how compatible existing applications are with being confined, and 
the challenges rule-based application-oriented access control schemes face due to poorly 
designed applications. Most of the programs studied behaved correctly and predictably 
when they were being restricted to only access certain resources. However, some pro-
grams did not handle access denial well, and it was obvious that most software was de-
signed for the paradigm of user-oriented security and did not have application-oriented 
restrictions in mind when it were designed. Some applications did not function correctly 
when they did not have the access to resources they expected. Other than in two cases 
(described in the previous section), adding the required privileges – either by assigning 
direct privileges to application policies, or by adding privileges to functionalities – al-
lowed the applications to function normally. The FBAC model is particularly good at 
avoiding issues due to inadequate access to resources for normal functioning, since high-
level abstractions are used to configure application policies, thereby granting access to the 
vast majority of the required privileges. 
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The way that existing applications act when application-oriented access controls are in ef-
fect (and potentially misconfigured) can affect the user’s experience of applying these 
types of restrictions. The ways in which the applications that were studied handled access 
denials can be divided into four categories: 
·  Those that gracefully recover from the denial and continue to run: When a pro-
gram had access to most of the privileges it utilises, such as those privileges that 
are required to load the required libraries and get the program started, then at-
tempts to access additional resources were usually handled well. For example, a 
program that had successfully loaded but was then denied access to a file the user 
wanted to open for editing within the program, would usually inform the user that 
the operation is not permitted and the program would continue to run. Occasional-
ly the user was not notified of these types of denials. This was the case with 
KWrite: in some cases when denied the right to access a file that the user had at-
tempted to open, the access would silently fail and a blank document was present-
ed. Network denials were also typically handled well. 
·  Those that cease to execute: When denied access to the libraries used, or any of 
the  relevant  application-specific  resources  (particularly  system-wide  resources) 
the programs would typically stop executing, often exiting with an error message. 
·  Those that go into an infinite loop trying to access the resource: Sometimes when 
access to a file was denied a program would try accessing the file a few times be-
fore giving up. This behaviour has also previously been observed by researchers 
[227] and may be designed to overcome the fact that network filesystems occa-
sionally fail. However, in some cases programs entered an infinite loop, effective-
ly freezing the program. These instances are examples of poor error handling. 
·  Those that crash: Some programs crashed when they were not authorised access 
to resources. These crashes included segmentation faults, and buffer overflows. 
This  is  due  to  poor  coding  practices;  some  developers  took  authorisation  for 
granted and did not program for the eventuality of access denial. As described in 
the previous section, in the case of the lbreakout program this even resulted in 
the corruption of configuration files. 
 
The KDE desktop environment provides a number of features designed to improve per-
formance; however, these features complicate the use of application-oriented access con-    155 
trols and obviously are not designed for use with the paradigm of application-oriented se-
curity. KDE optimises the execution of some programs by running them via kdeinit, 
which loads programs as libraries rather than executing them as individual processes. 
That  is,  rather  than  making  an  exec()  system  call  to  execute  the  program,  the 
kdeinit process forks and loads the corresponding shared object (.so). The effect is that 
kdeinit acts on behalf of all these programs and from an application confinement per-
spective means that kdeinit requires all the privileges any of these programs may re-
quire, and that these programs cannot easily be confined individually while kdeinit is 
acting on their behalf. Similarly, the KDE io (input/output) handler performs caching of 
network connections and acts on behalf of other programs to provide network connec-
tions. This means that the io handler requires access to all the network privileges required 
by any of these programs and that the network privileges granted to these programs can-
not  easily  be  restricted.  It  is  possible  to  disable  these  features  by  setting  the 
‘KDE_IS_PRELINKED’ and ‘KDE_EXECS_SLAVES’ environment variables, and this 
is necessary in order to use application-oriented security systems such as FBAC-LSM, 
AppArmor or SELinux to confine the programs that make use of some KDE features.  
 
It  may  be  possible  to  modify  these  KDE  features  to  be  application-oriented  security 
aware: for example, by modifying kdeinit to use special security system calls to in-
form the security system that the program is acting on behalf of another program, or by 
allowing the kdeinit to enforce the appropriate restrictions. Unfortunately, modifying 
the programs to communicate with the security system currently requires different modi-
fications depending on the security system in use. A security-system-independent scheme 
for specifying when a program is acting on behalf of another program or user could be 
proposed and developed to mitigate this problem. The new scheme could provide new 
system calls for programs to make this assertion explicit, or could be based on behaviour 
of the programs: for example, when applications read certain files (such as certain .so or 
.java files) they could be considered to be acting on behalf of another program. Relying 
on user-space tools such as kdeinit to enforce security policies requires either multiple 
schemes for specifying policies or requires kdeinit access to the policy definitions, 
neither of which is favourable. Also, it is considered bad design to allow multipurpose 
programs to additionally enforce security [177]. Therefore, it is recommended that these 
features be disabled (as was the case during the policy development discussed in this     156 
chapter), or alternatively a scheme for specifying what the program is acting on behalf of 
could be developed. 
 
Also, during the study it was found that some of the libraries that the programs utilised 
behaved in ways that did not consider application restrictions. For example, most pro-
grams that utilised the Gnome framework required access to alter the permissions associ-
ated with a “.gnome_private” directory within the user’s home directory. If this access 
was denied, these programs exited with an error message. This behaviour was designed to 
increase security by enforcing permission changes to protect the user’s private data from 
other  users  on  the  system.  However,  ironically,  
allowing all Gnome applications to control these permissions (as is required) somewhat 
lowers  application-oriented  security.  On  the  KDE-based  system  used  to  perform  this 
analysis, this privilege requirement was particularly curious as the directory was empty. 
KDE programs also required a few undesirable (although also low threat) privileges, in-
cluding read access to samba and Network Filesystem (NFS) settings. Since these privi-
leges should not be necessary for most applications to function, these libraries should be 
modified to recover gracefully from such denials. This highlights the importance of good 
programming practice in shared code such as libraries. 
 
All rule-based application-oriented access controls for Linux face these challenges
17. As 
mentioned earlier, compared to other schemes, the FBAC model reduces many of the is-
sues described in this section. These issues were identified through the detailed analysis 
of applications during the development of functionalities; however, end users construct 
FBAC application policies using high-level functionalities designed by a third party, such 
as the functionalities presented in this chapter. Using FBAC-LSM, end users are therefore 
less likely to experience erroneous application behaviour due to the absence of privileges, 
since, in most cases, functionalities provide all the resources required for an application to 
act benevolently. Moreover, in the event that an application does require additional privi-
leges, the amount of activity that needs to be analysed is significantly reduced compared 
                                                 
17 These issues are likely to also apply to other operating systems with established applications. Given that 
Linux has had rule-based application-oriented access controls (such as SELinux) for some time, and that 
applications developed for Windows have struggled to adapt to the introduction of new user-oriented con-
trols (UAC), it is likely that these same kinds of issues will apply at least to the same extent to rule-based 
application-oriented access controls for Windows.     157 
to a scheme that primarily constructs policy based on detailed low-level rules (such as 
AppArmor, SELinux, or Systrace). 
8.6  Discussion 
8.6.1  Functionalities Model the Needs of Applications 
The analysis of existing applications and the policy development presented in this chapter 
demonstrates that FBAC functionalities can model and abstract the privileges required to 
perform program features. This analysis has also demonstrated that FBAC-PL is capable 
of expressing useful policies that can fulfil the privilege needs of applications while limit-
ing their actions to prevent unauthorised activity. As demonstrated in Section 8.3, base-
level functionalities were developed to represent the privileges required by general clas-
ses of applications, high-level functionalities were developed representing high-level fea-
tures provided by applications, and low-level functionalities were successfully employed 
hierarchically to abstract and encapsulate policy details. 
 
As demonstrated in Section 8.4, the created functionalities were successfully utilised to 
authorise the applications to perform the features they provide. The 102 application poli-
cies that were created successfully assigned and adapted the three base-level functionali-
ties, and 27 of the 40 high-level functionalities that were developed, to authorise legiti-
mate application behaviour. These high-level functionalities included the seven platform 
functionalities and 20 functionalities that represent the features the applications provide. 
The functionalities were abstract and configurable enough to represent the needs of these 
many applications. 
 
Of the 102 applications studied, only four required privileges in addition to those provid-
ed by the functionalities developed. Those that had additional privilege requirements were 
resolved with minor additions, and it is believed that, in each case, further research and 
development would yield functionalities that would satisfy these privilege requirements.  
 
These results indicate that the FBAC model is able to represent the privilege needs of ap-
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FBAC model uniquely overcomes many of the application behaviour challenges faced by 
all rule-based application-oriented access controls.  
8.6.2  Actions Authorised 
The policies created could have been designed to be stricter and more narrowly focused: 
for example, by allowing access to only specific GUI frameworks for each application. 
However, as previously described, the methodology utilised takes a feature-driven ap-
proach. This results in applications potentially being granted multiple methods for provid-
ing the features that are expected from them. It is postulated that this is an excellent bal-
ance between the principle of least privilege, and that of psychological acceptability. Ap-
plications are granted the freedom to implement their features using various methods; 
however, they are only allowed to act within the confines of the actions that are approved 
for the functionalities they provide. 
8.6.3  Policy Manageability and Scalability 
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the challenges facing all finely-grained rule-based ap-
plication-oriented access control schemes is policy complexity. Each application policy is 
typically made up of a large number of low-level access rules, and the complexity of the 
overall system policy more or less increases in direct relation to the number of applica-
tions that are confined. Some existing schemes include simple abstractions that group re-
lated rules (for example, AppArmor policy abstractions, and SELinux domains); howev-
er, these abstractions only represent relatively low-level aspects of programs and have 
limited reuse.  
 
In contrast, the policies created for FBAC-LSM are largely defined in terms of reusable 
abstractions. The result is a hierarchical policy configuration that reduces redundancy in 
both application policies, and also within policy abstractions (where functionalities are 
defined in terms of other functionalities). The results presented in this chapter showed 
that the functionalities that were developed were reusable and flexible; functionalities 
were  adapted  to  provide  authority  to  multiple  applications  and  functionalities.  FBAC 
therefore improves the scalability of policy, since confining applications is performed by 
applying existing functionalities, rather than creating complex low-level rules.     159 
 
The structure produced by functionality hierarchies provides layers of abstraction. Logi-
cally grouped rules were abstracted into functionalities. This improves the manageability 
of policy, by making it possible to “drill down” from higher level functionalities, to low-
level details. This structure eases maintenance of policy, since details are encapsulated 
according to the purpose of the rules. As was illustrated in Figure 8.1, this can facilitate 
visual representations of policy that can assist in policy maintenance. 
 
Also, FBAC separates the task of abstraction development from association to application 
policies. Assigning functionalities to applications is separated from the more complicated 
task of developing functionalities, which would normally be performed by someone with 
more specialised knowledge. The task involved in associating functionalities with appli-
cation policies, and the usability benefits of the FBAC model are evaluated in the subse-
quent chapters. 
8.7  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has described the analysis of a number of existing applications, to evaluate 
the ability of the FBAC model to grant authority to applications based on functionalities. 
The chapter started by describing the methodology. Then the results of functionality de-
velopment and application policy construction were presented. Finally, the efficacy of the 
FBAC model, in terms of policy abstraction, was discussed. 
 
The FBAC scheme was successfully able to express policy abstractions for general clas-
ses of applications, and for high and low-level program features. Functionalities success-
fully encapsulated policy details, while remaining able to be adapted to the needs of dif-
ferent applications. The functionalities developed were successfully applied to policies 
for the applications. As discussed, the FBAC model overcomes many of the problems due 
to the complexity of the privilege needs of applications, and also the behaviour of some 
applications when actions are restricted. 
 
Despite literature demonstrating that the privilege needs of applications are complicated 
[228], and that policies for restricting applications can be very complex [201], this re-
search proves that using a functionality-based approach can yield reusable policy abstrac-    160 
tions, and that the privilege requirements of applications map well to these abstractions. 
From a policy development point of view, this builds a strong case for the reusability and 
flexibility of the FBAC model. 
 
The next chapter explores the suitability of the FBAC model to the automation of policy 
construction. The subsequent chapters evaluate the usability of FBAC.     161 
Chapter 9  Automation of Policy Specification 
 
“ 
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations we 
can perform without thinking.  
Alfred North Whitehead, English mathematician and philosopher 
(1861 – 1947)  ” 
 
 
9.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter explores the potential of FBAC policy specification to be automated, and 
proposes a number of techniques to assist in the creation of application policies. As dis-
cussed throughout this thesis, constructing a policy for an application using FBAC in-
volves specifying the executable paths of the application, the functionalities that represent 
the program’s characteristics and the features it provides, and also specifying arguments 
for the parameters of functionalities. Specifying parameter arguments adapts functionali-
ties to specific applications, and is the most complicated part of this process. Automating 
and providing suggestions for the specification of executables, functionalities, and param-
eter arguments can assist in the creation of application policies, and reduce even further 
the expertise required to construct policies to confine applications.  
 
This chapter presents a number of automation techniques unique within the field of appli-
cation-oriented access controls, to which the FBAC model is uniquely suited, and dis-
cusses how these techniques can enable FBAC-LSM to provide a priori policy specifica-
tion. That is, the construction of policies without having to first run the application to be 
confined. 
9.2  Application Confinement and Automation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous application-oriented access controls, including Sys-
trace, AppArmor, and SELinux, typically rely on learning mode tools in order to create 
policies to confine applications. Learning mode tools are the most common approach to 
mitigating the usability problems associated with the policy complexity of finely-grained 
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the actions of the programs that are to be confined. This can usually be performed either 
while running the program unconfined, or while the policy is enforced. Either way, there 
are a number of drawbacks to this approach of constructing policy. Typically, rules are 
created while the program is unconfined. However, in this case if the program behaves 
maliciously, then the program can do damage to the system and expose users’ files to 
misuse while the policy is being constructed. On the other hand, if the program is being 
confined while policy is created, the program will typically require extensive reruns in 
order to generate all the rules that are required in order for the program to successfully 
load and execute. In either case, the user creating the policy must carefully vet each of 
these rules to ensure that the program does indeed require access to the resources it tries 
to access. The inability of many users to successfully vet malicious requests is demon-
strated later in Chapter 11.  
 
The FBAC model separates the bulk of program analysis and rule specification from the 
task of specifying policies for individual applications. Since FBAC application policies 
are constructed using high-level abstractions, users do not need to use a learning mode in 
order to create an application policy, and using the automation techniques described in 
this chapter further eases the specification of policies. Complete policies can typically be 
specified without having to execute the programs being confined. FBAC therefore avoids 
many of the issues inherent with application-oriented controls that create policies using 
learning tools.  
 
Utilising FBAC, creating policies for applications using existing functionalities involves 
assigning functionalities and specifying parameter arguments. In many cases the choice of 
functionalities is intuitive: for example, the gnobots game is assigned the Stand-
ard_Graphical_Application functionality, because that is the base-level func-
tionality that describes the type of interface the user expects, and the Game high-level 
functionality, because the user expects the program to act as a game. However, in some 
cases the choice of functionality, and the values to provide as parameters, can be unclear. 
For example, selecting platform functionalities could require knowledge of the frame-
works used by the program being confined. Also, on a Linux system the files and directo-
ries that are used by an application, which are specified as arguments to parameters, are 
distributed across the filesystem according to the Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS)     163 
[226]. Therefore specifying parameter values can require knowledge of the Linux filesys-
tem. Automating and suggesting the selection of executable paths, functionalities and pa-
rameter argument values significantly reduces the burden of specifying policies and even 
further reduces the expertise required in order to utilise FBAC.  
 
The FBAC model is uniquely suited to policy specification automation. In nearly all the 
cases  studied  functionality  and  parameter  selections  can  be  suggested  and  automated. 
Since this reduces the effort involved in policy creation, successful automation contrib-
utes to a strong case for the suitability of functionalities as policy abstractions. 
9.3  Functionality Suggestions 
Two techniques are used by FBAC-LSM to suggest functionalities during policy con-
struction. Suggestions are based on the libraries that are dynamically linked to the pro-
grams and the dependencies of the programs that compose the application, and also the 
icon category specified for the application. As specified previously in Chapter 7, Section 
7.4, the conditions under which each functionality is suggested are specified in the func-
tionality  definition  using  the  “suggest_functionality”  directive.  Multiple  “sug-
gest_functionality” commands can be defined for a functionality, in which case, if there 
are matches with any of these, the functionality will be suggested. 
 
When the “suggest_functionality” directive is followed by “uses_library” the subsequent 
string is searched for within the dynamically linked libraries and dependencies of the ap-
plication’s executables. For example, the following line is included in the definition of the 
Audio_Player functionality: 
suggest_functionality uses_library ″libogg″; 
Libogg is a library used to decode Ogg media files. In this case, when constructing a poli-
cy for a new application, if the string “libogg” is found within the linked libraries or de-
pendencies, the Audio_Player functionality is suggested.  
 
This analysis is performed by parsing the output of third party programs. The ldd (List 
Dynamic Dependencies) command uses the runtime linker to diagnose an executable file 
and generate a list of all the shared objects (.so library files) that are loaded when the pro-
gram  is  run.  For  each  executable  file  associated  with  an  application  policy,  the  ldd     164 
command is run with the filename as an argument (i.e. ldd filename). If no match 
for the string is found using ldd, the rpm (RPM Package Manager) command is used to 
query the RPM database to retrieve a list of the dependencies for the executables. The fol-
lowing command is used to retrieve RPM dependencies: 
rpm -q -f filename –qf %{NAME} -R 
 
The “uses_library” strings that were identified during the study and the resulting func-
tionality suggestions are shown in Table 9.1. Any match to the left column results in all 
the suggestions in the column on the right. 
Table 9.1: Functionalities suggested based on library use 
Uses_library String (OR)  Suggested Functionalities (AND) 
libogg  Audio_Player, Audio_Editor 
libkmediaplayer  Image_Viewer, Video_Player, Vid-
eo_Editor,  
perl  Uses_Perl 
mono  Uses_Mono 
python  Uses_Python 
ORBit  Uses_Orbit 
java, jpackage,   Uses_Java 
xulrunner  Uses_XulRunner 
ruby  Uses_Ruby 
kde, gnome, Qt, gtk, X11  Standard_Graphical_Application 
libtorrent  BitTorrent_Client 
python-irclib  Irc_Chat_Client 
 
When the “suggest_functionality” directive is followed by “iconcategory”, the subsequent 
string is searched for within the icon categories the application is assigned to. For exam-
ple, the following line is also included in the definition of the Audio_Player functionality: 
suggest_functionality iconcategory ″Music″; 
 
On many Linux systems, files with a “.desktop” file extension are used to represent each 
of the graphical applications that are installed on a system. These files are used to create 
icons that can be used to sort and execute these programs. In addition to describing other 
metadata regarding applications, these files categorise programs. The KDE and Gnome 
desktop environments use the category to display the application within the appropriate 
program start-up menus. For example, the Opera application is classified within a file 
named “opera.desktop” as a “WebBrowser”. This information is used to place the pro-    165 
gram in the appropriate menu in KDE and Gnome. Figure 9.1 shows how KDE 3.5 uses 
the icon category to organise launch icons. 
 
Figure 9.1: Example of How KDE Uses Icon Categories 
The maintainers of software packages typically include ‘.desktop’ files with applications 
so that they are placed in the appropriate menus. The available icon categories are to 
some extent standardised [229]. The registered categories include these high-level main 
categories: 
AudioVideo, Audio, Video, Development, Education, Game, Graphics, Network, 
Office, Settings, System, Utility 
Adding additional categories to further specify the purpose of the program is encouraged. 
Many additional categories are available, as illustrated in Figure 9.2. 
 
In many cases these icon categories describe the high-level functions the programs are 
designed to perform and correlate directly to FBAC-LSM functionalities. The ‘iconcate-
gory’ strings and subsequent functionality suggestions are shown in Table 9.2. 
     166 
Building, Debugger, IDE, GUIDesigner, Profiling, RevisionControl, Translation, Calendar, Con-
tactManagement, Database, Dictionary, Chart, Email, Finance, FlowChart, PDA, ProjectManage-
ment,  Presentation,  Spreadsheet,  WordProcessor,  2DGraphics,  VectorGraphics,  RasterGraphics, 
3DGraphics,  Scanning,  OCR,  Photography,  Publishing,  Viewer,  TextTools,  DesktopSettings, 
HardwareSettings, Printing, PackageManager, Dialup, InstantMessaging, Chat, IRCClient, FileT-
ransfer, HamRadio, News, P2P, RemoteAccess, Telephony, TelephonyTools, VideoConference, 
WebBrowser, WebDevelopment, Midi, Mixer, Sequencer, Tuner, TV, AudioVideoEditing, Player, 
Recorder, DiscBurning, ActionGame, AdventureGame, ArcadeGame, BoardGame, BlocksGame, 
CardGame, KidsGame, LogicGame, RolePlaying, Simulation, SportsGame, StrategyGame, Art, 
Construction, Music, Languages, Science, ArtificialIntelligence, Astronomy, Biology, Chemistry, 
ComputerScience,  DataVisualization,  Economy,  Electricity,  Geography,  Geology,  Geoscience, 
History, ImageProcessing, Literature, Math, NumericalAnalysis, MedicalSoftware, Physics, Ro-
botics, Sports, ParallelComputing, Amusement, Archiving, Compression, Electronics, Emulator, 
Engineering, FileTools, FileManager, TerminalEmulator, Filesystem, Monitor, Security, Accessi-
bility, Calculator, Clock, TextEditor, Documentation, Core, KDE, GNOME, GTK, Qt, Motif, Java, 
ConsoleOnly 
Figure 9.2:  Examples of Additional Categories Available for .desktop Files 
 
Table 9.2: Functionalities suggested based on icon category 
Iconcategory String  Suggested Functionalities 
P2P  BitTorrent_Client 
Email  Email_Client 
FileTransfer  Ftp_Client, Downloader, BitTorrent_Client 
IRCClient  Irc_Chat_Client 
TextEditor  File_Viewer, File_Editor 
Archiving  Archive_Veiwer, Archive_Editor 
Music  Audio_Player 
Office;Viewer  Document_Viewer, PDF_Viewer, 
File_Viewer 
Graphics  Image_Viewer, Image_Editor 
Player  Video_Player, Audio_Player 
AudioVideoEditing  Audio_Editor, Video_Editor 
WordProcessor  Document_Editor 
WebDevelopment  Web_Files_Editor 
Game  Game, Network_Game 
WebBrowser  Web_Browser 
 
Although not a significant problem, functionality suggestions can be subject to some false 
positives and false negatives. False positive functionality suggestions could occur due to 
extraneous  ‘uses_library’  substring  matches.  During  this  study  no  irrelevant  ‘us-
es_library’ substring matches occurred, although it is foreseeable that an unrelated library 
could  contain  one  of  the  strings  used.  For  example,  a  library  named  “monochrome” 
would contain the string “mono” and the Uses_Mono functionality would therefore be 
suggested. False positives can also occur when an icon category is more general than the 
corresponding FBAC functionalities. As shown in Table 9.2, the icon category FileTrans-    167 
fer results in the suggestions: Ftp_Client, Downloader, BitTorrent_Client. At least one of 
these suggestions would likely be a false positive. The current implementation of FBAC-
LSM can also produce false positives due to the way that the ‘.desktop’ files are matched 
to the application being confined; resolving this will involve a simple code modification. 
False negatives can occur when non-standard or no libraries are used, or when ‘.desktop’ 
files are not provided. 
 
False positive functionality suggestions are unlikely to pose a significant problem as users 
must still make the conscious decision to add the functionalities to the application policy. 
Also, so long as the suggestions contain useful related functionalities they are helpful. 
False negatives generally force the user to browse through the functionalities, when creat-
ing an application policy, to manually identify the functionalities that describe the fea-
tures  the  application  provides.  As  previously  described,  FBAC  functionalities  are  as-
signed functionality-categories that are used to group related functionalities and ease the 
selection process. 
 
During the construction of policies for the 102 applications analysed, all platform func-
tionalities were reliably and accurately suggested based on the libraries and dependencies 
of programs. In most cases the icon category-based analysis yielded applicable high-level 
functionality suggestions.  
9.4  Automation of Parameter Value Selection 
Automation techniques can also be used to automate functionality parameter argument se-
lection. Using  FBAC-PL, automation methods  for parameters  can be specified within 
functionality definitions directly after each parameter has been defined. Parameter defini-
tions typically include the default values, description, and type, followed by methods for 
automating the parameter arguments. Parameter value automation can be performed by 
searching for matching file and directory paths, and by using the default typical values. 
 
Parameter automation directives start with the command “parameter_automate”. If this is 
followed with “searchforpathmatching” then the policy manager will search for any paths 
that match the subsequent string. For example, the following line is included in the defini-    168 
tion of the Standard_Graphical_Application functionality for the peruser_files 
parameter: 
parameter_automate  searchforpathmatching  “/home/*/ 
.**[APPLICATION_NAME]*”; 
 
As illustrated in the above example, search strings can contain constants that are repre-
sented within square brackets in uppercase. Currently, only one constant has been de-
fined: [APPLICATION_NAME], which represents the name of the current application 
policy being configured. Constants are only utilised by the policy manager and result in 
literal suggestions that the security module can enforce. That is, if an actual parameter 
value specified contains the string “[APPLICATION_NAME]” it has no special meaning 
beyond its literal value, it only has a special meaning to the policy manager for automa-
tion purposes.  
 
The wildcard matching for parameter argument automation is performed using a combi-
nation of case-insensitive greedy wildcard matching and pattern matching using FBAC-
LSM wildcard matching (as described in Chapter 5). The result is that case is ignored, 
and an asterisk (*) matches any character except a slash (/), and a double asterisk (**) 
matches any character.  
 
The example parameter automation line above therefore tells the policy manager to search 
the names of all the hidden files in home directories, and within all the files in hidden 
subdirectories in home directories. Any files that contain the name of the application are 
added to the values for that parameter. As the last character in the string is a single aster-
isk, directory paths will not be added, as they end in a slash. Examples of filenames that 
would match for an application named “app” are: 
·  /home/cliffe/.apprc 
·  /home/cliffe/.test/app 
 
If the “parameter_automate” directive is followed by “searchfordircontaining” the string 
following this is searched for within the files contained in directories, and if any files 
within a directory match the search string, the containing directory is added to the param-
eter arguments. Pattern matching is performed the same way as described for “searchfor-    169 
pathmatching” commands. These example lines of policy directly follow the definition of 
the  application_libraries_directory  parameter  for  the  Standard_Graphical_Application 
functionality: 
parameter_automate  searchforpathmatching  "/usr/lib/ 
**[APPLICATION_NAME]*/"; 
parameter_automate  searchfordircontaining  "/opt/ 
kde3/lib/kde3/*[APPLICATION_NAME]**.so"; 
parameter_automate  searchfordircontaining  "/opt/ 
kde3/lib/kde3/*[APPLICATION_NAME]**.la"; 
 
In this case, any directory paths within the /usr/lib directory (including subdirecto-
ries) that contain the application name are added. Then if any library filenames (with the 
extension .so or .la) are found in the kde3 library directory that contain the application’s 
name, then that containing directory is also added. 
 
If the “parameter_automate” directive is followed by “usedefault” then one of two things 
happens during automation. If this is the only parameter_automate line for the current pa-
rameter and the typical values do not include any constants, then the parameter is set to 
use the typical values without any modifications. Otherwise, if there is more than one au-
tomate line or constants are used, any constants are replaced with their values and the typ-
ical values are added to the list of parameter argument values.  
 
When a parameter has no automation directives, the user is prompted to enter values 
manually. Otherwise the user is asked to review the values that have been automatically 
added. 
 
During application policy creation, the ability to automatically add parameter values was 
found to vastly expedite the task of creating policies. This method of automating values 
was found to be quite comprehensive, although some false positive and false negatives 
occurred. During parameter argument automation some false positives occurred due to the 
application name appearing within unrelated paths. This was particularly the case with 
applications with very short names such as vi.  
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In the majority of cases the automated parameter arguments contained all the required 
values. However, some false negatives were due to non-standard naming of application 
resources. Although the FHS does not define how application resources should be named, 
it was found that in the vast majority of cases these resource names did conform to un-
written conventions. In most cases directories and files that contain application-specific 
libraries, configuration files, and other resources contained the command name of the 
primary executable used to start the application. As noted earlier, FBAC-LSM application 
policies are by convention named after the command used to launch the application, and 
this name is used in the automation process. An example of one of the few applications 
that do not conform to this naming scheme is the Frozen Bubble game, which uses the 
abbreviation “fb” for its resources rather than the name of the command, which is fro-
zen-bubble.  For  example,  the  Frozen  Bubble  game  uses  files  named  “.fbrc”  and 
“.fbhighscores” to store data in users’ home directories.  
 
Despite not being standardised, file naming was consistent enough to facilitate automa-
tion of parameter values. It would be advantageous to standardise the way application-
specific data is named and organised. Standardising would simplify policy construction 
for most application-oriented access controls and would improve automation of parameter 
values for FBAC-LSM. The FHS could be updated to include standard or recommended 
ways of naming application resources.  
 
Alternatively completely different approaches to filesystem organisation could simplify 
functionality parameters and value automation. The FHS specifies that the files for a sin-
gle application are dispersed throughout the system according to the purpose of each file. 
For example, the executable component is usually stored in /bin or /usr/bin and li-
braries are usually stored in /usr/lib. The number of parameters would be reduced if 
application-specific resources were organised into fewer locations. Organising these files 
based on the application to which they belong, rather than the type of file, would simplify 
the parameters and the automation of parameter arguments. The GoboLinux project [185] 
aims to develop a Linux distribution that takes this type of approach to filesystem hierar-
chy  organisation,  where  each  application  has  a  directory  within  /Programs/,  within 
which all the files for that program are stored.  
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A  second  source  of  false  positives  occurred  when  applications  required  access  to  re-
sources that didn’t exist when the policy was created. When an application has not been 
executed previously, per-user files will typically not yet exist for that application and the-
se paths are therefore not automatically added to parameter arguments. The policy man-
ager’s learning mode can be used to add these values to parameters. In the future a real-
time access monitor could be developed to detect denied access attempts that match pa-
rameter automation strings and accordingly suggest additional parameter values. It is ex-
pected that this would completely remove any benefit of running an application uncon-
fined before specifying an access policy. 
9.5  Automation of Executable Paths 
Another aspect of policy specification that the policy manager can automate is generating 
the  list  of  executable  files  associated  with  an  application.  This  is  achieved  using  the 
whereis command (with the command argument “-b”) to locate the executable files 
that share the name of the application policy.  
 
A number of the applications studied had additional executable components of the appli-
cation stored with each application’s libraries. For example, when /usr/bin/opera 
starts, it in turn runs /usr/lib/opera/9.64/opera. Therefore, the policy manager 
also searches for library directory paths that contain the application name and, if found, it 
adds an executable path with wildcards, which matches any executable located within the 
application’s library directory. 
 
During program analysis these techniques for automatically selecting executable paths 
typically resulted in accurate values. False positives seldom resulted from unrelated li-
brary paths containing the application policy name, or from the whereis command oc-
casionally returning non-executable files. False negatives could occur if the application 
policy name does not follow convention, by not matching the application command. Also, 
occasionally applications are composed of multiple executable files within /usr/bin. 
This occurred with three of the applications studied: lskat, amarok, and gftp. In the 
future FBAC-LSM could be modified to also look for similar executable names when au-    172 
tomating executable path selection. A limitation of the current implementation is that ex-
ecutable paths defined in application policies cannot contain spaces. 
9.6  Automation Discussion 
The techniques described in this chapter successfully ease the task of specifying policy by 
making suggestions and by automating policy specification. In the majority of the cases 
studied these techniques were able to create complete policies for confining applications 
while allowing them to function legitimately, with very little intervention required by the 
user. Using automation, the user constructing the policy reviews the paths (which almost 
always are complete), is asked to select functionalities (the appropriate functionalities are 
usually suggested), then the user is asked to review the parameter values that are automat-
ically generated. These values are usually complete, although occasional false positives 
can be removed by the user and wildcard globing can be used to grant access to related 
resources.  
 
In many cases complete policies can be created a priori, without executing the program. 
When extra privileges are required, these are usually few in number and can be added us-
ing the learning tool while enforcing the policy. This is in contrast to policy specification 
using other schemes, such as Systrace, SELinux, and AppArmor, which typically require 
those creating policy to perform extensive analysis of the results of learning mode output 
in order to meaningfully review the detailed policy that is generated. Users are often not 
qualified to review the low-level policies generated by learning modes. This is discussed 
and illustrated later in Chapter 11. Also, executing potentially malicious software while 
creating policy can pose serious risks as the program to be confined is typically not re-
stricted while learning from its behaviour. Using these other systems it is possible to build 
incrementally while enforcing the policy being created; however, this can be a very tedi-
ous task as it can require numerous iterations. To illustrate, one particular participant in 
the usability study (which will be described in Chapter 10) was an IT security profession-
al. He tried to take the more secure iterative and enforced approach using AppArmor, and 
found it too tedious, and failed to correctly vet the rules that were generated. No tools cur-
rently exist for these other security systems to automate complete policy generation with-
out executing the program being confined.  
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The FBAC model is unique in its suitability for this type of automation. The policy ab-
stractions map to high-level attributes, which can be detected, and the details that need to 
be specified can be deduced based on the functionalities utilised. These details can in turn 
also be automated. The hierarchical nature of functionalities allows high level abstrac-
tions  to  encapsulate  policy  detail,  and  the  appropriate  functionalities  can  be  detected 
based on attributes of the program. The parameterisation provided by the FBAC model al-
lows abstractions to be reused and adapted to the needs of various applications, and the 
techniques presented in this chapter can create policy a priori by automating the specifi-
cation of the parameter arguments.  
9.7  Future Automation Research and Development 
The techniques for policy automation described in this chapter demonstrate the feasibility 
of the automation of complete application policies. There are many opportunities for fur-
ther research and development into ways to improve these preliminary automation tech-
niques. Linux package management data could be analysed to automate parameter argu-
ments, utilising the list of files created for each program. Source code  static analysis 
could be used to detect likely functionalities. Binary executable analysis is more difficult 
but could possibly also be used to suggest functionalities. Based on the analysis of the 
paths  detected  during  parameter  automation,  the  policy  manager  could  perform  auto-
globing  when  appropriate.  For  example,  temporary  files  sometimes  contain  random 
strings that could be replaced by wildcards automatically. Also a run-time access monitor 
could facilitate the addition of denied access when the denied resource path matches one 
of the automation strings. 
9.8  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a number of techniques for automating the specification of ap-
plication-oriented access control policies. Unlike previous approaches, using these tech-
niques users can typically create complete policies for applications without having to run 
them first. These techniques demonstrate and leverage the FBAC model’s suitability to 
policy automation. The three tasks involved in specifying an FBAC application policy 
can  all  be  automated:  supplying  the  executables,  functionalities,  and  parameter  argu-    174 
ments. These results further indicate the suitability of the FBAC model for application 
confinement. 
 
The next chapter describes a comparative usability study that was conducted to evaluate 
the usability benefits of the FBAC model.     175 
Chapter 10  Usability Study:  
Aims and Methodology 
 
“ 
Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing 
pigs every time.  
Gary McGraw and Edward Felten, Securing Java, Chapter One, Part Seven 
[230]  ” 
 
 
10.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter describes the aims and method of a comparative study conducted to evaluate 
the usability of the FBAC model. Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 present and discuss the re-
sults  from  the  usability  study.  The  usability  study  compared  the  new  Linux  security 
mechanism based on this concept, FBAC-LSM, and two widely deployed mechanisms, 
SELinux and AppArmor. Each of these three systems enables users to restrict the actions 
of applications. The LSM framework, as currently implemented, only allows one of these 
security mechanisms to be installed at a time on a Linux system. Therefore users must 
choose between these security systems if they wish to confine their applications with one 
of these schemes. 
 
The research described in this chapter addresses the lack of research on the usability is-
sues associated with application restrictions. As described in Chapter 2, usability is an 
important, yet often overlooked, aspect in the design of security systems. Although the 
literature contains an increasing number of publications related to computer security usa-
bility, very little research has investigated or addressed the usability issues associated 
with application restrictions. To date, the study described in this chapter is the most com-
prehensive comparative usability study conducted on application-oriented access control 
systems. As described in Chapter 2, the previously most comprehensive study of an ap-
plication-oriented security scheme examined the usability of the Polaris system, and in-
volved 10 participants [193].     176 
10.2  Aims and Hypotheses 
FBAC is designed to have usability and psychological acceptability benefits that were an-
ticipated to improve both perceived usability and the quality of the policies created. The 
usability study described in this chapter was designed to evaluate these aspects of the 
FBAC model by comparing use of the FBAC-LSM implementation with the two most 
widely deployed Linux security modules, SELinux and AppArmor. This is the first for-
mal comparative usability study to examine any of these systems. 
 
The  hypotheses  that  were  tested  are  as  follows.  The  approach  taken  by  FBAC-LSM, 
compared to the other approaches, results in: 
Hypothesis 1:   Improved perceived usability; 
Hypothesis 2:   More frequent success at creating and applying policies; 
Hypothesis 3:   More frequently allowing programs to perform their legitimate fea-
tures; 
Hypothesis 4:   Decreased overall risk exposure; 
Hypothesis 5:   Improved policies for restricting well behaved programs; 
Hypothesis 6:   Improved policies for restricting malicious programs; 
Hypothesis 7:   Improved time-efficiency. 
 
In addition to testing how FBAC-LSM compares to the other approaches, where possible 
AppArmor and SELinux were compared to each other. The effect of the different ap-
proaches taken by each was investigated.  
10.3  Research Design Overview 
The usability study employed a within-subjects design. As described in the following sec-
tions, participants used all three security mechanisms to construct policies to confine two 
programs, subjects provided feedback regarding security system usability and preference, 
and the security properties of the resulting policies were analysed.  
10.4  Participant Recruitment 
Participants were primarily recruited from the information technology students at an Aus-
tralian university, and from members of a Linux user group and an information security     177 
association. Participant recruitment targeted people who had previously used Linux sys-
tems, although this was not an absolute requirement for participation. Participants were 
recruited  using  flyers  on  university  notice  boards,  announcements  in  lectures  and  via 
email. A prize of an 8GB iPod Nano was used to encourage participation, and was award-
ed to a participant chosen at random. 
 
A convenience sample of 46 people was used, made up of every potential participant 
available during the study period. Seven of those people left before completing the exper-
iment and were excluded from analysis, leaving 39 participants considered during analy-
sis. The size of this sample compares favourably with that of the Polaris study (which had 
10 participants assessing the usability of 1 system, in contrast with 39 participants using 3 
systems) [18]. 
10.5  Environment and Logistics 
The study was conducted over a number of sessions in a university computer laboratory, 
with between one and 10 subjects participating at a time. In order to ensure consistent dis-
semination of information, most information presented to participants was pre-recorded 
and was presented to participants using video files launched via batch scripts on the com-
puter.  
 
Each participant was assigned a copy of each of the three Virtual Machines (VMs) that 
were configured for use with each security system. Access to the VMs was via batch 
scripts that used VMWare player to run the appropriate VM, and logged the time VMs 
were started and when participants were finished. A copy of each of VM was then stored 
for later analysis. 
10.6  Procedures 
Participants were randomly assigned an order in which to use the three security systems. 
This counterbalancing was to remove any biasing due to learning effects [231]. Partici-
pants were given headphones and the following hand outs: 
·  Participant consent form, and information sheet (Appendix E) 
·  An ID and the order that they would use the three systems.     178 
·  Welcome page, system use, and task scenarios (Appendix F). 
·  A Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) reference (Appendix G). The complete 
FHS v2.3 was available as a PDF file on the lab computers
18. 
·  A Unix/Linux command reference
19. 
 
A short presentation explained the various handouts and how to access the videos and 
VMs via the scripts. Participants were prompted to record their ID on the computers they 
were using to facilitate the collection and collation of data. The time constraints were also 
explained: they were encouraged to spend a maximum of approximately one hour on each 
system, with a total maximum experiment time, including feedback, of four hours. Partic-
ipants were encouraged to ask for help if they were stuck on a task (as they would do in a 
workplace environment). Participants were also told that if a VM crashed to notify the 
moderator,  and  that  system-wide  VM  crashes  were  not  due  to  them  doing  anything 
wrong. Participants were not informed that this advice was necessary due to the alpha de-
velopment stage of FBAC-LSM, which crashed occasionally.  
 
Participants were then prompted to watch the introductory video. This video explained 
the justification and goal of application confinement, and further explained how the ex-
periment would be run. The scripts and slides used in the videos can be found in Appen-
dix H. As was explained in the video, the sequence of the experiment was as follows: 
•  Watch the introductory video 
•  Complete the pre-experiment questionnaire 
•  Watch the Linux filesystem video 
•  For each security mechanism 
–  Watch the mechanism videos 
–  Confine the programs 
–  Complete the post-task questionnaire 
•  Complete the post-experiment questionnaire 
•  Debriefing 
 
The pre-experiment questionnaire (Appendix I) was used to identify demographic charac-
teristics of participants. Information collected included self-assessed expertise and experi-
                                                 
18Available from http://www.pathname.com/fhs/ 
19Available from http://fosswire.com/post/2007/8/unixlinux-command-cheat-sheet/     179 
ence. Each of the participants rated their computer skill, knowledge of computer security, 
knowledge of Linux, and knowledge of how files are organised on Linux on semantic dif-
ferential scales. The frequency that they used Linux was recorded using a multiple choice 
question.  
 
The filesystem video essentially runs through the FHS reference handout, viewing the di-
rectory hierarchy on an example Linux system. This familiarised the participants with the 
Linux directory structure. This knowledge was  valuable in utilising  each of the three 
mechanisms being compared, and ensured a minimal level of awareness about the way 
files are organised on a Linux system. 
 
Before participants used each system, they watched a video describing the way the securi-
ty system works and a demonstration of configuring the system. Each explanation video 
covered the same level of detail: policy components, how policy is represented on disk, 
the states that policies for applications can be in (either enforced or not), an overview of 
the steps involved in confining an application, and a list of helpful commands. Another 
video for each system gave a demonstration of creating a policy to confine the KWrite 
program. When participants were ready to start learning about each system, they were 
given a hardcopy of the demonstration script so they could more easily access the infor-
mation without re-watching the video. Access to the Internet was permitted, although par-
ticipants were asked not to search for information regarding the security systems being 
used. 
10.7  Tasks 
Information about the programs to be confined was presented to the group on the task 
scenario handouts and during the initial talk. Using each of the mechanisms in the random 
order  allocated,  each  participant  consecutively  created  security  policies  for  these  pro-
grams with the goal of restricting the ability of each program to act maliciously, while al-
lowing the programs to function as described in the scenarios. The participants were not 
made aware FBAC-LSM had been created by the researcher. 
 
The programs that the participants endeavoured to confine were the Opera web browser 
and a simulation of a Trojan horse posing as a Tetris game (KSirtet) which, according to     180 
the task scenario, had been downloaded from an unauthenticated website. Participants 
were informed they should allow Opera to browse the web, chat using IRC, and download 
files, while KSirtet should be permitted to act as a game.  
 
Both of these scenarios pose realistic risks, and this was explained in the information pre-
sented to participants during the introduction video and on the scenario sheet. As web 
browsers interact with external untrusted hosts, software vulnerabilities can lead to at-
tackers taking control of the program. A game that originates from an unauthenticated 
source could be malicious code posing as a legitimate program.  
10.8  The Role of the Researcher 
During the usability study the researcher was available to participants. Participants were 
encouraged to ask for help if they got stuck on a task or if they were having problems 
with the software, such as if they encountered bugs or crashes. Whenever participants re-
quired assistance, the event was recorded as either a “hint” (short tip), “help” (more ex-
tensive help such as step-by-step assistance or where the researcher was required to inter-
vene), “bug” for non-fatal errors, and “crash” for system-wide crashes. 
10.9  Trojan Horse Simulation 
The KSirtet Tetris game was modified to simulate a Trojan horse. The program accesses 
many resources that a game should not need access to and, as a malicious program, could 
cause serious security concerns. In addition to threats that can be exploited within the 
context of a correctly configured Linux system, the Trojan horse simulation also attempts 
to access resources normally protected by discretionary access controls (DAC). The VMs 
were deliberately misconfigured to allow this access. This type of configuration could be 
caused by user error, malicious actions from other programs, or be standard on single user 
Linux systems such as embedded devices. This design is intended to illustrate the de-
fence-in-depth provided by application-oriented access controls in providing an additional 
layer of security that can mitigate deficiencies in user-oriented access controls.  
 
The list of malicious activity for the Trojan simulation to attempt was developed by enu-
merating a diverse range of risks and malicious behaviour that could compromise a Linux     181 
system. These risks include privacy risks as relevant to the task scenarios, and system-
wide or user-level compromise. Given the realistic scenarios used, these threats are equal-
ly relevant regardless of the security mechanism in use. Appendix J describes the activi-
ties the Trojan simulation attempted. 
10.10  Measuring Perceived Usability 
Perceived system usability of each security system was measured using the System Usa-
bility Scale (SUS) [194], a widely employed and extensively verified tool [232, 233] de-
veloped by John Brooke in 1986. The SUS is a 10 item Likert scale, with even-numbered 
items worded negatively and odd-numbered items worded positively. The scale yields a 
single score ranging from 0 to 100, representing an assessment of the system’s usability. 
After  using  each  security  system,  participants  completed  the  SUS  questionnaire 
(Appendix K).  
 
Participants also completed a post-task questionnaire for each security system (Appendix 
L) with semantic differential scales designed to assess specific qualities related to applica-
tion-oriented access control usability. These included: 
·  Understanding the way that security policy is constructed using System is: (very 
hard to very easy); 
·  Configuring a security policy to confine an application using System is:  
(very hard to very easy); 
·  Using System made me feel the computer was: 
(very insecure to very secure); 
·  How likely would you be to use System to secure a computer in the future? 
(very unlikely to very likely). 
Additional questions were used to collect information on how successfully participants 
thought they performed: 
·  How successfully do you think you created policies which would restrict the pro-
grams from behaving maliciously? 
(very unsuccessful to very successful); 
·  How successfully do you think you created policies which would allow the pro-
grams to perform their tasks? 
(very unsuccessful to very successful).     182 
 
The  post-task  questionnaire  also  included  space  for  3  positive  comments,  3  negative 
comments, and 3 suggestions for how the security system could be improved. This infor-
mation was used for qualitative analysis to identify themes relating to the factors that in-
fluenced the participants’ perceived usability. 
 
After  they  had  used  all  three  systems,  participants  completed  a  final  questionnaire 
(Appendix M), ranking the three systems in terms of how easy they were to use, how easy 
they were to understand and how likely they would be to use them again. They also indi-
cated whether they suspected that either of the programs was malicious, and if so, which 
system they were using when they became suspicious. Semantic differentials were also 
used to collect further participant perceptions: how important they felt this type of securi-
ty was, and how likely they would be to pay for a subscription for policies provided by a 
third party. 
 
Once participants had completed using all of the security systems and questionnaires, 
they were taken into a separate room and each of the security systems was discussed in a 
debriefing session where additional opinions were collected. 
10.11  Measuring Policy Quality and Task Success 
The VMs from each participant were stored for subsequent data collection. Data collec-
tion involved testing the ability of the confined programs to run and the ability of the pro-
grams to access the security sensitive resources the Trojan horse attempted to use. Each 
program was tested manually to assess whether it could run and that all the required fea-
tures were accessible. Whether or not policies were successfully created was also as-
sessed manually. To assess the threats that the programs still posed, the Opera and KSirtet 
executables on each VM were replaced with a program that attempted to access the same 
resources as the Trojan simulation. While retaining the policies created by participants, 
the replacement scoring program then output the result of each access attempt; that is, 
whether the program was able to potentially act maliciously. All results were stored in a 
database for statistical analysis.  
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Additionally, time-on-task and the number of times the FBAC-LSM VM was started (in 
order to get an estimate of the number of time FBAC-LSM crashed) was extracted from 
the logs created by the batch scripts. 
10.12  Pilot Study 
The study was assiduously designed to eliminate any potential biasing factors. For exam-
ple, the order in which participants used the systems was randomised, the names of the 
systems studied were not advertised during participant recruitment, and participants were 
not allowed to search the Internet for information about them during the study. 
 
A pilot study was conducted with four participants, having a range of expertise levels. 
The primary concerns of the pilot study were to detect the potential for participant bias, 
and to test that the experiment procedures would work. The pilot group completed an ad-
ditional pilot questionnaire regarding whether they noticed anything potentially biasing in 
any of the videos, presentations, and handouts presented during the experiment and were 
also asked during the debriefing. The pilot group reported no biasing factors. The pilot 
study did raise awareness of a number of technical problems, such as networking prob-
lems  (which  turned  out  to  be  due  to  incompatibilities  between  VMWare  Server  and 
VMWare Player), missing codecs for video playback, and missing sound in one of the 
videos. All technical issues identified were resolved prior to the main study. 
10.13  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has described the usability study that was conducted to evaluate the FBAC 
model, by comparing FBAC-LSM with SELinux and AppArmor. The chapter described 
the aims and the methodology employed to conduct the usability study. The next chapter 
presents and discusses the quantitative results of the study.     184 
Chapter 11  Usability: Quantitative Results 
 
“ 
Agent 99: Best of all Max, the security of our espionage school hasn’t been 
violated. 
Maxwell Smart: That’s right 99. And there is nothing more important than 
security. Nothing. Why, without security none of us would be safe. 
Bystander: Excuse me. Is this Mrs Green’s house? 
Maxwell Smart: No that’s the spy school. Mrs Green’s house is over there.  
Get Smart, Season 1 Episode 3: “School Days”, 1965  ” 
 
 
11.1  Chapter Introduction 
This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  the  quantitative  results  of  the  usability  study  de-
scribed in Chapter 10. This chapter starts by presenting the results of the analysis that was 
used to test each of the hypotheses that were presented in the previous chapter. One way 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), the non-parametric Friedman test, re-
peated measures logistic regression, and descriptive statistics were utilised to compare the 
within-subjects effects of the three security systems, SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-
LSM. Subsequently, the quantitative results are discussed, and, finally, conclusions about 
the usability of the FBAC model are presented.  
11.2  Participant Demographics 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 67 (mean: 31.1 std. deviation: 13.0). Five of the 39 
participants were female. Table 11.1 summarises the self reported expertise of the partici-
pants,  collected  using  the  pre-experiment  questionnaire.  In  each  case  responses  could 
range from one to seven, with higher values representing higher levels of experience or 
expertise. As shown in the table, the majority of participants evaluated themselves as pos-
sessing above average computer skill, with a relatively wide range of responses for the 
computer security and Linux questions. As recommended for usability studies, the exper-
iment included some least competent users (LCU), that is, users representing the mini-
mum level of expertise that would be expected to utilise the systems [234 p. 129]. The 
study also included some Linux and computer security experts, who work within industry 
managing Linux systems and providing IT security services.      185 
Table 11.1: Participant Self Assessment 
Expertise  Mean  Std dev  Min  Max 
Skill with computers  5.82  0.90  3  7 
Knowledge of computer security  4.47  1.20  2  7 
Frequency of Linux use  4.24  2.32  1  7 
Knowledge of Linux  3.53  1.89  1  7 
Knowledge of FHS  3.61  1.97  1  7 
 
11.3  Hypothesis 1: Preference Evaluation 
11.3.1  System Usability Scale 
A one-way within subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of security sys-
tem on SUS. The assumptions of the test were met. There was a significant effect of secu-
rity system, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.38, F (2,35) = 28.99, p < .001, n=37. The effect size was 
.624. Post hoc analysis using the Tukey LSD test showed significant contrasts between 
each pairwise comparison. That is, all three conditions were significantly different from 
each other.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 11.1, on average FBAC-LSM received the highest SUS scores 
(M=70.21, SD=18.34), followed by AppArmor (M=54.93, SD=24.18), and SELinux with 
the lowest scores (M=34.58, SD=18.04).  
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Figure 11.1: Box Plot Comparing SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-LSM System Usability Scale 
Scores 
11.3.2  Additional Scales 
Table 11.2: Semantic Differentials Measuring Acceptability 
  SELinux  AppArmor  FBAC-LSM 
Measure of  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD 
Understanding the way that 
security policy is constructed 
using System is: (very hard to 
very easy) 
3.46  1.620  5.00  1.622  5.51  1.335 
Configuring a security policy 
to confine an application us-
ing System is: (very hard to 
very easy) 
3.13  1.609  4.38  1.858  5.64  1.224 
Using System made me feel 
the computer was: (very inse-
cure to very secure) 
4.38  1.091  4.31  1.657  5.08  1.403 
How likely would you be to 
use System to secure a com-
puter in the future? (very un-
likely to very likely) 
3.00  1.919  3.64  1.953  4.64  2.006 
 
A summary of the results of the additional semantic differentials designed to assess spe-
cific usability qualities of the security systems are presented in Table 11.2. Each question     187 
is scored from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). In each case, FBAC-LSM on aver-
age rated highest. In each case AppArmor rated second and SELinux lowest, with the ex-
ception of the question of how secure the user feels the computer is, where SELinux was 
rated second and AppArmor last. 
11.3.3  Ranking 
Table 11.3 shows the mean rank (one, first, to three, last) for each system in terms of: 
how easy they were to use, how easy they were to understand, and how likely participants 
would be to use them again. In each case, on average FBAC-LSM was ranked highest, 
followed by AppArmor, then SELinux. FBAC-LSM was also ranked first most frequent-
ly, and SELinux was ranked last most frequently. 




for ease of 
use 






SELinux  2.67  2.64  2.58 
AppArmor  1.85  1.90  1.92 
FBAC-LSM  1.49  1.46  1.45 
 
The results of the SUS score differences, additional usability scales, and ranks all support 
Hypothesis 1: that compared to AppArmor and SELinux the approach taken by FBAC-
LSM results in improved perceived usability.  
11.4  Hypothesis 2: Creation of Policies 
In this section the extent to which participants were able to create policies to confine the 
programs is explored. The quality of the policies created is explored in subsequent sec-
tions. The following results (including percentages) do not include participant records 
with “missing values” due to: 
·  Seven SELinux virtual machines that froze at start-up with a SELinux AVC mes-
sage. This problem appeared to be the result of participants creating SELinux 
rules that inadvertently prevented the VMs from starting. 
·  Two VMs (one SELinux, one AppArmor) that did not start due to kernel panics. 
The exact cause of this was not clear.     188 
·  Existing SELinux rules for KSirtet that conflicted with the creation of a new poli-
cy to confine KSirtet. Due to the abstruseness of the command-line output that re-
ports this conflict, the problem was not detected during initial environment setup, 
the pilot study, or by the majority of participants. After the problem was detected, 
it was remedied for the following participants. Therefore 22 participants could not 
create a policy to confine KSirtet due to this conflict. Ironically, the default policy 
did not provide any protection against the threats tested during the study. 
 
As policies were either successfully created or not, repeated measures logistic regression 
was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the creation of enforced poli-
cies for Opera. There was a significant effect of security system, Wald Chi-Square (2, 
N=105) = 31.30, p < .001. All three conditions were significantly different from each oth-
er. As shown in the Enforced Policy column of Table 11.4, 90% of participants created 
enforced policies for Opera using FBAC-LSM, 66% using AppArmor, and only 23% us-
ing SELinux. 
Table 11.4: Policy Creation Rates for Opera and KSirtet Using SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-
LSM 
Security 










(n=31)  21 (68%)  3 (10%)  7 (23%) 
KSirtet 
(n=9)  6 (67%)  1 (11%)  2 (22%) 
AppArmor 
Opera 
(n=38)  3 (8%)  10 (26%)  25 
(66%) 
KSirtet 





(n=39)  4 (10%)  0 (0%)  35 
(90%) 
KSirtet 
(n=39)  7 (18%)  0 (0%)  32 
(82%) 
 
Repeated measures logistic regression was also conducted to compare the effect of securi-
ty system on the creation of enforced policies for KSirtet using each of the security sys-
tems. Again, there was a significant effect of security system, Wald Chi-Square (2, N=86) 
= 10.03, p = .007. As with Opera policies, all three systems were significantly different 
from each other: 82% of participants created enforced policies for Opera using FBAC-
LSM, 71% using AppArmor, and only 22% using SELinux. 
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In  both  cases  participants  were  most  likely  to  successfully  create  policies  to  confine 
applications using FBAC-LSM. This supports Hypothesis 2: that compared to AppArmor 
and SELinux, FBAC-LSM results in more frequent success at creating  and enforcing 
policies. In addition to participants who were unsuccessful at creating a policy at all (refer 
to the No Policy column in Table 11.4), SELinux and AppArmor resulted in a number of 
policies that were left in an unenforced state. The terminology for an unenforced policy 
differs for each system – SELinux: permissive domain, AppArmor: complaining mode, 
FBAC-LSM: complaining or disabled modes. The result of an unenforced policy is that 
the application is not confined, despite the fact that a policy exists. Despite the fact that 
participants  had  seen  videos  describing  the  way  policy  enforcement  works  for  each 
system,  it  is  likely  that  many  participants  were  unaware  these  policies  were  in  an 
unenforced state. As illustrated in the Unenforced Policy column, a number of policies for 
SELinux and AppArmor for both Opera and KSirtet were not in an enforced state. In 
contrast, 100% of the policies created using FBAC-LSM were in an enforced state. 
11.5  Hypothesis 3: Applications Run 
As shown in Table 11.5 and Table 11.6, the extent to which the confined programs can 
actually operate is affected by the security system. Using FBAC-LSM 97% of the policies 
created for Opera allowed the program to run, compared to 56% and 43% for AppArmor 
and SELinux respectively. These results support Hypothesis 3, that compared to AppAr-
mor and SELinux, FBAC-LSM more frequently allows programs to perform their legiti-
mate functions. While a policy that prevents a program from running altogether may in-
deed protect a user from malicious programs, in practice a security policy that stops a user 
from performing their goals will likely result in the security mechanism being disabled. 
Table 11.5: Extent to Which Opera Can Function While Confined by SELinux, AppArmor, and 
FBAC-LSM 









Program runs  3 (43%)  14 (56%)  34 (97%) 
Can access web 
pages via HTTP  3 (43%)  14 (56%)  34 (97%) 
Can access web 
pages via HTTPS  3 (43%)  13 (52%)  34 (97%) 
Can access IRC  1 (14%)  8 (32%)  19 (54%) 
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Table 11.6 shows that 100% of FBAC-LSM policies for KSirtet allowed the program to 
run, as opposed to 70% of AppArmor policies. However, only 31% of FBAC-LSM poli-
cies allowed the program to record high scores in the user’s home directory. This did not 
affect game-play and was due to the fact that the score file may not exist when the policy 
was created. The planned addition of a notification feature to FBAC-LSM would address 
this issue. Due to the policy conflict described in Section 11.4, only two participants cre-
ated policies for KSirtet using SELinux, both of which allowed the game to run. 
Table 11.6: Extent to Which KSirtet Can Function While Confined by SELinux, AppArmor, and 
FBAC-LSM 









Program runs  2 (100%)  19 (70%)  32 (100%) 
Can play game  2 (100%)  19 (70%)  32 (100%) 
Can store high 
scores  2 (100%)  19 (70%)  10 (31%) 
11.6  Hypothesis 4: Overall Risk Exposure 
Risk exposure was measured using a simple score, one demerit point for each security 
sensitive resource that was accessible for each of the two programs. This measure was de-
signed to give a clear indication of the effect of the security system on the exposure to 
threats by simply recording the number of realistic threats the systems remained exposed 
to, rather than attempting to subjectively weight each threat. The nonparametric Friedman 
test was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the overall risk exposure. 
This test was used as an alternative to one-way within subjects ANOVA to ensure that vi-
olations of the assumptions of ANOVA did not impact on the interpretation of the results. 
Analysis included the data from participants who participated after the SELinux KSirtet 
default policy conflict was detected and resolved. There was a significant effect of securi-
ty system, χ
2(2) = 36.32, p < 0.001. Post hoc analysis was conducted using the Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test with a Bonferroni correction applied. This showed that FBAC-LSM 
(M=14.3, SD=9.7) had a significantly lower risk exposure than both AppArmor (M=30.3, 
SD=17.0) and SELinux (M=43.0, SD=12.0). AppArmor was also found to have a signifi-
cantly lower risk exposure than SELinux. A post hoc analysis confirmed that the order in 
which the systems were used did not influence risk exposure. Appendix N gives further 
detail regarding the types of access permitted by each security system.     191 
 
These results allow comparison between the level of protection each system provided, re-
flecting the success of creating and enforcing correctly configured policies using each of 
the systems. As illustrated in Figure 11.2, SELinux was the least successful at reducing 
risk exposure. AppArmor had the highest degree of variation, resulting in a broad range 
of risk exposure values, from policies that did not allow anything to policies that allowed 
all attempted access. Overall, AppArmor averaged second most successful at reducing 
risk exposure. AppArmor’s average score still indicates that its policies exposed the user 
to high degrees of risk by allowing the programs undue access to resources. FBAC-LSM 
was the most consistent, and also provided the greatest protection. These results support-
ed Hypothesis 4 that, compared to the other systems, FBAC-LSM results in decreased 
overall risk exposure. 
 
 
Figure 11.2: Box Plot Comparing SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM Overall Risk Exposure 
11.7  Hypothesis 5: Opera Risk Exposure When Policies Ex-
ist 
The nonparametric Friedman test was also used to compare the effect of security system 
on the Opera risk exposure. Risk exposure was measured using a simple score, one de-
merit point for each security sensitive resource that was accessible to Opera. Analysing     192 
the data from participants who created an enforced policy for Opera using all three sys-
tems (n=5) showed no significant effect of security system , χ
2(2) = 5.06, p = 0.080. This 
was repeated analysing the participants who created an enforced policy for Opera using 
AppArmor and FBAC-LSM (n=23) to compare the effect of security system on the Opera 
risk exposure using these two systems. An effect was detected, χ
2(1) = 7, p = 0.008. This 
result indicates that, when policies for Opera were successfully created and enforced Ap-
pArmor policies were slightly more restrictive (M=4.65, SD=3.19) than those created us-
ing FBAC-LSM (M=7.83, SD=1.72). Therefore Hypothesis 5 (that compared to the other 
systems FBAC-LSM results in improved policies for well behaved programs) was not 
supported. Both of these scores represent a significant reduction in exposure to risk, alt-
hough FBAC-LSM authorised additional network access. However, only 57% of those 
AppArmor profiles actually allowed Opera to function, compared to 96% of the FBAC-
LSM policies, which allowed Opera to run while reducing exposure to risks. Also, in 
practice there would be a difference in risk exposure between the three mechanisms due 
to FBAC-LSM’s  greater success at creating  and enforcing policies. All three systems 
when successfully deployed to confine a non-malicious application reduced the exposure 
to risk. 
11.8  Hypothesis 6: Trojan Horse Risk Exposure When Pol-
icies Exist 
Due to the low number of participants who created an enforced policy for KSirtet using 
SELinux (n=2), there was insufficient residual degrees of freedom to compare the effect 
of security system on the KSirtet risk exposure using all three systems. Instead, a Fried-
man test was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the KSirtet risk expo-
sure using only AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. Risk exposure was measured in the same 
way as previously, one demerit point for each accessible security sensitive resource. Se-
curity system was found to have a significant effect, χ
2(1) = 5.26, p = 0.022. Therefore in 
the case of malicious programs, the results showed that FBAC-LSM (M=6.04, SD=4.96) 
is likely to be superior in producing more secure confinement policies than AppArmor 
(M=14.54, SD=9.85). This supports Hypothesis 6, that compared to AppArmor and SEL-
inux FBAC-LSM results in improved policies when confining malicious programs. 
     193 
Unlike in the case of Opera, the Trojan program KSirtet was attempting to behave mali-
ciously. AppArmor builds policy based on learning rules from program behaviour and 
having users review each of these rules. Therefore, successful restriction relies on the us-
er’s ability to vet the actions of misbehaving programs. FBAC-LSM on the other hand 
constructs policy based on the features the user wants the program to perform, and on the 
location of various application specific resources. These results indicate that users, in 
general, do not have the expertise necessary to vet the actions of programs and that the 
FBAC approach provides greater protection.  
 
It is expected that, had more participants successfully created policies for KSirtet using 
SELinux, SELinux would have rated even worse than AppArmor. The user-space tools 
for SELinux automatically add all the learned rules, and there is no GUI tool to assist us-
ers with the vetting process. 
11.9  Hypothesis 7: Efficiency 
To compare the effect of security system on the overall time-on-task, a Friedman test was 
conducted. Time-on-task was defined as the time spent using each security system, and 
was  measured  in  minutes  based  on  the  start  and  end  times  as  recorded  by  the  batch 
scripts. There was a statistically significant effect of security system, χ
2(2) = 14.45, p = 
0.001. Post hoc analysis was conducted using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test with a 
Bonferroni correction applied. This showed there was a significant difference in the time-
on-task for AppArmor (M=29.3, SD=14.3), which was significantly less than SELinux 
(M=45.18, SD=19.0), and also significantly less than FBAC-LSM (M=40.1, SD=15.8). 
No significant difference in time-on-task was found between SELinux and FBAC-LSM. 
This indicates that participants completed the tasks faster using AppArmor than the other 
two systems. During the study it was observed that, when faced with repetitive AppAr-
mor dialogs with rules to vet, some participants simply clicked “Allow” as fast as possi-
ble for each rule, and this appears to explain the shorter completion time using AppAr-
mor.  
 
Two scales for each system were used to gauge the perceived time efficiency of the three 
systems. As shown in Table 11.7, these results are in contrast to the actual time-on-tasks. 
On average participants rated FBAC-LSM as the most time efficient. The majority of par-    194 
ticipants indicated that they felt they had enough time to use AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. 
Participants  provided  a  more  varied  response  (SD=2.22)  regarding  whether  they  had 
enough time to use SELinux; on average response was neutral (M=3.90). An additional 
factor was the tendency of FBAC-LSM to crash, due to its early stage of development, 
which required participants to wait for virtual machines to be restarted. Based on the 
number of times the VM was started, on average each participant experienced an FBAC-
LSM crash twice  (Min=0, Max=5). Whenever  FBAC-LSM crashed, participants were 
told that the crash was not their fault and asked to restart the VM. Any saved policies 
were not lost. Therefore, although Hypothesis 7 – that compared to the other systems 
FBAC-LSM would result in improved time-efficiency – could not be supported, further 
research is needed to draw any conclusions. 
Table 11.7: Semantic Differentials Measuring Efficiency 
  SELinux  AppArmor  FBAC-LSM 
Measure of  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD 
Creating security policy using SELinux 
is: (very time consuming to very time 
efficient) 
2.82  1.805  3.72  1.932  4.72  1.638 
Please rate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the following statement:  
I had enough time to complete the task 
using SELinux: (strongly disagree to 
strongly agree) 
3.90  2.222  5.51  1.684  5.97  1.224 
 
11.10  Other Findings 
Of the 39 participants only 19 (49%) reported suspecting either of the programs as being 
malicious. Three incorrectly suspected Opera, and 16 (41%) correctly suspected KSirtet. 
Ten of these participants were using AppArmor when they first suspected a program as 
being malicious, six using FBAC-LSM, and three using SELinux. This can be attributed 
to the fact that AppArmor requires the user to review every resource the program access-
es, whereas FBAC-LSM currently silently denies access to resources based on policy. 
The KSirtet policy conflict, which was described previously, meant that the SETrouble-
Shoot GUI tool did not report any malicious behaviour, despite allowing it. 
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Questioned about the importance of this type of security, on average participants rated its 
importance (on a scale of 1 to 7) as quite high (M=5.97, SD=1.5). Although they were un-
likely to pay for a subscription for policies (M=3.92, SD=2.3). 
 
Semantic differentials were also used to gauge how successfully participants thought they 
performed. As shown in Table 11.8, the mean scores appear to more or less follow the 
trends of performance as reported in Section 11.6. That is, on average participants per-
formed best using FBAC-LSM and on average rated their performance best with FBAC-
LSM, followed both in performance and self-assessment by AppArmor and then SELi-
nux. However, Friedman correlation coefficients were computed for each system, to as-
sess the relationships between perceived success at restricting programs and the overall 
risk exposures. There was no correlation between these variables. This may suggest that 
many participants were unable to judge their own individual success at the tasks. In a 
number of cases participants asserted that they had successfully restricted applications, 
when in fact they had not restricted the applications successfully. Unwittingly leaving 
policies in unenforced states may have contributed to this misjudgement. The fact that 
many participants had not noticed that the Trojan horse simulation was acting suspicious-
ly would have been reflected in this discrepancy. For example, one participant, who had 
worked as a Linux system administrator for the past 18 years, did not notice that KSirtet 
was accessing security sensitive resources. This indicates that even advanced users do not 
necessarily have the expertise required to vet the actions of programs.  
Table 11.8: Semantic differentials measuring perceived performance 
  SELinux  AppArmor  FBAC-LSM 
Measure of  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
How successfully they think 
they  restricted  applications 
(V. Unsuccessful to V. Suc-
cessful) 
3.85  1.800  4.18  1.945  5.44  1.410 
How successfully they think 
they allowed applications to 
perform (V. Unsuccessful to 
V. Successful) 
4.00  1.850  4.51  1.876  5.63  1.282 
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11.11  Summary of Support for Hypotheses 
Based on the quantitative results of the usability study, Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were 
supported. Compared to AppArmor and SELinux, FBAC-LSM: 
1.  Was rated and ranked as easiest to use; 
2.  Resulted in significantly higher rates of policy creation and enforcement; 
3.  Resulted in more policies that allowed the programs being confined to run and 
function; 
4.  Protected the “user” to the greatest extent by significantly reducing the overall risk 
exposure; 
5.  Produced similarly protective policies for Opera, a program behaving legitimately: 
slightly lower than AppArmor when policies are successfully created; 
6.  Produced significantly more protective policies to confine KSirtet, a Trojan horse 
simulation; 
7.  Took longer than AppArmor; although, as discussed in Section 11.9, efficiency 
results are inconclusive. 
The following sections discuss these results in further detail. 
11.12  Discussion of Quantitative Results 
11.12.1 Hypothesis 1 Discussion: Perceived Usability 
Based on their research, Bangor et al. suggest that “products with scores less than 50 
should be cause for significant concern and are judged to be unacceptable” [232 p. 592]. 
SELinux scored 34.58, which suggests that SELinux suffers from major usability defi-
ciencies  and  is  in  need  of  significant  usability  improvements.  Based  on  observations 
made during the experiment, the primary factors limiting SELinux usability seem to be 
due to the complexity of the model used and the lack of an intuitive graphical interface 
for much of the task of policy specification. 
 
AppArmor scored 54.93. According to Bangor et al., “products with scores less than 70 
should be considered candidates for increased scrutiny and continued improvement and 
should be judged to be marginal at best” [232 p. 592]. This suggests that, while AppAr-
mor is significantly preferred over SELinux, improvements are required before it would     197 
be classified as “acceptable”. Based on observations during the study, the primary factor 
limiting AppArmor usability seems to be due to the inability of typical users to make in-
formed decisions about the files to which applications require access.  
 
Bangor et al. suggest that “products which are at least passable have scores above 70”  
[232 p. 592]. Based on these interpretation guidelines, FBAC-LSM, with a score of 70.21, 
is the only system studied classified as “acceptable”. While FBAC-LSM was significantly 
preferred  over  AppArmor  and  SELinux,  there  is  clearly  still  room  for  improvement. 
However, FBAC-LSM was in early development during the study, and will incorporate 
feedback from the experiment and further research to improve usability in the future. 
These preliminary results indicate that the FBAC model is very well suited to providing 
usable application-oriented controls. The qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 12 ex-
plores in detail factors that influenced the perceived usability of the three systems. 
11.12.2 Hypothesis 2 Discussion: Rate of Policy Enforcement 
As described in Section 11.4, FBAC-LSM had the highest success rate in creating en-
forced policies, followed by AppArmor and then SELinux. The variation in rate of policy 
enforcement can be attributed to a number of factors. The successful creation of a policy 
is likely to be affected by the ease of using the system and the ease of understanding how 
to create policies. FBAC-LSM ranked highest in both respects, followed by AppArmor 
and then SELinux. 
 
One factor that affects whether the policies are enforced is the behaviour of the policy 
tools for each of the systems and the state in which they leave newly created policies. The 
SELinux Policy Generator tool left newly created skeleton policies in permissive mode so 
that users could further develop these policies before manually editing the appropriate file 
to set the domain to be enforced, and then run a shell script to recompile and load the pol-
icy. Some participants forgot to manually set the policy to be enforced, meaning these 
policies were unenforced. As discussed further in Chapter 12, some participants reported 
that they were not comfortable with the requirement to run console commands and simply 
completed what they could using the graphical tools available. The result was that the 
policies were not created and assigned to the executables. A more complete graphical tool 
that steps users through the whole process would have improved success using SELinux.     198 
 
AppArmor’s policy tools left policies either enforced or in complaining mode (which is 
not enforced) depending on user interaction. For example, exiting from the Add Profile 
Wizard resulted in the policy left in complaining mode. This resulted in some policies be-
ing left (likely unbeknownst to the user) unenforced. Making this behaviour more obvious 
to the user may have helped decrease the number of users who left the programs uncon-
fined. 
 
FBAC-LSM created policies that were enforced unless the user actively toggled the poli-
cy activation. This combined with the wizard for creating policies that steps users through 
the process, and the fact that the main window includes information about whether the 
policy is enforced are expected to be factors that contributed to the high success rate in 
creating enforced policies. 
11.12.3 Hypothesis 3 Discussion: Continued Program Operation 
Of the policies that were in effect, FBAC-LSM allowed the highest percentage of pro-
grams to run and function. SELinux often did not log all of the access attempts required 
to create a policy that allowed Opera to start. As described on the SELinux handout pro-
vided to participants, the solution was to set SELinux to log all events, which led to the 
display of a flurry of unrelated messages. While using AppArmor, a number of partici-
pants created policies that denied access to resources that were required in order for the 
programs to function legitimately. Again this demonstrates that users typically do not 
have the expertise required to vet the actions of programs. Because FBAC-LSM builds 
policy using reusable, easily understandable policy abstractions, all the required access 
rules were assigned when building the application policies. This approach clearly led to 
higher program-feature-access success rates compared with requiring users to vet the ac-
tions of programs.  
 
As noted in Section 11.5 some FBAC-LSM policies were missing rules for a file that did 
not exist when policy was created. To clarify, this does not imply that all files the applica-
tion will require access to need to pre-exist, just that the parameter automation in this case 
failed to predict the existence of the configuration file. The planned addition of a notifica-
tion feature to FBAC-LSM would address this issue, since this filename can already be     199 
identified as belonging to the application and a simple interactive prompt could add to the 
a priori policy. 
11.12.4 Hypothesis 4 Discussion: Overall Protection 
Factors contributing to the overall risk exposure score include the success rate of creating 
policies and ensuring policies are enforced (as discussed in Section 11.4), the extent to 
which the legitimately behaving program (Opera) was restricted, and the extent to which 
the malicious program (the KSirtet Trojan) was restricted. The overall risk exposure score 
reflects the practical security benefit of each system by measuring the extent that users are 
protected from misbehaving programs accessing sensitive resources.  
 
As described in Section 11.6, FBAC-LSM had significantly lower overall risk exposures. 
This result can be attributed to the fact that the highest number of users were successful in 
creating policies, ensuring policies were enforced, and confining the Trojan simulation 
using FBAC-LSM. 
11.12.5 Hypothesis  5  Discussion:  Confinement  of  Trustworthy 
Programs 
Considering policies that were successfully created and enforced, all three systems per-
formed similarly where the program being confined was acting benevolently during poli-
cy construction. This result reflects the fact that, when the program is behaving non-
maliciously, adequate protection will be obtained by simply allowing all the rules sug-
gested by the learning tools. In this scenario if, at a later point in time, the program is 
compromised or replaced by a malicious version, the user will be protected. 
 
While in this scenario, where enforced policies had been created, FBAC-LSM was found 
to have no significant restriction advantages compared to AppArmor and SELinux, fur-
ther  research  is  required.  SELinux  makes  decisions  based  on  types  assigned  to  files, 
which in the case of the user’s home directory are typically very coarsely grained. It is 
therefore anticipated that, in most cases, user applications will be granted access to exces-
sive rights; that is, access to almost anything in the user’s home directory. This could be 
improved by creating more finely-grained SELinux types. Therefore a typical SELinux     200 
installation is perhaps better suited to improving system-wide user-oriented access con-
trols than to application-oriented access controls for programs run by users. 
The AppArmor policies created provided slightly tighter controls than those created using 
FBAC-LSM. FBAC-LSM was more permissive due to the high level of network access 
the “Web Browser” functionality authorised in order to allow Active FTP, and a policy 
mistake that granted access to Firefox’s configuration files. The access that was granted is 
illustrated in Appendix N. However, this FBAC-LSM policy abstraction could be im-
proved (in one central location) to provide tighter controls for all the policies that were 
created using it. As noted in Section 11.7, a large number of those AppArmor profiles 
stopped Opera from running at all, which significantly reduces their usefulness; if the se-
curity mechanism stops a user’s applications from working, they more likely to simply 
disable the mechanism, and therefore the actual protection provided in practice may be 
lower. Also, this analysis only considered policies that were successfully created and en-
forced, and FBAC-LSM had the highest rate of enforced policies. 
Finally, it is important to note that these results are only applicable where the user can be 
completely certain that an application can be trusted at the point of policy construction. In 
practice this cannot be safely assumed in many cases, for example when downloading 
software. Therefore the ability of users to successfully confine potentially malicious pro-
grams is very important. 
11.12.6 Hypothesis  6  Discussion:  Confinement  of  Potentially 
Malicious Programs 
As established in Section 11.8, FBAC-LSM was significantly more successful at protect-
ing resources from the Trojan horse simulation than AppArmor was. Not enough partici-
pants successfully created policies using SELinux to confine KSirtet to make reliable 
comparisons between all three systems. However, based on observations during the study, 
policies created by typical users using SELinux would be expected to also provide less 
protection than FBAC-LSM. This section discusses some of the possible reasons for the 
creation of ineffective policies. Chapter 12 presents qualitative analysis that further ex-
plains differences between the approaches of the three systems.  
 
When using AppArmor, a user runs the program to be confined, and is stepped through 
the process of vetting the learnt rules that would allow the program to perform the same     201 
actions in the future. Protecting the user and the system from malicious programs is de-
pendent upon users successfully vetting these rules. This study demonstrated that typical 
users, and even security professionals and Linux system administrators, do not necessari-
ly have the required expertise to successfully vet these actions.  
 
A number of noteworthy examples of the tendency of users to allow malicious activity us-
ing AppArmor illustrate the general inability of users to vet program actions: 
·  74% of participants who managed to create an enforced policy using AppArmor 
allowed KSirtet to access the shadow file
20. The shadow file is a very high profile 
target that contains the hashed user passwords for the system. With this file, a ma-
licious program could attempt authentication attacks such as brute-forcing pass-
words; 
·  71% granted write access to the hosts file, which could allow the program to 
discretely redirect network traffic and perform man-in-the-middle attacks; 
·  68% granted write access to the exports file used to configure network shares. 
This could be used to covertly share the contents of files to remote hosts; 
·  58% granted access to private information in the users Firefox directory, potential-
ly including saved web passwords such as those for Internet banking; 
·  68% granted unrestricted network access, allowing the Trojan unlimited scope for 
sending information to, or receiving commands via, the network;  
·  47% allowed the program to insert itself into KDE startup, which allows a mali-
cious program to get a persistent presence on the system. 
 
Any single one of these potential breaches would have very serious security consequenc-
es. Some participants relied heavily on the severity level suggestions provided by Ap-
pArmor, as they did not have the expertise to vet rules based on resource names and types 
alone. However, many participants reported that the severity level metric was ambiguous 
and often absent. Others seemed to not pay any attention to the specifics of the rules at 
all, simply clicking “Allow” to almost every rule (this is related to the complaint made by 
users that AppArmor required too many decisions, which is presented in Chapter 12, Sec-
tion 12.4). Participants who incorrectly did not notice any suspicious behaviour included 
ICT PhD candidates, security professionals, and Linux system administrators. If experi-
                                                 
20 As previously discussed in Section 10.8, user-oriented access controls were configured to allow this ac-
cess in order to assess the protection provided by the application-oriented controls studied.     202 
enced users of this calibre cannot use AppArmor to successfully confine a malicious pro-
gram, it is highly unlikely that typical users could. Therefore, this study contends that or-
dinary users cannot reliably employ learning mode application-oriented access controls 
that rely on users vetting the generated rules. This result can be generalised to other sys-
tems such as Systrace, which in addition requires knowledge of system calls (an interface 
considered complex and arguably not suited to security mediation [26]) in order to vet the 
rules.  
 
Rules for SELinux modules are typically generated in a similar fashion based on program 
behaviour. Rules are described in terms of access to types rather than specific files. SELi-
nux does not currently have a graphical tool to step users through the vetting process, 
which means that vetting is a manual process of editing complex rules that were generally 
not considered easy to understand by participants (as is discussed in Chapter 12). As pre-
viously mentioned, some participants were uncomfortable with the command-line based 
nature of the SELinux tools used to create policy. It is believed that most participants did 
not edit or remove any lines of the rules generated by audit2allow, which created 
rules based on the previous actions of the program. Since this method of generating poli-
cy is also based on a learning mode and the rules are not easily vetted by users, it is likely 
that policies created by typical users using SELinux would also provide less protection 
than FBAC-LSM. Also, as demonstrated by the policy conflict encountered during this 
study, the ineffective default configuration of SELinux can inhibit users from specifying 
policies to enforce their own security goals. 
 
Alternative tool sets exist for managing SELinux policy. However, the tools used were 
the ones that are standard with Fedora (the Linux distribution with the most complete 
SELinux support) and, unlike many SELinux tools, these provided graphical tools to step 
users through some of the process. It is believed that further development could yield 
more usable tools. However, due to the complex nature of the way rules are modelled, 
and the need for vetting the output of learning tools used to create rules for SELinux, it is 
believed that SELinux faces serious obstacles to improving usability. The results of this 
study support the argument that SELinux and its current set of configuration tools is not 
suited to end user configuration to protect themselves against misbehaving software. 
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FBAC-LSM  substantially  lowered  the  risk  exposure  compared  to  AppArmor.  In  each 
case, as previously described, FBAC-LSM lowers the risk. For example, 6% of partici-
pants granted access to the shadow file (compared to 74%) and only 6% granted access to 
the hosts, exports, and private user files (compared to 71%, 68%, and 58 respective-
ly). Furthermore, only 50% allowed outgoing network connections, 12%  allowed incom-
ing connections (compared to 68% full network access with AppArmor), and 19% al-
lowed insertion into KDE startup (compared to 47%). FBAC-LSM clearly provided the 
best protection of the systems studied. These results are attributable to the abstractions 
provided by the FBAC model, which abstract away the low-level privileges used to pro-
vide various features. The techniques for automating the discovery of parameter argu-
ments also helped the security decisions made by users, allowing them to focus on higher 
level (functionality-based) security goals. 
 
FBAC-LSM was also able to step participants through the process of creating policies 
without requiring users to execute the program being confined. AppArmor and SELinux 
both rely on the execution of programs in order to generate rules. It is possible to add new 
rules while enforcing the policy being developed. However, using SELinux or AppArmor 
this can take an extremely large number of iterations to create a working policy, as in-
complete  policies  will  often  cause  the  program  to  terminate.  Therefore  the  method 
demonstrated in the preparation videos was to generate the rules while the policy was not 
enforced. This is the approach that is typically used; however, it leaves the program un-
confined while rules are generated. Therefore, if the program is malicious, it could com-
promise the system while a policy is being developed. The risk of using this approach was 
stressed, and participants were encouraged to take the more restrictive approach, although 
few did. As established in Chapter 2, there are many reasons not to trust software and 
therefore it is recommended to avoid these learning modes. FBAC-LSM provides an al-
ternative approach to policy creation that avoids these risks. The potential risk exposure 
during learning was not considered when assessing the policies created during the study.  
11.13  Limitations of the Usability Study 
The primary limitation of this study was the SELinux KSirtet policy conflict, which ex-
cluded some results from a large number of participants from analysis. As discussed pre-
viously, existing SELinux rules for KSirtet prevented new rules from being enforced. Due     204 
to the abstruseness of the output from the SELinux command-line tools, participants were 
unaware that their new policies were not in effect. When this was detected, the VMWare 
image was modified to remove this conflict for the nine subsequent participants. Data 
from the previous participants regarding KSirtet was not included in analysis. As noted 
previously, the conflicting SELinux policy (included in the games policy module) did not 
provide any protection against the malicious activities attempted by the Trojan horse sim-
ulation. 
 
The prototype status of FBAC-LSM was also a limitation of this study. FBAC-LSM con-
tained a bug that occasionally caused the system to crash, requiring participants to restart 
the VM. No policies that had been created were lost. Participants were not specifically 
told that this was due to a bug in FBAC-LSM; they were merely informed that the crash 
was not their fault. This bug very likely impacted the time-on-task measurement, and may 
have negatively affected participants perception of the system. 
11.14  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the quantitative results of a comparative usability study, and 
compared the usability and security outcomes of three different approaches to application 
confinement. These results demonstrate that the FBAC model is well suited to applica-
tion-oriented access controls and can provide significant improvements to both usability 
and security. These results also demonstrate the large practical impact usability has on se-
curity; by providing a model designed to be more usable, and abstracting the low-level 
details of policy away from end users, FBAC-LSM was able to significantly improve the 
efficacy of the policies created. These results also demonstrate that learning mode ap-
proaches that rely on users to vet rules are not reliable. SELinux provides a mature and 
technically secure framework. However, due to its complex model and the very low usa-
bility of its existing tools, the study showed it to have a low use success rate, suggesting it 
is better suited to providing system-wide standard security improvements when config-
ured by suitably qualified experts. For application-oriented controls to enforce users’ se-
curity goals, other systems may be more appropriate. AppArmor is relatively quick to 
learn; however, the security decisions made during policy construction require expertise 
beyond that of most users. FBAC-LSM resulted in the highest success rate in terms of re-
stricting the actions of programs and allowing the programs to function while confined,     205 
and was also rated the most usable. Therefore, the results of this study show the very sig-
nificant  benefits  resulting  from  a  functionality-based  approach  to  application  confine-
ment. 
 
The next chapter presents results of qualitative analysis, which further explores the fac-
tors that affect the usability of application-oriented access controls.      206 
Chapter 12  Usability: Qualitative Results 
 
“ 
You may have heard the world is made up of atoms and molecules, but it's 
really made up of stories. When you sit with an individual that's been here, 
you can give quantitative data a qualitative overlay. 
William Turner, British scientist and naturalist (1508 - 1568)  ” 
 
 
12.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter reports and discusses the qualitative results of the usability study described 
in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. Chapter 11 mentioned some of the differences between the 
security systems that were thought to have had an effect on usability. This chapter further 
explores the effect on usability of the three different approaches to application restrictions 
taken by FBAC-LSM, SELinux, and AppArmor. A qualitative research approach was 
employed to gain insight and contribute a better understanding of the factors that affect 
the subjective usability of application-oriented access controls. 
 
This chapter starts with an overview of the methods used during analysis. The chapter 
then presents the results of the qualitative analysis of the participant survey feedback for 
each of the security systems. The qualitative analysis identified a number of emergent 
themes in participants’ comments. These themes indicate a number of factors that affect 
the usability of application-restriction mechanisms, and identify factors that are likely re-
sponsible for the usability differences between the security systems studied. These results 
are then discussed and used to compare the usability of the three systems studied. 
 
The chapter then proposes changes to SELinux and AppArmor to address or mitigate spe-
cific usability issues that were identified throughout the study. 
12.2  Method of Qualitative Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 10, qualitative data was collected from open-ended questions in 
the questionnaires, note-taking while participants used the security systems, and during 
debriefing sessions. The post-task questionnaire included three written  response ques-    207 
tions; these requested positive and negative comments about the system the participants 
had just used, and asked how the security system could be improved. Each of these ques-
tions had space for three responses. The final questionnaire also asked participants to 
elaborate on their ranking decisions. All of the responses from the 39 participants that 
completed the study were copied verbatim into digital form for analysis. 
 
The debriefing sessions included six open-ended questions, asking participants to discuss 
what they thought of each of the three systems, and then whether they understood the de-
cisions they were making with each system. Participants were asked follow up questions 
as necessary for clarification. This was followed by the opportunity to ask participants 
some more specific questions about issues that seemed relevant or contentious based on 
previous feedback. For example, participants were asked whether they found the AppAr-
mor severity level helpful, and whether they thought FBAC-LSM presented too much in-
formation at a time. 
 
In order to explore the causes of difference in usability between application-restriction 
systems,  emergent  themes  were  identified  in  the  post-task  questionnaire  comments. 
Theme identification is a technique used in qualitative research to provide an insight into 
the issues that are under study by extracting meaning and developing explanations of 
phenomena. The survey responses of negative and positive comments for each of the se-
curity systems were analysed using a combination of qualitative techniques. Open coding, 
also known as latent coding, a form of inductive data analysis, was used to code com-
ments based on categorising the underlying meaning of the text into central tendencies. 
These themes were induced, that is, they emerged, from the participants comments. As is 
recommended in the literature [235], the complete text of all the comments was read a 
number of times. Following this preparation, pawing was used to label common themes, 
by  marking  up  and  colour  coding  the  responses.  Cutting  and  sorting  (digitally,  on  a 
spreadsheet) was used to organise the responses to assist the process. Unmarked com-
ments were then analysed to attempt to identify whether they related to one of the previ-
ously identified themes, or formed new categories. In most cases the categorisation of 
comments into themes was an intuitive abstraction of the manifest content, to a form of 
latent content. For example, the comment “The program was a hassle to navigate between 
as the layout of the interface was larger than the screen and could not be scaled down” 
was assigned the “interface criticism” label. Comments that generally commented on easy     208 
of use were noted and are discussed, but were too general to be categorised into a theme. 
The presentation of themes in the following sections includes descriptions of sub-themes: 
the types of comments that make up themes. 
 
All of the qualitative data that was collected, including notes from debriefing interviews 
and those taken during the experiment, were considered when developing suggestions for 
improving the usability of AppArmor and SELinux. Each of the major issues that were 
identified, as well as the constructive suggestions from participants, were formulated as 
suggestions for improving these security systems.  
12.3  SELinux and Usability 
A total of 70 negative comments, 50 positive comments, and 51 suggestions for SELinux 
were collected from the responces to the post-task questionnaire. Of the three systems 
SELinux received the most criticism. The themes that emerged from these indicate some 
of the reasons for SELinux’s usability problems. 
 
Eight themes emerged from the negative comments. They are listed here in descending 
order of frequency: 
·  Criticism of interface (18 comments) 
Participants reported a number of problems with the interface for SELinux. Although 
some graphical policy tools exist (and were used as far as possible in the study), in 
order to create policy users are required to use command line tools. However, as stat-
ed by a participant “command line interface reduces the usability [for] some people 
with less knowledge”. Another participant stated, “You need to run a script to compile 
the policy. Everything should be done using the GUI”. Even when using the tools 
provided to automate the generation of rules, users have to manually vet the rules 
generated by audit2allow: the following comment highlighted this “no GUI for fine-
grained editing of the .te files”. Three participants commented on the fact that the pol-
icy generator GUI did not fit on the display, and it could not be resized. Other criti-
cisms of the interface included the lack of wizards to guide the processes, and the fact 
that, while SETroubleShoot identified policy problems, it did not allow users to use 
the tool to make the suggested policy changes. 
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·  Expertise required (14 comments) 
In addition to the command line expertise required (as described above), participants 
commented on the expertise required to use SELinux. In order to use the graphical 
tools to generate the initial skeleton policy, users “… require intimate knowledge of 
Linux e.g port numbers, dbus …”. A participant who found this initial part comforta-
ble stated “While the first stage is easy, the following stages require knowledge and 
use of scripts and macros that would take significant time to learn”. Participants also 
reported that SELinux “Requires very in-depth knowledge of [the] Linux file struc-
ture”, and “Required technical understanding/knowledge about the software/security 
system to be usable”. 
 
·  Unclear or confused about behaviour (9 comments) 
Some responses indicated participants were confused by SELinux or its behaviour. 
For example, one participant said “Allowed http access when no ports were specified 
in initial setup”; this seems to be due to a participant not remembering that policies 
are created in permissive mode. Although explained in the SELinux explanation vid-
eo, the software did not inform users that new policies that are created are not auto-
matically in effect. 
 
·  Time and number of steps involved (6 comments) 
As one response stated “It's very time consuming, the amount of work that has to be 
done is enormous”. Also the number of separate commands and steps were listed as 
negative comments. 
 
·  Complexity of the system (6 comments) 
Related to the expertise required, some responses highlighted the complexity of SEL-
inux and the terminology used.  
 
·  Unsure of success (5 comments) 
Some participants were not sure if the policy they created would provide security, or 
whether they had successfully completed the tasks. Comments included: “It wasn't 
clear if the security policy was going to work”, “Didn't feel like I secured anything”, 
“No confidence that setup is successful in providing security”. 
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·  Output/policy hard to understand (4 comments) 
The format of the SELinux policy, logs (AVCs), and tools designed to make these 
easier for users (setroubleshoot and audit2why) were criticised as being hard to under-
stand. The output from these tools is at times extremely abstruse. Comments included: 
“Even with [audit2why] it couldn't succinctly express what the problem was”, “The 
information provided when there was a security error was hard to understand”.  
 
·  Bugs (3 comments) 
A bug was identified where specifying the ports in the policy generator tool would re-
sult in a “Too many values to unpack” error message. Also SELinux silently ignored 
some denied actions that needed to be audited in order to create rules that were neces-
sary for Opera to run. Neither of these faults prevented policies from being created; 
however they did introduce complications. 
 
·  Other noteworthy comments: 




Six themes emerged from the positive comments for SELinux: 
·  Good interface (13 comments) 
Two participants stated that they favoured the command line interface. Others referred 
to the graphical interface that is used in the first half of the task, stating that it is well 
labelled and easy to read. One participant stated that “It's integrated nicely in the op-
erating system”. Another stated that there were “not too many options”. 
 
·  Good auditing and alerts (6 comments) 
The auditing messages and alerts were commended.  SELinux was the only system 
(by  default)  to  include  runtime  notifications  of  security  events  as  they  happened. 
Some participants found the SETroubleShoot tool helpful. As stated by participants, it 
“gives great informative messages when it blocks something”, and “had tools to help 
you locate issues and attempt to fix them”. One participant found audit2why and au-
dit2allow “good for summarising otherwise unintelligible log file output”.  
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·  Ease of editing and updating (3 comments) 
Some participants thought that it was easy to update and edit policy. 
 
·  Comprehensive protection (3 comments) 
Some participants commended SELinux for being fully featured. 
 
·  Other noteworthy comments: 
Ten comments were that SELinux was generally easy or straightforward
22: for exam-
ple, “Easy to use”. However, most of the evidence, both qualitative and quantitative 
do not support the idea that configuring SELinux is straightforward. Some of these 
comments explicitly refer to the initial stage, where the GUI tools were available. One 
separate comment stated “it did not get overly technical”, another that it didn’t “re-
quire  deep  knowledge”.  Two  comments  implied  that  SELinux  would  be  good  for 
someone with further expertise. Other single comments included that it seemed se-
cure, and was quick. 
12.4  AppArmor and Usability 
Participants provided a total of 69 negative comments, 65 positive comments, and 54 
suggestions for AppArmor by means of the post-task questionnaire. In light of this data 
some usability issues have been identified. From the negative comments for AppArmor, 7 
themes were identified. They are listed here in descending order of frequency: 
·  Expertise required (17 comments) 
The AppArmor tools display almost every low-level resource each application utilis-
es, and this exposes the complexity of applications and the underlying platform to end 
users. Most participants did not possess the expertise necessary to correctly vet the 
rules  that  were  generated.  For  example,  one  participant  said  “Requires  some 
knowledge of what each action is and does in order to ensure correct configuration”. 
 
·  Criticism of interface (14 comments) 
Some responses criticised aspects of the interface, such as the inability to “navigate 
backwards while allowing/denying things”, and the lack of a progress bar. 
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·  Too many decisions to make (7 comments) 
The large number of security decisions the user needs to make to confine an applica-
tion led many participants to click ‘allow’ without considering the security implica-
tions of each rule. For example, comments included: “Hundreds of file access deci-
sions”, “Lots of allow/deny clicks. By the end I was just clicking allow without think-
ing / reading.” 
 
·  Criticism of help provided (6 comments) 
Related to interface criticisms, some responses identified problems participants had 
with the help provided by the AppArmor tools. Comments included: “Not enough ex-
planation as to the modes”, “User help is poor - not able to define buttons use when 
selecting 'help' in the GUI”. 
 
·  Time taken (6 comments) 
Related to the number of decisions made, some responses criticised the amount of 
time it takes to create AppArmor profiles. 
 
·  Unclear or confused about behaviour (6 comments) 
Some responses indicated participants were confused by AppArmor or its behaviour. 
For example, “Had to resort to command line as couldn't figure out GUI - maybe bet-
ter after used command GUI first time as realised what to do”, “Seems to only prevent 
access to individual files instead of denying unsafe actions”. 
 
·  Unsure of success (4 comments) 
Some participants expressed that they were “not sure how secure it was by the end of 
the process”. 
 
·  Other noteworthy comments: 
Two  participants  commented  generally  that  AppArmor  was  difficult  to  use.  Two 
comments indicated that it was difficult to create a restrictive policy. For example, “I 
thought it was too difficult to build a 'deny all' policy (for an untrusted app) then al-
low  permissions  subsequently”.  One  participant  indicated  that  configuration  was 
complex, which is related to the expertise required theme; however, this was kept     213 
separate to facilitate comparison between systems. Another participant stated that Ap-
pArmor caused the program being confined to crash, since they did not give the pro-
gram sufficient privileges. 
 
Analysis of the positive comments for AppArmor indicated these four primary themes: 
·  Good interface (24 comments) 
AppArmor’s interface was commended for being “well laid out”, and “efficient”. Two 
comments mentioned that it was “well integrated into OS”. Three participants indicat-
ed that they appreciated the guided wizard driven approach. Other features mentioned 
include the globbing feature, and the ability to view rules before they are applied. 
 
·  Intuitive / easy to understand (11 comments) 
Some participants thought that AppArmor had “simple concepts, [and that] the gen-
eral configuration and profiles are simple to grasp”. Some comments also indicated 
that the learning mode was a concept that was easy to understand. 
 
·  Automation (5 comments) 
Five participants appreciated the ability of the learning mode to automate the task of 
specifying policy. 
 
·  Seemed secure (5 comments) 
Some comments indicated that AppArmor “seems very secure in managing program 
access”, and that they could see that it “does block things”. 
 
·  Other noteworthy comments: 
Ten comments were that AppArmor was generally “easy to use”
23. Two comments 
indicated that it was easy to edit or update policies. Other positive comments men-
tioned the lower expertise required, the abstractions provided, its comprehensiveness, 
and the policy format. 
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12.5  Functionality-Based Application Confinement and Us-
ability 
The post-task questionnaire collected 46 negative comments, 84 positive comments, and 
44 suggestions for FBAC-LSM. Eight themes were identified from the negative com-
ments about FBAC-LSM. These results will inform future development of FBAC-LSM. 
They are listed here in descending order of frequency: 
·  Criticism of interface (11 comments) 
Criticisms of the graphical interface included having “too many options”, being “a bit 
arcane in its terminology”, and having popup dialogs that could not be suppressed.  
 
·  Time and number of steps involved (9 comments)  
The automation process is currently quite slow, which was criticised. Also there were 
“lots of steps”. 
 
·  Expertise required (7 comments) 
FBAC-LSM asked users to review all the steps that were automated. In order to fully 
understand the automation of parameter arguments participants “require a deep under-
standing of Linux file system”. As one participant put it, a “naïve user won't be able 
to  use  software”.  One  participant  commented:  “Requires  the  individual  to  specify 
what the program does, not something everyone would know”. 
 
·  Unclear or confused about behaviour (4 comments) 
 
·  Unsure of success (4 comments) 
 
·  Bugs (4 comments) 
Although  functional,  FBAC-LSM  is  currently  unstable.  Many  participants  experi-
enced FBAC-LSM crash. Participants were simply informed that the crash was not 
their  fault,  that  they  would  not  loose  the  policies  they  had  created,  and  that  they 
should restart the VM. 
 
·  Silent denials / auditing and alerts (2 comments)     215 
FBAC-LSM currently silently denies any action that is not authorised (notification is 
via dmesg). A graphical notification interface is in development. 
 
·  Name (2 comments) 
FBAC-LSM’s name was criticised. 
 
·  Help provided (2 comments) 
Two participants indicated that they would prefer further “context-sensitive help”. 
 
Analysis of the positive comments for FBAC-LSM identified these seven themes: 
·  Good interface (25 comments) 
Positive comments regarding FBAC-LSM’s interface relate to: the use of wizards, the 
use of categories for organising functionalities, and that the interface is “intuitive and 
explanatory”. Four positive comments were made regarding the help and guidance 
provided within the interface. 
 
·  Automation (19 comments) 
A number of participants found the automation of a priori policy specification useful. 
As  one  participant  described  it,  FBAC-LSM  “supplies  default  configurations  and 
populates suggestions on what could be good settings based on previous options cho-
sen”. Another participant noted, “the software was very intuitive, it auto-recognised 
the type of program it was”. Three participants also found the learning mode useful, 
and noted that it included “learning ability if profile didn't satisfy requirements”. 
 
·  Useful policy abstractions (6 comments) 
Some participants made positive comments regarding the use of functionalities to as-
sign authority. Comments included “Liked the preconfigured profile templates ie In-
ternet, IRC, etc”, and “Nice organisation of the programs to be confined in categories 
depending on their functionalities”. 
 
·  Seems secure (4 comments) 
For  example,  one  participant  stated  that  FBAC-LSM  “seemed  to  be  effective  in 
providing adequate access for users while being secure”. 
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·  Intuitive / easy to understand (3 comments) 
As one participant stated, FBAC-LSM has a “very easy to understand model for per-
missions and privileges”. 
 
·  Comprehensive protection (3 comments) 
 
·  Ease of editing and updating (3 comments) 
 
·  Other noteworthy comments: 
Fifteen comments commended FBAC-LSM for being generally easy
24. The “ability to 
test the application without running it, eg test if can write to a file” was commended 
by two participants. Also FBAC-LSM was described as “quick”. 
12.6  Discussion 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, very little research has investigated the usability issues asso-
ciated with application-oriented access controls [236], or identified the security issues that 
arise in this specific field. The qualitative analysis of the comments provided by partici-
pants identified a number of emergent themes. These themes give an indication of the ex-
isting problems and strengths of the systems studied, serve as a means of comparison be-
tween systems, and identify a number of issues that can affect the usability of application-
restriction mechanisms and that can inform both the design of new systems and develop-
ment of existing ones.  
12.6.1  Negative Factors Affecting Usability 
Qualitative analysis identified 11 themes in the negative comments across the three sys-
tems, which correspond to factors that can be the cause of decreased usability in applica-
tion-oriented access controls. These factors are:  
·  poor interface design,  
·  level of expertise required,  
·  time taken and steps required,  
·  unclear behaviour,  
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·  clarity of success,  
·  help and guidance provided,  
·  complexity,  
·  bugs,  
·  number of decisions required,  
·  output format,  
·  auditing and alerts. 
 
Table 12.1 summarises the themes that emerged from the negative comments, and shows 
how many comments  corresponded with each theme. The two most prominent issues 
were interface design, and expertise required. The amount of time taken, and the confu-
sion and uncertainty of users were also common themes, which are related to the two 
main issues and should be considered when assessing the interface and expertise required 
for application-oriented access controls.  
Table 12.1: Themes in Negative Comments 
Theme  SELinux  AppArmor 
FBAC-
LSM  Total 
Poor interface design  18  14  11  43 
Level of expertise required  14  17  7  38 
Time taken and steps required  6  6  9  21 
Unclear behaviour  9  6  4  19 
Clarity of success  5  4  4  13 
Help and guidance provided  0  6  2  8 
Complexity  6  1  0  7 
Bugs  3  0  4  7 
Number of decisions required  0  7  0  7 
Output format  4  0  0  4 
Auditing and alerts  0  0  2  2 
 
Previous human computer interface security (HCISec) research has demonstrated that in-
terface problems can impact the protections provided by security systems [237]. This re-
search supports these findings, and demonstrates that interface design impacts the usabil-
ity of application-restriction schemes. 
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The  user  interface  for  SELinux  was  particularly  criticised,  in  part  due  to  the  lack  of 
graphical tools. AppArmor has a more complete set of graphical tools compared to SELi-
nux, but still requires a high-level of expertise to utilise correctly. However, the graphical 
interface provided for AppArmor is relatively simple, and since interface design appears 
to be a significant aspect of the perceived usability, this helps explain the fact that Ap-
pArmor was preferred by some participants. The FBAC-LSM interface was criticised for 
the amount of information presented to users. A few negative comments also focused on 
the large number of steps in the FBAC-LSM wizard, and the help provided. However, the 
FBAC-LSM interface received the least amount of criticism. 
 
The nature of the problem of defining rules that allow programs to run and perform their 
legitimate tasks while also restricting programs from acting maliciously results in com-
plex policies. The task of creating and configuring these complex policies can require ad-
vanced expertise. This is particularly the case with SELinux, which requires high levels 
of expertise in understanding the complex constructs that policy is composed of, in addi-
tion to the expertise necessary to use the command line tools. Due to its graphical inter-
face AppArmor requires less expertise to operate, but still requires advanced expertise to 
be used meaningfully, since users need to decide which resources the program should be 
allowed to access.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 11, a number of participants who rated themselves as experts in 
Linux and/or IT security (such as a Linux system administrator and a security profession-
al) were not successful at utilising either AppArmor or SELinux to confine malicious 
code. In a number of cases “expert” participants believed that they had correctly confined 
the applications but had authorised the Trojan simulation to perform numerous malicious 
actions, including compromising the security of their personal data and obtaining system 
or user-level compromise. This illustrates that users do not typically have the expertise to 
vet the low-level actions of applications. This observation has substantial ramifications 
for  the  usability  of  the  approaches  taken  by  many  application-oriented  access  control 
mechanisms including AppArmor and SELinux, and their ability to use learning modes to 
confine malware. This also further emphasises the importance of the expertise required, 
and its effect on usability and security. 
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As described throughout this thesis, FBAC-LSM incorporates techniques to abstract poli-
cy into high-level goals and to automate tasks. The result of these features is that users are 
not required to vet every low-level action that applications perform, thus reducing the ex-
pertise required while still allowing users to enforce their specific security goals. The 
qualitative data supports the theory that reducing the expertise requirement can improve 
usability, as expertise required is a stronger theme with the data collected regarding SEL-
inux and AppArmor than with FBAC-LSM. 
 
The other negative themes identified were more specific to particular systems. Related to 
the expertise required, SELinux is a particularly complex system, and the output from the 
tools exposes the complexity of the policy language and constructs to users. Although the 
interface is simple, AppArmor exposes users to the low level complexity of the resource 
requirements of applications, requiring users to vet nearly every action performed; this re-
sults in a very large number of security decisions for the user to make and a high level of 
expertise is required to vet the rules that are generated. Also, related to the interface, the 
in-program help provided by AppArmor was criticised. Many of the negative comments 
for FBAC-LSM are related to its prototype status: it is slow, contains a number of bugs, 
and lacks an interactive graphical notification tool. Some participants criticised its name, 
with one participant stating they “would not have considered this application [as FBAC-
LSM’s] name [is] not aimed at business users”. While the author does not consider the 
name to have had a significant impact on FBAC-LSM’s usability, these comments sug-
gest that system names may influence decision making.  
 
In addition to the main common themes described at the start of this section, the follow-
ing themes affected the usability of the systems studied and may be considered in future 
research and design: complexity of the system, format of output, auditing and alerts, and 
bugs.  
12.6.2  Positive Factors Affecting Usability 
Analysis of the positive comments collected identified nine themes. These correspond to 
these factors that can have a positive impact on the usability of application-oriented ac-
cess controls: 
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·  Automation, 
·  Intuitive design, 
·  Sense of security, 
·  Ease of editing and updating policy, 
·  Visibly comprehensive features and mediation, 
·  The use of good policy abstractions, 
·  Auditing and alerts. 
 
Table 12.2 summarises the themes that emerged from the analysis of positive comments. 
Again, a large number of comments related to the general quality of the interface. Auto-
mation of policy specification, the intuitiveness of the scheme, alerts, and the abstractions 
used also appear to be significant factors that can positively effect the usability of applica-
tion-oriented access controls. 
Table 12.2: Themes in Positive Comments 
Theme  SELinux  AppArmor 
FBAC-
LSM  Total 
Good interface  13  24  25  62 
Automation  0  5  19  24 
Intuitive  0  11  3  14 
Seemed secure  0  5  4  9 
Editing and updating  3  2  3  8 
Comprehensive  3  1  3  7 
Abstractions  0  1  6  7 
Alerts  6  0  0  6 
 
Some of the positive interface attributes that were commonly mentioned include: wizards 
and step-by-step  guidance, simplicity of the interface, integration with the rest of the 
operating  system,  logical  grouping  of  concepts  and  widgets,  multiple  approaches 
available  for  performing  tasks,  and  policy  review  features.  SELinux,  AppArmor,  and 
FBAC-LSM all employ some form of wizard interface for creating application policies. 
SELinux provided a wizard for the initial stage. Some participants liked this tool, but 
many were not satisfied by the requirement to also use command line tools. AppArmor 
provides a wizard for creating policies using the learning mode. FBAC-LSM provides a 
wizard for a priori policy specification, and also a learning mode tool to add rules to     221 
existing policies. FBAC-LSM reportedly provided the most guidance in the form of on-
screen  help.  AppArmor  had  the  simplest  interface,  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  details 
displayed at a time (although, as discussed, this was displayed for too many decisions). 
SELinux and AppArmor were naturally better integrated into the operating system, since 
these  are  included  in  the  Linux  distributions  used,  and  were  incorporated  into  the 
administration tools for the distribution. For example, SUSE Yast includes an AppArmor 
panel with launchers for the AppArmor configuration tools. The fact that AppArmor and 
FBAC-LSM include the ability to review the policies that are created were also described 
as positives. FBAC-LSM included extensive review and query capabilities that allow the 
permissions to be tested without running the application. 
 
Automation was a common theme in praise for FBAC-LSM. As described in Chapter 9, 
FBAC-LSM’s automation techniques leverage the policy abstractions used by the scheme 
to create policies a priori. The effect of this is that a lower level of expertise is required, 
and less decisions need to be made by end users, compared to the learning mode method 
of automation provided by AppArmor and SELinux. The learning mode scheme of Ap-
pArmor was commended by some participants. The intuitiveness theme, mainly attributed 
to AppArmor, can in part be explained by the simplicity of the notion of learning rules 
based on what an application does. FBAC-LSM also included a learning mode, for the 
situation that policies created a priori required extra rules. Comments such as “Had learn-
ing ability if profile didn't satisfy requirements” indicated that those participants under-
stood that the FBAC-LSM learning mode can be used if policies that are created do not 
provide all the privileges required by the application to function. 
 
As described throughout this thesis, a foundational aspect of the FBAC model is the poli-
cy abstraction (functionalities) that assigns privileges based on the features that applica-
tions provide. As described in the last paragraph, FBAC-LSM’s automation techniques 
leverage these abstractions. Several participants also explicitly identified these abstrac-
tions as positive aspects of FBAC-LSM (shown in Table 12.2 as the abstractions theme), 
other comments described the FBAC-LSM permission model as intuitive. Some mention 
the primitive abstractions used by AppArmor: for example, “KDE”. In contrast, the com-
plexity of the SELinux model was criticised. These results support the theory that the type 
of policy abstractions has a significant impact on the usability of application-oriented ac-
cess control schemes and that functionalities can provide usability benefits.     222 
 
Other factors such as how secure the system seems, and how easy it is to update and 
change existing policies can also have an effect on perceived usability. The alerts and no-
tifications employed also can have an effect. SELinux systems, by default, typically come 
with user-space notification and auditing tools, which were praised by some participants. 
AppArmor notification tools exist, but are typically disabled by default. FBAC-LSM did 
not include notification tools, due to its prototype status.  
12.7  Usability Improvement Suggestions 
Based on all the qualitative information collected, this section proposes changes to SELi-
nux and AppArmor to address or mitigate a number of the issues identified. Due to fun-
damental design properties of these systems, some of these suggestions may be challeng-
ing to implement. However, they are included for completeness and to aid in the design of 
new solutions to application-oriented access controls. The final chapter includes a discus-
sion of how FBAC concepts could be applied to these systems to improve usability. 
 
Although FBAC-LSM demonstrated significant usability advantages, there is room for 
future improvement. A number of participants provided criticism that will be addressed in 
future development. For example, the version of FBAC-LSM used in the study required 
users to review each step that was automated. Some participants would have preferred op-
tions to automatically accept the suggestions or to review all of the automated configura-
tion at once rather than on a step by step basis. Some also would have preferred a simpli-
fied interface. Future work on FBAC-LSM is discussed in Chapter 13. 
12.7.1  Suggestions for Improving SELinux 
Currently no graphical tool has been developed to step users through the entire task of 
confining applications using the standard SELinux primitives. The system-config-selinux 
tool could be used to browse an overview of the policies installed and to edit the SELinux 
configuration, and polgengui, the SELinux Policy Generation tool, could be used to create 
a barebones template policy module. However, no graphical interface was available to 
complete policy development or to compile and apply the created policy. Some partici-
pants reported that they were uncomfortable with the amount of command-line interaction     223 
required, and some participants simply refused to attempt the console portion of the task. 
Therefore it is proposed that tools are developed for SELinux that: 
·  cover the whole process of creating, editing, compiling and enabling policies; 
·  step users through the complete process using a wizard style interface. 
 
The tools used to create rules based on access denials do not currently step users through 
the process of vetting the generated rules. During the usability study it was observed that 
most participants did not review the rules that they added to policy modules. Therefore, 
since SELinux relies on the successful vetting of these rules it is suggested that the graph-
ical interface: 
·  facilitate the vetting of learned rules. 
 
It is also suggested that a graphical tool should also: 
·  provide information about the practical impact of rules. For example, a list of all 
the permissions afforded to a program, and the ability to query whether an appli-
cation is authorised to access particular resources. 
 
Based on participant feedback it is also recommended that: 
·  graphical tools provide further documentation and hints; 
·  the ability should be included to take action from the SETroubleshoot tool to 
make the policy changes it suggests. 
 
Rules are represented in a format that was reported by a number of participants as hard to 
understand. Thus, it is suggested that: 
·  the policy language is simplified to make rules easier to understand.  
This is particularly important while no GUI tools are available to assist in the vetting of 
rules. Other alternative approaches such as intermediary policy languages (such as the 
Common  Intermediary  Language  (CIL)  and  Simplified  Policy  Description  Language 
(SPDL) [213]) and easier to understand alternative views of policy may help alleviate 
policy abstruseness. It is also recommended that: 
·  the feedback from all SELinux tools be improved. This should include the scripts 
used to compile policy modules. Improving the output from audit2why and     224 
SETroubleshoot is particularly important since the format of the AVC denial logs 
are not easily read by humans. Perhaps include a simplified interface for less tech-
nical users.  
 
A number of flaws were noted that should be corrected: 
·  The polgengui tool did not inform users that the created policies start in permis-
sive mode. 
·  The polgengui tool contained a bug that occasionally reports that there were “too 
many values to unpack” when port numbers are specified. 
·  The size of the the polgengui tool’s window did not fit on low resolution displays 
and could not be resized. 
·  Default policies should provide actual confinement, the default policy for KSirtet 
did not. 
·  AVC denial logs were sent to one of two separate log files (dmesg and audit.log). 
This has been acknowledged as a bug. 
·  The failure to log relevant denials, as was the case with Opera, should be investi-
gated. 
12.7.2  Suggestions for Improving AppArmor 
Improvements to the AppArmor rule vetting process are proposed based on the qualitative 
information  that  was  collected.  Many  of  these  suggestions  apply  to  any  rule  vetting 
mechanisms, and are  expected to  generalise to  other systems. Results  from the study 
demonstrate that most users do not have the expertise required to perform vetting using 
the current interface. Since the level of security AppArmor provides depends on the suc-
cessful vetting of rules, the following changes are proposed.  
 
Participants were divided over the usefulness of the severity levels that are displayed as a 
guide for users during vetting. A few pointed out that, for most resources, the severity 
level was ‘unknown’. Many found the severity levels to be ambiguous. Therefore these 
improvements are proposed: 
·  clarify severity levels using colour coding; 
·  clarify the scale used by displaying what the maximum and minimum levels are.     225 
 
It is suggested that AppArmor should also provide more useful information about re-
sources and executables, such as including descriptions of: 
·  the purpose of each resource; 
·  the risks of granting access to certain resources; 
·  the recommend actions. 
This could be implemented by extending the current resource database that is used to cal-
culate severity levels, or by assigning this information directly to files using extended at-
tributes. 
 
Based on participant feedback it is also suggested that AppArmor should: 
·  provide more help describing the on-screen elements. For example, clarify the 
meaning of access types (for example, the meaning of “mrw” could be explained); 
·  provide an optional simplified interface for less experienced users; 
·  allow users to navigate back to change their mind about previous rules they have 
set; 
·  give an indication of progress through the process of vetting rules; 
·  optionally, provide rules in list format for vetting; 
·  allow users to skip denials and deal with them later rather than only having the op-
tion to allow or deny; 
·  allow users to edit profiles as text from the AppArmor control panel; 
·  allow users to use the graphical update tool to only update specific policies, rather 
than updating all the policies that have denied access to resources; 
·  improve the interface integration between the various graphical tools, such as the 
new application profile wizard and the update wizard. 
 
Also, where possible, parts of the process could be automated. For example: 
·  automatically suggest globing where appropriate. 
 
Some participants inadvertently left profiles in complaining mode. Therefore: 
·  the enforcing state should be made more obvious to users. 
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Participants found it hard to create policies incrementally due to the potentially very large 
number of resources used. Therefore it is recommended to: 
·  have predefined templates that can be used as a starting point to develop profiles. 
12.8  Relation Between the Qualitative and Quantitative Re-
sults 
As described in Chapter 11, quantitative results from the usability study  showed that 
FBAC-LSM had the highest perceived usability, and also resulted in the highest quality 
application policies, both in terms of allowing the applications to function, and preventing 
malicious activities from malware. The results of the qualitative analysis presented in this 
chapter  also  indicate  usability  benefits  of  the  FBAC-LSM  approach  to  application-
oriented access controls. The identification of emergent themes helps to explain reasons 
for the usability differences between the systems, and also provides a unique insight into 
factors that can effect the usability of application-oriented access controls. 
12.9  Chapter Conclusion 
A usability study was conducted to compare three different approaches to application-
restrictions,  and  to  test  the  efficacy  of  new  techniques  for  managing  application-
confinement policies that had been incorporated into the prototype FBAC-LSM mecha-
nism. This chapter presented qualitative results of the study. These results provide an in-
sight into the causes of usability issues associated with application-oriented access con-
trols. 
 
A number of themes were identified in survey feedback from participants. These themes 
indicate factors that can affect the usability of application-restriction mechanisms. The 
factors were used to compare the three systems and explain how their different approach-
es to application confinement lead to differences in usability.  
 
Qualitative analysis supported the theory that techniques employed by FBAC-LSM, such 
as policy abstraction and automation, have a positive effect on usability. These results     227 
demonstrate that the FBAC model’s policy abstractions, and the automation techniques 
developed for FBAC-LSM, result in usability benefits.  
 
A number of other factors that affect the usability of application-confinement schemes 
were also identified. It is proposed that the factors that were identified can be used to in-
form the design of new systems and development of existing ones. This chapter also pro-
posed changes to SELinux and AppArmor to address or mitigate specific usability issues 
that were identified.  
 
This concludes the discussion of the usability study, and evaluation of the model and 
techniques proposed in this thesis. The next chapter concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 13  Conclusions 
 
“ 
Because things are the way they are, things will not stay the way they are.  
Bertolt Brecht, German poet and playwright (1898-1956)  ” 
 
 
13.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter starts by describing opportunities for future research and development, and 
the further work that has already begun. The chapter then gives an overview of this thesis 
and draws conclusions about the research that has been presented. 
13.2  Summary of the Research and Its Contribution 
Developing usable security software has long been acknowledged as a challenge that has 
not received sufficient attention in the literature [178]. Application-oriented controls have 
the potential to improve security, but pose new usability problems that, until recently, had 
not been considered [193]. This thesis has presented a new approach to restricting appli-
cations. An access control model with unique attributes and features, known as Function-
ality-Based Application Confinement (FBAC), was proposed in Chapter 4. FBAC is a hi-
erarchical and parameterised model, which confines applications based on the functionali-
ties they provide. An implementation of FBAC has been developed. The implementation 
utilised the Linux security module (LSM) framework to provide application-oriented ac-
cess controls for Linux, and is available as free open source software [207]. The imple-
mentation is known as FBAC-LSM and its design, components, and policy language were 
described in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 respectively. As described in Chapter 8, 
the flexibility of the model to represent the needs of applications was confirmed via anal-
ysis of over 100 applications, and the successful development of a set of reusable func-
tionalities demonstrated the efficacy of the policy abstractions. Techniques for automat-
ing the task of application policy specification were presented in Chapter 9. These tech-
niques successfully lowered the expertise required to construct policies to confine appli-
cations using FBAC-LSM, and added further evidence of the benefits of the FBAC mod-
el. A comparative study was conducted to evaluate usability benefits of the FBAC model,     229 
by comparing FBAC-LSM with two widely deployed alternative systems, AppArmor, 
and SELinux. As described in Chapter 11, the usability study showed that FBAC-LSM 
was rated significantly more usable than the other systems. FBAC-LSM was also signifi-
cantly more successful at securing the systems. Learning mode systems, which rely on 
users vetting rules, were demonstrated to be unreliable and open to subversion by mali-
cious programs compared to a functionality-based approach. In Chapter 12, qualitative 
analysis provided a further insight into factors that can influence the usability of applica-
tion-oriented access controls, and confirmed that the abstractions and techniques enabled 
by the FBAC model resulted in usability benefits. 
 
The FBAC model represents a significant contribution to the field of application-oriented 
access control. FBAC provides the flexibility to simultaneously enforce the security goals 
of users and administrators, and can express complex finely-grained application confine-
ment policies in terms of high-level reusable policy abstractions. These policy abstrac-
tions can be developed separately by third party experts. FBAC-LSM exhibits the usabil-
ity advantages and unique features of this new approach to application confinement, and 
is itself a contribution to the security, Linux, and open source and free software communi-
ties. The analysis of the resource needs of applications, techniques for a priori policy 
specification, and insight into the usability of application-oriented access controls have 
also contributed new knowledge. As evidenced by the results presented throughout this 
thesis, the model and techniques presented accomplish the research aims: to improve the 
usability and flexibility of application-oriented access controls. 
13.3  Future Work 
The model, implementation and results presented in this thesis indicate many opportuni-
ties for potential future research and development projects. A method of managing the 
policies of security systems such as SELinux and AppArmor using functionality-based 
tools is currently under investigation. Future research will investigate a variety of access 
control and IDS techniques and their suitability to functionality-based controls. Develop-
ment  will  continue  on  FBAC-LSM,  incorporating  many  suggestions  for  improvement 
from participants of the usability study, future extensions to the FBAC model, and many 
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13.3.1  Functionality-Based Policy Export 
Development has started on a method of managing the policies of security systems such 
as SELinux and AppArmor using FBAC-LSM tools. This technique has the potential to 
provide some of the demonstrated usability benefits of the FBAC model to other frame-
works, by exporting FBAC-LSM application policies to other policy formats. This ap-
proach does not provide many of the structural advantages of the FBAC model, such as 
the ability to dynamically disable functionalities for processes or the ability to enforce 
multiple confinements concurrently. However, this will provide the ability to develop pol-
icies using functionalities, make use of the functionalities that have been developed for 
FBAC-LSM, and benefit from the policy development and automation techniques that 
have also been developed for FBAC-LSM. This is anticipated to result in direct usability 
and security benefits, as demonstrated in the usability study, to these other systems. The 
impact of the difference in privilege propagation models used needs to be investigated. 
 
The underlying low-level privilege primitives of FBAC-LSM map particularly well to 
AppArmor rules, and therefore one of the current goals of the FBAC-LSM project is for 
the user-space tools to export and manage AppArmor profiles. These features are in de-
velopment and are available for testing in the current version of FBAC-LSM. Exporting 
to AppArmor profiles involves “compiling” or “exploding out” the high-level FBAC pol-
icy language (FBAC-PL) to a large number of rules for AppArmor profiles. In this way it 
is possible to optionally manage AppArmor using the FBAC-LSM user-space tools. Ap-
pArmor developers currently plan to include features, such as profile intersection [238], 
that will incidentally simplify exporting from FBAC rules. Exporting to other name-based 
mechanisms such as Systrace (a system call interposition mechanism [20]) will also be 
explored.  
 
Exporting to label-based policies is also an area for further research. FBAC-LSM could 
attempt to export to label-based policies directly, or it could export to intermediate policy 
languages such as Simplified Policy Description Language (SPDL), as used by SEEdit 
[213]. SELinux enforces label-based policies and SEEdit provides name-based, AppAr-
mor-like, policy specification for SELinux. Exporting from FBAC-LSM-PL to SEEdit is 
anticipated to be relatively straightforward. However, the effect of dissonance between 
name-based and label-based primitives is an area for future research, as they do not typi-    231 
cally exhibit the same level of granularity. This may reduce the quality of policies result-
ing from translations between name-based and label-based policies.  
 
FBAC-LSM currently provides system-wide application-oriented access controls, where 
all running processes are subject to policies if they are specified, and authorisation grants 
access directly to resources; however, it is proposed that FBAC-LSM could also be used 
to configure sandbox environments. Sandboxes only enforce restrictions on applications 
that are launched into sandboxed environments. Often these environments are completely 
isolated, which makes configuration simple. However these isolation-based sandboxes 
provide inflexible environments that don’t accommodate normal workflows: for example, 
using one program to create a file, and separate programs to view, edit and share the file. 
Some sandbox environments provide mechanisms for configuring exceptions to isolation, 
such as with Plash and the new SELinux sandbox mechanism. However, configuring the-
se rules to allow applications to function normally while successfully mitigating threats 
involves usability issues similar to those faced by AppArmor and SELinux as policy can 
become very complex. It is proposed that FBAC-LSM could facilitate launching pro-
grams into FBAC-configured sandboxes by exporting policy to the configuration of exist-
ing sandboxing schemes. 
 
Although  various  security  mechanisms  that  are  capable  of  application-oriented  access 
controls support different sets of security  features, it is proposed that  in many  cases, 
FBAC-LSM policies could be converted to policies for other security systems. This is ex-
pected to provide some of the usability benefits to these other systems without modifying 
these systems or duplicating the efforts of the FBAC-LSM project. However, some of the 
security features provided by FBAC-LSM would not be supported by other security sys-
tems. For example, the hierarchical nature of policies allows sub-trees of policy to be dy-
namically disabled: that is, functionalities not currently being used can be dropped. Also 
FBAC-LSM allows administrators to enforce non-discretionary policies and, if permitted, 
users can simultaneously configure and enforce discretionary policies. Most mechanisms 
do not include these features, and therefore exporting the policies to other systems means 
losing certain FBAC-specific features that the kernel-space component of FBAC-LSM 
provides. 
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Further usability studies may be justified, to further explore the impact of various a priori 
policy techniques on participants with various levels of expertise. For example, a study 
could focus on AppArmor experts using FBAC-enhanced a priori policy generation tools. 
13.3.2  Future Improvements for FBAC-LSM 
Development of FBAC-LSM has already incorporated interface improvements based on 
results from the usability study. For example, the wizard to create new application poli-
cies now includes more options for automation for people with different levels of exper-
tise ranging from completely automated, with no interaction required from the user, to 
completely manual, where the user manually specifies everything. 
 
Many other improvements to FBAC-LSM are planned
25. These improvements include 
code cleanup and bug fixes, further policy development, and planned features and behav-
iour. Some of the features planned include: 
·  a notification system to inform and interact with users; 
·  more information about the security implications regarding access to resources 
and the use of functionalities; 
·  suggesting  functionalities  and  parameter  arguments  based  on  run-time  activity 
deemed to be normal; 
·  improved automation accuracy and speed. 
 
Based on qualitative results from the usability study, a number of suggested modifications 
for AppArmor and SELinux have been presented in Chapter 12. 
13.3.3  Future Functionality-Based Model Research 
The FBAC model proposed in this thesis utilises a privilege model where access deci-
sions are considered to be stateless. The FBAC model could be extended, using more 
complex  methods  of  mediation,  to  further  restrict  applications  by  providing  context 
awareness. Various techniques used in access control, anti-malware, and IDS systems, 
and firewalls could augment the controls currently provided by FBAC to provide stronger 
                                                 
25 These planned changes are documented further in the TODO file within the FBAC-LSM source reposito-
ry (which can be accessed at http://schreuders.org/FBAC).     233 
application-oriented controls. Potential methods of control anticipated to provide further 
restrictions to FBAC include: 
·  Separation of Duty (SoD) (as utilised in RBAC to enforce mutual exclusion of 
conflicting roles [71]) could be used to prevent certain functionalities from being 
concurrently assigned (Static SoD) or simultaneously activated (Dynamic SoD); 
·  Separation of privilege requires multiple conditions to apply in order to grant cer-
tain accesses [177], and could be applied to the FBAC model by requiring multi-
ple functionalities or operations for a single access attempt to succeed – in a sense 
FBAC-LSM achieves this by requesting multiple access permissions for file ac-
cess when necessary, such as file_read and file_write when a file is opened 
for both reading and writing; 
·  Third generation firewall features such as protocol analysis could be used to ana-
lyse network traffic utilised by applications to make sure that traffic conforms to 
protocol standards, and to make access decisions based on message contents; 
·  Intrusion prevention system (IPS) and anti-malware features, such as statistical 
anomaly and signature-based heuristic analysis, could be used to detect and fur-
ther confine malicious or compromised programs, or to categorise series of actions 
as an indication of the presence of particular program features; 
·  Program identity authentication (as used by signature-based anti-malware) could 
be utilised to include or exclude programs from confinement by particular applica-
tion policies; 
·  The  potential  benefits  of  incorporating  history-based,  location-based  and  other 
context-based access control techniques could also be explored. 
 
The FBAC model could be extended to provide further control over application policies 
by incorporating the following features into parameter specification: 
·  Boolean parameters, which could be used to disable parts of policy. For example, 
the FTP_Client functionality could have a Boolean parameter that controls wheth-
er the application can use active FTP, or alternatively only passive FTP. This is re-
lated to a policy feature of SELinux. 
·  Parameter value limitations. These would limit the acceptable values that could be 
supplied to parameters. For example, a parameter could then be defined such that 
only directories in a user’s home directory are acceptable values for parameter ar-    234 
guments. These restrictions could be specified within functionalities in order to 
prevent parameters from being misused to grant excessive access to resources. 
 
It may also be beneficial to enable some resources (such as security sensitive resources 
that could lead to system compromise) to be labelled as protected, meaning that only ap-
plications confined by FBAC are authorised to access them. This could reduce the danger 
inherent in allowing some applications to run unconfined.  
 
Techniques for deploying functionality-based application-oriented access controls across 
networked computers could be developed. The feasibility of incorporating application au-
thor supplied policies, distributed policy construction collaboration, and policy subscrip-
tions could be explored. Deployment of application-oriented access controls in organisa-
tional environments is also an area for future research. Techniques for incorporating user-
oriented and system-oriented access controls with FBAC (which is application-oriented) 
could be developed. For example, it may be feasible to use a single functionality-based 
model to define how a machine is authorised to act, what the users are authorised to do, 
and how the applications are authorised to behave; rather than using separate models to 
make these decisions.  
 
Other techniques for policy generation automation such as static code analysis could be 
explored to detect the features programs provide. 
 
Alternative methods for providing functionality-based application controls, such as sim-
plified forms of the FBAC model could be investigated further. The author has discussed 
a simplified label-based form of functionality-based confinement with the developers of 
the MeeGo security framework. 
13.4  Implications of this Research 
In addition to contributing new methods and techniques, more generally this research has 
demonstrated that it is possible to design application-oriented access controls that are 
more usable and secure. Application-oriented schemes can provide clear security benefits 
that can mitigate threats posed by malicious code; however, as established throughout this 
thesis, previous approaches have had serious usability issues. The large gap between the     235 
approach to security that is required to mitigate contemporary threats, and the security 
systems that are commonly deployed and utilised in practice, points to the severity of the 
problem and the need to improve the situation. 
 
This research has identified factors that can affect the usability of application-oriented ac-
cess controls (including interface design, automation, and abstraction), and shown that an 
approach that focuses on high-level security goals and reusable abstractions can provide 
significant usability improvements. Specifically, functionality-based restrictions (that is, 
authorisation based on the features provided by applications) were demonstrated to be a 
successful approach to application-oriented access controls. As discussed in the previous 
section, the research described in this thesis indicates many opportunities for further im-
provements to application-oriented schemes.  
 
This research contributes to the increasing awareness in the literature of the importance of 
usable security. It is the author’s hope that that the model, methods, techniques, and re-
sults presented in this thesis will help users to protect themselves against malicious code, 
and that this research will help to direct and inspire future work in this developing field of 
research. 
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Appendix A  Other Access Control 
Techniques for Mitigating the Effects of 
Malicious Code 
A.1  Appendix Introduction 
This appendix describes some access control techniques for mitigating the effects of 
malicious code that were outside the scope of Chapter 2, Section 2.4. Trust-based se-
lective execution is the simplest form of application-oriented access control, where 
the ability to start applications is restricted. Integrity-level schemes provide some 
protection against malicious code by separating programs into corresponding levels 
of integrity; however, these schemes don’t provide a mechanism for safely running 
untrusted programs. 
A.2  Trust-based Selective Execution 
One of the simplest access control techniques to mitigate the risk of running pro-
grams with all of the user’s authority is to only allow particular programs to run. Us-
ing this approach, running programs typically still have all the authority of the user; 
however, only those programs deemed trustworthy are allowed to run. There are a 
variety of methods that have been developed to help decide whether to treat an appli-
cation as trustworthy. Simple white or black lists of programs can be used to control 
which programs are authorised to run [239]. In addition to paths to executables and 
attributes attached by the author, digital signatures can be used by these systems to 
make decisions based on who authored the software [240]. Examples of trust-based 
selective  execution  include  Microsoft  AppLocker,  and  Microsoft  Software  Re-
striction Policies (SRP), which are typically configured by an administrator to speci-
fy the programs that are allowed to execute [241, 242]. ActiveX controls are used to 
run native code embedded in a web page [243]. It prompts users to decide whether to 
allow content from particular authors, and then trusts code signed by those authors to 
run with the full authority of the user. Due to the threat they can pose, Microsoft 
maintain a black list of known harmful Active X controls.     237
 
Another method of selected execution is to analyse source code or binary files to de-
cide how trustworthy the program is. This form of trust-based selective execution is 
used by many of the current generation of anti-malware suites. Signature-based and 
heuristic lists identify programs based on characteristics of executable files and are 
typically used to specify black lists to prevent known types of malware from run-
ning. The techniques used to identify malware have become increasingly sophisticat-
ed, as have the various techniques used by malware to avoid detection [244-248]. 
Reputation-based security, used by systems such as Symantec Quorum, Microsoft 
SpyNet, and McAfee Artemis, is a relatively new technique that uses information 
collected from a large number of users to make judgements about the likely trustwor-
thiness of programs to decide if programs should be allowed to run [249]. 
 
These trust-based security systems provide protection from a limited number of spe-
cific threats. However, many legitimate “trusted” programs can be the source of ma-
licious behaviour. These approaches do not provide a mechanism for safely running 
untrusted programs. However, as discussed earlier, it is not ideal to have to trust any 
software. In many cases it is overly restrictive or impractical to restrict users from 
running code obtained from third parties via the Internet. For example, mobile phone 
“apps” are currently very popular, and the web is constantly becoming increasingly 
dynamic, including client-side execution of mobile code. Also these techniques fre-
quently fail to protect users from malware. At various times: 
·  digital signatures and certificates have failed to accurately reflect the truth 
about the source of programs [46, 250, 251]; 
·  ActiveX has been a prevalent infection vector [252, 253]; and, 
·  anti-malware black list techniques often fail to identify malware [48, 254, 
255]. 
Clearly a more comprehensive confinement approach that facilitates the execution of 
untrusted software, and that has the ability to treat applications as untrusted, can bet-
ter mitigate the threats posed by the problem of malicious code.     238
A.3  Integrity-level Schemes 
Some integrity-level security schemes are related to application confinement. How-
ever, rather than focusing on restricting particular programs, these schemes divide 
programs and resources based on how trustworthy they are considered and restrict 
lower level programs  from interacting with higher level programs  and  resources. 
This involves labelling every subject and object with integrity levels, and restricting 
the  interaction  between  different  levels.  For  example,  Microsoft  Windows  (since 
Vista) incorporates an integrity level scheme known as the Windows integrity mech-
anism [256]. Windows runs most user programs at the same integrity level, while 
some high risk applications such as Internet Explorer are run at a lower level. Other 
similar security schemes include LOMAC [257, 258] (which takes a dynamic ap-
proach to integrity labelling) and HIPP [173]. Although these schemes reduce the 
risk of malicious code, these systems are not intended as mechanisms for restricting 
and sandboxing applications and do not limit programs to only the resources they re-
quire.      239
Appendix B  Notes on Application 
Confinement Terminology 
 
In the literature, a clear distinction has not always been made between access control 
that bases its restriction on the confinement of users and that which provides re-
strictions based on the privileges required by specific applications or processes. In 
this thesis the terms ‘user-oriented access control’ and ‘application-oriented access 
control’ have been used to differentiate between access control based on the identity 
of the user and that based on the identity of the application or process. It is useful to 
introduce this distinction, not previously made explicit in the literature, to identify 
the paradigm shift that has separated these fields of research. With user confinement, 
the security context is primarily the identity or authority of the user associated with 
the active entity being confined, and the identity of the program is of secondary con-
cern and is typically disregarded. However, with application confinement the securi-
ty context is primarily the identity or authority of the process or application, and the 
identity of the user is of secondary concern and is typically considered separately. 
These terms are proposed to differentiate between two distinctive types of access 
control and areas of research that are often not considered in terms of each other. 
 
Application confinement has usually been considered separately from user confine-
ment and access control research. This may be due to a perceived equivalency be-
tween access control and user confinement. It may also be due to the tendency of ap-
plication confinement research to propose, design and implement systems rather than 
model solutions (for example, [21, 26, 78]). Rather than propose a theoretical model 
and then develop an implementation to demonstrate the model, research in the field 
of application confinement often revolves around the design and implementation of 
an application  confinement system.  A clear  exception is Type Enforcement (TE) 
[161], which is an application confinement based access control model that has been 
described and developed within the field of access control; although this distinction 
has typically not been made in the literature. 
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The idea that user confinement and application confinement are different enough to 
only be studied independently has arguably been a large oversight. User confinement 
confines the actions of users to specific system-wide resources, while application 
confinement can further confine an application to specific resources they require; 
typically a subset of a user’s authority. Essentially the theory developed in user con-
finement (access control) research can apply to application confinement research. 
This is demonstrated in the conceptualisation of the functionality-based application 
confinement (FBAC) model by this author, which incorporates constructs adapted 
from RBAC [196]. Although in the past application confinement has usually been 
considered separately from user confinement and access control, there is a close rela-
tionship between the two fields. 
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Appendix C  Logic of the FBAC Model 
C.1  Appendix Introduction 
Chapter 4 introduced FBAC, described its components and the model structure, and 
discussed the design of privilege propagation across process invocation. This appen-
dix defines the logic that is utilised to enforce the FBAC model. Algorithms are pre-
sented here for starting new processes, performing access decisions, and resolving 
parameters to values. The specification of these algorithms is necessarily complex; 














































Figure C.1: The FBAC Model, Showing Set Association Function Names     242
The names of the functions used to identify mapped entities in the following algo-
rithms are displayed on the entity mapping connections in Figure C.1. For example, 
PT(PROCESS x) represents the set of task confinements associated with the process 
denoted by the variable ‘x’. This notation can denote the association in either direc-
tion: for example, PT(TASK_CONFINEMENT c) represents the process associated 
with the task confinement ‘c’. Function names are shown in bold, and attribute val-
ues (as shown in Figure C.1 as dotted rectangles) are accessed using a “.” followed 
by the entity name: for example, task_confinement.propagate. It is suggested 
the reader refer to the figure while reading the following sections. 
C.2  Starting a Process 
The procedure for starting a new process involves checking that the program is au-
thorised to run, creating the process context and policy instances, and managing the 
ancestry  propagation  of  authority.  The  procedure  is  divided  into  functions,  each 
function is first described then defined using pseudocode. 
 
As defined in Figure C.2, the function process_start describes how processes 
start. The function parent_task_conf is called to retrieve each task confinement 
from the parent, which is added it to the ancestry association for the child process. 
The function find_propagation_type is then used to retrieve the execute opera-
tion that authorises the parent to start the new process. If, for any of the task con-
finements, the parent is not authorised to start the new process, the attempt is denied 
and the process will not start. If the process has no parent (that is, the parent is un-
confined or nonexistent), then the child starts using the execute_load_profile 
operation. This means that ancestry for that process will not be considered again 
when making access decisions.  
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Function process_start 
Parameters: path, user, parent, newprocess 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  boolean permit = TRUE 
for each conf in set CAU(USER user) 
  parent_conf = parent_task_conf(conf, parent) 
if(parent_conf != NO_PARENT_CONF) 
add parent_conf to set TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT 
conf) 
op = find_propagation_type(path, parent_conf) 
else 
  op = execute_load_profile 
if(op != NONE) 
  app = find_application(path, conf) 
  if(app == NOT_FOUND) 
    switch(conf.no_profile) 
case confine_with_restricted_profile: 
permit = build_task_tree (conf, 
RESTRICTED_APPLICATION, newpro-
cess, user, execute) 
      case unconfined: 
op = execute_as_current_app 
        permit = TRUE 
      case deny_execution: 
        permit = FALSE 
  else 
permit = build_task_tree(conf, app, 
newprocess, user, op) 
manage_propagation(op, conf, parent_conf) 
  else 
    permit = FALSE 
Figure C.2: Function process_start 
The application policy that applies to the process is identified based on the executa-
ble path using the find_application function. If no policy is found for the pro-
cess, the confinement attribute no_profile (which can be configured by an adminis-
trator, and was described in Chapter 4, Section 4.8) is used to decide whether to re-
strict the process to a limited policy, confine it using its parent’s policy (unconfined 
if the parent was unconfined), or deny the execution. If the program is permitted to 
run, the function manage_propagation is then called to modify the process ances-
try (if required due to a parent running with the execute_shell operation). 
 
The remaining functions described in this section perform other steps necessary for 
process_start to  function.  The  process  ancestry  is  maintained  separately  for 
each task confinement, since each confinement can represent separate rules. There-
fore, a process can have a different ancestry of rules that needs to be considered for     244
each task confinement. The function parent_task_conf, shown in Figure C.3, 
simply retrieves and returns the parent task confinement for a given task confine-
ment, by searching for one that is associated with the parent process and is inherited 
from the same confinement. 
 
Function parent_task_conf 
Parameters: child_conf, parent   
Returns: TASK_CONFINEMENT 
 
TASK_CONFINEMENT retval = NO_PARENT_CONF 
for each parent_task_conf in set PT(PROCESS parent) 
  if(parent_task_conf inherited_from(child_conf)) 
    retval = parent_task_conf 
return retval 
Figure C.3: Function parent_task_conf 
The function find_propagation_type, shown in Figure C.4, queries a task con-
finement for the authority to start a program. If no privilege allows the program to 
run, the function returns NONE and process_start stops the process from starting. 
Otherwise, the operation used to authorise the process to start is returned. As shown 
in the algorithm below, the operations are checked in the following order of prece-
dence:  execute_as_current_app,  execute_as_interpreted,  exe-
cute_shell,  execute_load_profile,  then  execute.  The  function 
conf_has_authority (as defined later in the access control decision logic) is 
used to check if starting the program with one of these operations is authorised. If the 
parent  was  started  using  execute_shell  or  execute_as_current_app,  then 
the confinement’s parent’s privileges are queried (i.e. the parent’s parent, and so on 
recursively).  
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Function find_propagation_type 
Parameters: executable_path, confinement 
Returns: OPERATION {execute_as_current_app, execute_as_interpreted, execute_shell, exe-
cute_load_profile, or execute} 
 
  prop_type = NONE 





if(confinement.propagate == execute_as_current_app  
OR confinement.propagate == execute_shell) 
prop_type = find_propagation_type(TT 
(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT confinement), path); 
  else  
for each eop in execute_operations  
if(conf_has_authority(eop, executable_path, conf) 
== TRUE) 
        prop_type = eop 
        break for 
  return prop_type 
Figure C.4: Function find_propagation_type 
The find_application function, shown in Figure C.5, simply searches all the ap-
plication policies in a confinement, for an application policy that has an executable 
matching the executable_path argument. 
 
Function find_application 
Parameters: executable_path, confinement 
Returns: APPLICATION 
 
for each app in set AC(CONFINEMENT confinement) 
for each exec in set AE(APPLICATION app) 
if(exec matches(executable_path)) 
return app 
  return NOT_FOUND 
Figure C.5: Function find_application 
The function build_task_tree, shown in Figure C.6, creates the new records and 
establishes the relationships between records to represent the presence of a new pro-
cess on the system. As shown in the algorithm, the new process is first associated 
with the user entity. A new task confinement is created as an instance of the con-
finement and is associated with the process. The application is associated with the 
new task confinement. All the functionalities associated with the application (and re-    246
cursively all contained functionalities) are created as functionality instances and as-
sociated with the new process.  
 
Function build_task_tree 
Parameters: confinement, application, newprocess, parent, user, op 
 
  add newprocess to set UP(USER user) 
create task_confinement(confinement) 
  add task_confinement to set PT(PROCESS newprocess) 
add application to set TA(TASK_CONFINEMENT task_confinement) 
 
for each func in set AF(APPLICATION application) 
create_func_instance_recursive(func, 
task_confinement) 
Figure C.6: Function build_task_tree 
The  function  create_func_instance_recursive,  shown  in  Figure  C.7,  is 
called by build_task_tree, and simply creates and establishes the relationships 
between contained functionality instances. 
 
Function create_func_instance_recursive 
Parameters: functionality, task_confinement 
 
create func_instance(functionality) 
add func_instance to set IT((TASK_CONFINEMENT 
task_confinement) 
for each func in set II(PARENT_FUNCTIONALITY functionality) 
create_func_instance_recursive(func, 
task_confinement) 
Figure C.7: Function create_func_instance_recursive 
After  everything  else  has  successfully  been  established,  the  function  man-
age_propagation, shown in Figure C.8,  is called by process_start to set the 
propagation type of the new process. If the parent confinement was running as exe-
cute_shell  and  the  operation  used  to  authorise  the  process  to  start  was  exe-
cute_load_profile, then the operation is reset to execute (so that the shell can 
be used to launch helper programs, as described in Chapter 4, Section 4.11). The op-
eration that has been calculated is associated with the task confinement. 
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Function manage_propagation 
Parameters: op, child_conf, parent_conf 
 
if(parent_conf != NO_PARENT_CONF  
AND parent_conf.propagate == execute_shell  
AND op == execute_load_profile) 
    op = execute   
  child_conf.propagate = op 
Figure C.8: Function manage_propagation 
C.3  Access Decision 
The logic used to make access control decisions is defined in this section. The func-
tion task_has_privilege, shown in Figure C.9, is the interface to the decision 
logic. It reports whether a process is authorised to perform an action, given the oper-
ation and the specifics of the resources to be accessed (specified via the ‘arguments’ 
function parameter). As shown in the algorithm, task_has_privilege uses the 
conf_has_authority function to check that every task confinement for a process 
authorises the proposed access. This enforces the requirement that the resulting per-
mission is an intersection of these confinements. 
 
Function task_has_privilege 
Parameters: operation, arguments, current_process 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  boolean permit = TRUE 
for each task_confinement in set PT(PROCESS current_process) 
permit = permit AND conf_has_authority(operation, argu-
ments, process, task_confinement) 
  return permit 
Figure C.9: Function task_has_privilege 
The function conf_has_authority, shown in Figure C.10, returns whether a giv-
en task confinement authorises the action. This function takes the type of propaga-
tion into account. Depending on the type of propagation, it may call itself recursively 
for its parent and may check the privileges associated with the task confinement us-
ing the test_all_app_privileges_with_op function. If there is no task con-
finement supplied (that is, there is no parent task confinement), the recursive call re-
turns TRUE, and the intersection of the previous task confinements is returned. This     248
enforces the requirement that the authority granted by a task confinement is an inter-
section of the hierarchy of task confinements for the process’s ancestry. 
 
Function conf_has_authority 
Parameters: operation, arguments, task_confinement 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  boolean permit 
  if(task_confinement == ¸) 
    return TRUE 
  switch(task_confinement.propagate) 
    case execute: 
permit = conf_has_authority(operation, arguments, 
TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT task_confinement) AND 
test_all_app_privileges_with_op(operation, 
TA(APPLICATION task_confinement), arguments) 
    case execute_as_interpreted: 
permit = conf_has_authority(operation, arguments, 
TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT task_confinement) OR 
test_all_app_privileges_with_op(operation, 
TA(APPLICATION task_confinement), arguments) 
    case execute_shell: 
permit = conf_has_authority(operation, arguments, 
TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT task_confinement) 
    case execute_as_current_app: 
permit = conf_has_authority(operation, arguments, 
TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT task_confinement) 
    case execute_load_profile: 
  if(TT(CHILD_TASK_CONFINEMENT 
task_confinement).propagate == execute_shell) 




TA(APPLICATION task_confinement), arguments) 
      else 
permit = test_all_app_privileges_with_op( 
operation, task_confinement, arguments) 
  return permit 
Figure C.10: Function conf_has_authority 
The  function  test_all_app_privileges_with_op,  shown  in  Figure  C.11,  is 
used by conf_has_authority to check whether an application policy for a specif-
ic task confinement grants the authority to perform an action. This is achieved by 
calling  the  function  test_all_func_privileges_with_op  to  check  whether 
any of the functionality instances associated with a task confinement’s application 
policy authorise the activity.  
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Function test_all_app_privileges_with_op 
Parameters: operation, task_confinement, arguments 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  boolean permit = FALSE 
 
for each functionality in set IT(TASK_CONFINEMENT 
task_confinement) while permit == FALSE 
permit = test_all_func_privileges_with_op(operation, 
functionality, arguments) 
    if(permit == TRUE) 
      break for 
  return permit 
Figure C.11: Function test_all_app_privileges_with_op 
Subsequently test_all_func_privileges_with_op, shown in Figure C.12, re-
cursively  calls  itself  to  check  if  any  functionality  instances  contained  within  the 
functionality  grant  the  access.  For  every  functionality,  test_direct_privs  is 
used to test the privileges directly assigned to each functionality. 
 
The function test_direct_privs, shown in Figure C.13, searches for privileges 
matching the specified operation, and calls test_permission to test if that privi-
lege grants access. 
 
Function test_all_func_privileges_with_op 
Parameters: operation, functionality, arguments 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  Boolean permit 
 
permit = test_direct_privs(operation, FP(FUNCTIONALITY 
FI(FUN_INSTANCE functionality)), arguments) 
 
  if(!permit) 





    if(permit == TRUE) 
      break for 
  return permit 
Figure C.12: Function test_all_func_privileges_with_op     250
Function test_direct_privs 
Parameters: operation, privileges, arguments 
Returns: Boolean 
 
  Boolean permit = FALSE 
for each privilege in set privileges 
    if(privilege.operation == operation) 
  if(test_permission(operation, privilege, argu-
ments) == _TRUE) 
        permit = TRUE 
        break 
  return permit 
Figure C.13: Function test_direct_privs 
The function test_permission, shown in Figure C.14, calls the implementation 
dependent has_privilege to check if the arguments supplied to the decision logic 
are a match for any resource descriptors associated with the privilege. This can in-
volve different types of comparisons based on the type of resource being accessed. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.5, this may involve pattern matching 
between the patterns specified in resource descriptors and the strings representing the 
resource in the parameter arguments. Resolving parameters, as described in the next 
section, can be used at this stage to determine non-literal parameter argument values. 
 
Function test_permission 
Parameters: operation, privilege, arguments 
Returns: Boolean 
 
return  [has_privilege](operation,  privilege,  argu-
ments) 
Figure C.14: Function test_permission 
C.4  Resolving Parameter Arguments to Privileges 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.7, application policies or function-
alities can supply literal arguments (in other words, actual descriptions of resources) 
to parameters. These associations are represented in  Figure  C.1 as AA and  FA. 
However, parameters can also refer to other parameters contained in parent function-
alities. This is represented as PP in the figure. It is necessary to resolve these pa-
rameters to literal arguments in order to make access decisions.     251
 
The following algorithm resolves resource descriptors that refer to parameters to the 
literal argument values that describe the resources the operation grants access to.  
 
The function resolve_nonliteral_resource_descriptor, shown in Figure 
C.15, returns a literal result that describes resources. If the ‘resource_descr’ argu-
ment is already literal (that is, it is not associated with a parameter), it is simply re-
turned. If it is non-literal (it is associated with a parameter) then the function re-
solve_argument is used to return the literal parameter argument. 
Function resolve_nonliteral_resource_descriptor 
Parameters: resource_descr 
Returns: ARGUMENT or RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR (if literal) 
 
param = OR(RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR resource_descr) 
if param != ¸ 
return resolve_argument(param) 
  else 
    return resource_descr 
Figure C.15: Function resolve_nonliteral_resource_descriptor 
The function resolve_argument, shown in Figure C.16, checks whether a param-
eter is associated with a parent parameter. If it is, the function calls itself recursively 
until all parents have been traversed and a literal value is found. If the parameter has 






parent_param = PP(CHILD_PARAMETER parameter) 
if parent_param != ¸ 
  return PA(PARAMETER parameter) 
else 
return resolve_argument(parent_param) 
Figure C.16: Function resolve_argument 
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Appendix D  FBAC-LSM Structures and 
Shared Code 
D.1  Appendix Introduction 
This  appendix  gives  a  brief  overview  of  some  the  code  that  the  components  of 
FBAC-LSM have in common. First the way in which policy is represented internally 
is discussed. Finally a very brief overview of the organisation of the shared code is 
presented. 
D.2  Internal Policy Representation 
As alluded to earlier, components of FBAC-LSM share code in common. The most 
important aspect of this shared code is the way that policy is represented internally. 
The fbac.h file contains C structures (structs), many of which represent FBAC model 
elements. The mapping between elements is represented with pointers to the con-
tained elements. Many-to-many relationships are represented with arrays of pointers, 
typically with an accompanying integer that keeps track of the length of the array 
used. These structures form the basis of internal policy representation and are de-
scribed  in  this  section.  The  structures  shown  in  the  following  figures  have  been 
abridged to remove comments and code that are unnecessary for this discussion. 
 
Components of FBAC-LSM start by loading all the policy information into these 
structures starting with the confinement structure, which is shown in Figure D.1. 
This structure stores all the information about a set of restrictions and who it applies 
to. The functionalities and applications arrays refer to all the policy ab-
stractions and application policies that apply to this confinement. As described in the 
last chapter, each confinement can either apply to everyone, to some specific users, 
or to all but some specific users. The applies_to_type value describes which of 
these apply, and if it does not apply to everyone, applies_to_users specifies 
which users it does apply to. The apps_maintained_by array specifies which 
users are authorised to create, edit or delete application policies. The no_profile     253
value specifies how processes are restricted when no application policy matches the 
program. The audit value specifies which events to log. The active value stores 
whether the confinement’s restrictions are enforced. This same structure is also used 
to store the restrictions that apply to individual tasks, known as task confinements in 
the FBAC model. Each task confinement inherits all its values from the correspond-
ing confinement, but only has one application, the one that applies to the task. If a 
confinement does not apply to a user, corresponding task confinements will be deac-
tivated and therefore ignored. The propagate variable stores which operation was 
used to start the process from the parent’s task confinement. As described in the 
model description, process ancestry is represented within each task confinement. The 
process ancestry is maintained using the parent_task_confinement variable, 
which points to the parent. 
 
struct confinement { 
    char name [MAX_FUNC_NAME_LENGTH]; 
    int active; 
    enum only_or_except applies_to_type;  
    int applies_to_users[MAX_USERS]; 
    int number_of_applies_to_users; 
    int apps_maintained_by[MAX_USERS]; 
    int number_of_app_maintainers; 
    enum no_profile_actions no_profile; 
    enum audit_type audit; 
    struct application *applications[MAX_NUM_OF_APPLICATIONS]; 
    int number_of_applications; 
    struct functionality *functionalities[MAX_NUM_OF_FUNCTIONALITIES]; 
    int number_of_functionalities; 
    // the below only applies to task confinements 
    struct confinement *parent_task_confinement; 
    enum operations propagate; 
}; 
Figure D.1: Abridged Confinement Structure 
Each task (process or thread) has a task_sec structure (as shown in Figure D.2) 
in the FBAC-LSM module, and this information is associated with the task’s kernel-
space void *security value. This structure contains all the task confinements 
that can apply to a task. Note that the user id associated with the task is retrieved 
from elsewhere.     254
struct task_sec { 
    struct confinement *confinements[MAX_NUM_OF_CONFINEMENTS]; 
    int number_of_confinements; 
}; 
Figure D.2: Abridged Task Security Structure 
The application structure, shown in Figure D.3, defines a set of rules that ap-
plies to any program that matches a path in the executable_list array.  The 
functionalities array specifies all the functionalities the application is author-
ised to perform. The literal_parameters array holds arguments to parameters 
for contained functionalities. Unlike when functionalities send arguments to other 
functionalities, the arguments application policies specify are always literal values. 
The to_send_to_functionalities array specifies which arguments are for 
each functionality. The privileges array holds optional direct privileges. This al-
lows the mechanism to optionally create flat policies, such as those used by alterna-
tive schemes: for example, AppArmor or Systrace. The macros array is used to 
create multiple direct privileges by expanding  groups of  resources. For example, 
they can grant access to multiple filenames within particular directories. Macros are 
described in Chapter 7. 
 
The single application structure associated with a task confinement has a special 
purpose. The functionalities and parameters it contains are copied to task specific in-
stances so they can be altered without affecting other tasks. Arguments are propagat-
ed across these functionalities, from parameter to contained parameter. This is de-
scribed further in Chapter 6 in the description of the LSM. 
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struct application { 
    char name [MAX_APP_NAME_LENGTH]; 
    struct executable_list *executables [MAX_NUM_OF_BINS_PER_APP]; 
    int number_of_executables; 
    struct privilege *privileges [MAX_NUM_OF_PRIVS]; 
    int number_of_privileges; 
    struct parameter *literal_parameters [MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_PER_FUNC]; 
    int number_of_parameters; 
    struct functionality *functionalities [MAX_NUM_OF_FUNCS];  
    struct to_send_to_functionality *to_send_to_functionalities [MAX_NUM_OF_FUNCS]; 
    int number_of_functionalities; 
    char *macros [MAX_NUM_OF_MACROS]; 
    int number_of_macros; 
    enum mode enforce_mode; 
}; 
Figure D.3: Abridged Application Structure 
The executable_list structure shown in Figure D.4 specifies a set of path pat-
terns that identity a single executable program. 
 
struct executable_list { 
    char *paths[MAX_NUM_OF_PATHS_PER_BIN]; 
    int number_of_paths; 
}; 
Figure D.4: Abridged Executable List Structure 
The to_send_to_functionality structure, shown in Figure D.5, lists the pa-
rameters that are to be sent to a corresponding functionality. These parameters speci-
fied in parameter_values are either references to parameters contained in the 
parent application or functionality, or are literal values specified when containing a 
functionality. 
 
struct to_send_to_functionality { 
    struct parameter *parameter_values [MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_VALUES]; 
    int number_of_parameters_for_func; 
}; 
Figure D.5: Abridged To Send To Structure 
The  parameter  structure  shown  in  Figure  D.6  holds  parameter_values. 
These values can be literal, or refer to another parameter. In the latter case its values 
will be overwritten with the value of the other parameter when arguments are propa-
gated. The type of resource restricts the values the parameter can hold: for exam-
ple,  a  path  of  an  IP  address.  The 
linked_into_app_tree__using_defaults variable stores whether the pa-    256
rameter is using its default values, and is therefore linked to itself. The values de-
scription and suggest_parameter_value are used by the policy manager 
to assist the user in policy assignment. 
 
struct parameter { 
    char name [MAX_PARAM_NAME_LENGTH]; 
    char *parameter_values [MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_VALUES]; 
    int number_of_parameter_values; 
    enum true_false linked_into_app_tree__using_defaults; 
    enum parameter_types type; 
    char *description; 
    struct suggest_parameter_value *suggestions[MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_SUGGESTIONS]; 
    int number_of_suggestions; 
}; 
Figure D.6: Abridged Parameter Structure 
The privilege structure shown in Figure D.7 specifies an authorised opera-
tion on a resource that is described using parameters. These parameters define 
resources using literal string resource descriptors, or may be described in terms of 
other parameters, in which case they will be overwritten with literal values when ar-
guments are propagated. The macro_made variable specifies whether the privilege 
is the result of expanding a macro. 
 
struct privilege { 
    enum operations operation; 
    struct parameter *parameters[MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_PER_FUNC]; 
    int number_of_parameters; 
    enum true_false macro_made; 
}; 
Figure D.7: Abridged Privilege Structure 
After the confinements and applications are loaded into their structures, each func-
tionality is loaded into a functionality structure, as shown in Figure D.8. Func-
tionalities can have direct privileges, and can contain other functionali-
ties. Similar in many ways to the previously described application structure, the 
to_send_to_functionalities array specifies the parameters to send to 
each  functionality,  and  macros  can  be  expanded  into  multiple  privileges.  The 
level, category, description and suggestions are used by the policy 
manager to ease management of policy. When a process starts, the functionalities as-
sociated with the matching application policy are copied to the process’s functionali-    257
ty instances. The active variable allows a functionality instance to be deactivated 
or reactivated dynamically. 
 
struct functionality { 
    char name [MAX_FUNC_NAME_LENGTH]; 
    int active; 
    char policy_location [MAX_PATH_LENGTH]; 
    enum levels level; 
    enum categories category; 
    char description [MAX_FUNC_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH]; 
 
    struct parameter *parameters [MAX_NUM_OF_PARAM_PER_FUNC]; 
    int number_of_parameters; 
    struct privilege *privileges [MAX_NUM_OF_PRIVS]; 
    int number_of_privileges; 
    struct functionality *functionalities [MAX_NUM_OF_FUNCS]; 
    struct to_send_to_functionality *to_send_to_functionalities [MAX_NUM_OF_FUNCS]; 
    int number_of_functionalities; 
    char *macros [MAX_NUM_OF_MACROS]; 
    int number_of_macros; 
    struct suggest_functionality *suggestions[MAX_NUM_OF_FUNC_SUGGESTIONS]; 
    int number_of_suggestions; 
}; 
Figure D.8: Abridged Functionality Structure 
Each  operation  also  has  an  OPERATION_DETAILS  structure  that  describes  its 
properties such as the number of parameters, their descriptions and the type of re-
source. This structure is shown in Figure D.9. The function_has_privilege 
value is a pointer to the function that is used to decide if the task has the privilege to 
access a resource using this operation. 
static struct OPERATION_DETAILS { 
    const char *name; 
    enum operations index; 
    int number_of_parameters; 
    char *param_desc[MAX_PRIVILEGE_PARAMETERS]; 
    enum parameter_types param_type[MAX_PRIVILEGE_PARAMETERS]; 
    int (*function_has_privilege) (struct privilege *privs, char *arguments[],  
    int num_args); 
} 
Figure D.9: Abridged Operation Details Structure 
D.3  Shared Code 
Table D.1 gives an overview of the files of code that many of the components share 
in common. These files are .c code files with accompanying .h prototype files.     258
Table D.1: Shared C Code Files 
Filename (.c & .h)  Purpose 
audit  Writes auditing messages. 
buildapptree  Creates the privilege tree for a loading program and propagates arguments to 
functionalities. 
buildstructs  Creates and populates internal policy representation. 
commandparsing  Handles the execution of commands received. 
copyandfree  Copies and de-allocates data item memory. 
decide  Makes access control decisions. 
display  Displays policy data. 
funcstatus  Activates and deactivates functionalities. 
importanthelpers  Functions used to perform support tasks. 
macro  Processes commands that group strings together to form multiple commands. 
matcher  Does resource descriptor name-based pattern matching. 
navigation  Navigates arrays and retrieves structs and pointers. 
output  Outputs the internal policy in the FBAC-LSM policy language. 
serversendcommand  Reads policy files and sends them as commands. 
task  Starting new processes and ending existing processes. 
 
While most of this code is reused as is, a few shared functions are declared as exter-
nal using the c extern keyword, and are separately implemented for each compo-
nent. These functions are mem_alloc and mem_free, which are wrappers for al-
locating memory, and log_event, which is the interface for messaging and log-
ging. The prototypes for these functions are shown in Figure D.10. 
 
int mem_alloc(void *newthing, size_t size, char *description); 
void mem_free(void *ptr); 
int log_event(enum event_type type, char *formatstring, ...); 
Figure D.10: Redefined Functions 
The function mem_alloc has access to different memory allocation techniques de-
pending on the environment. The LSM mem_alloc uses kmalloc while the other 
components use malloc. Similarly mem_free uses kfree() or free() de-
pending on the component. The log_event is a variadic function (that is, it ac-
cepts  a  variable  number  of  arguments)  and  uses  QMessageBox::warning  or 
QMessageBox::information, printf or fprintf, or printk depending 
on the component. 
 
 
     259
Appendix E  Participant Consent Form and 
Information Sheet 
E.1  Consent Form 
Project title: Comparing the usability of three Linux security mechanisms 
I have read the participant information sheet, which explains the nature of the research and 
the possible risks. The information has been explained to me and all my questions have been 
satisfactorily answered. I have been given a copy of the information sheet to keep. 
I understand that I do not have to answer particular questions if I do not want to and that I 
can withdraw at any time without consequences to myself. 
I agree that research data gathered from the results of the study may be published provided 
my name or any identifying data is not used. I have also been informed that I may not re-
ceive any direct benefits from participating in this study. 
I understand that all information provided by me is treated as confidential and will not be re-
leased by the researcher to a third party unless required to do so by law. 
□  I wish to receive a copy of the summary report  
(please provide your email address), 
□  I wish to be included in the draw for the prize of an 8GB iPod Nano  
(please provide your email address):   
 
Email address:  _________________________ 
 
___________________________________    ______________________ 
  Signature of Participant         Date 
___________________________________    ______________________ 
  Signature of Investigator        Date     260
E.2  Participant Information Sheet 
Project title: Comparing the usability of three Linux security mechanisms 
Attackers often gain access to a computer by taking control of a program a user starts. The 
program may have unintentional vulnerabilities that may lead to exploitation by an attacker, 
or the program itself may be malicious, such as a Trojan horse. Fortunately security systems 
exist that can limit what each program is allowed to do. This can dramatically reduce the 
damage a program acting maliciously can do.  
 
This study will compare the quality of the policies created and the usability of three different 
approaches  to  application  confinement.  The  three  Linux  security  mechanisms  being 
compared are FBAC-LSM, SELinux and AppArmor.  
 
You can help by agreeing to participate. If you participate you will be introduced to each of 
these security mechanisms for Linux. There will also be a short explanation of the Linux 
filesystem heirarchy and file labeling. You will then use the three mechanisms to confine 
some programs. You will be asked to complete short surveys before the policy construction 
and after each mechanism, and the policies you create will be compared to each other later. 
The whole experiment is expected to take less than two hours. 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can decide not to participate at 
any time. This research has received Murdoch University's Human Research Ethics Commit-
tee approval. All information given during the study is confidential and no names or other 
information that might identify you will be used in any publication arising from the research.  
If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete the consent form. If you have 
any  questions  about  this  project  please  feel  free  to  contact  Cliffe  Schreuders 
(c.schreuders@murdoch.edu.au),  Christian  Payne  (c.payne@murdoch.edu.au)  or  Tanya 
McGill (t.mcgill@murdoch.edu.au). We are happy to discuss with you any concerns you 
may have on how this study has been conducted. If you wish to talk to an independent per-
son about your concerns, you can contact Murdoch University's Human Research Ethics 
Committee on 9360 6677 or email ethics@murdoch.edu.au. 
 
Participants in this study can opt to be included in a draw for a prize, the prize/incentive be-
ing an 8GB iPod Nano. Feedback on the study will be provided in the form of a summary 
report at the end of the study. If you wish to receive a copy of the summary report and/or be 






Cliffe Schreuders, Dr. Tanya McGill, Christian Payne.     261
Appendix F  Handouts: Welcome Page, 
System Use, and Task Scenarios 
Welcome and System Use 
Thanks for participating. 
 
As you entered the room you were allocated an ID and an order in which to use the 
security systems. Your ID will never be associated with your personal details, and is 
used to collate your contribution to the study. 
 
The directory “Security Usability Study” contains everything you will need in order 
to participate in this study. 
 
There is a text document named “Please write your ID in this file.txt”. Please enter 
your ID into this file as soon as possible. 
 
In the subdirectory “Information” you can find some resources such the Filesystem 
Hierarchy Standard (FHS), which describes how files are organised on Linux, and a 
“Linux Commands Cheat Sheet”, which lists some commands that can be used from 
a terminal window. 
 
The directory “Start Here” contains a command to start the introduction video, which 
you will watch first. A video describing the FHS is available here also. Watching the 
FHS video is optional, but highly recommended unless you are very familiar with 
how files are organised on Linux systems. 
 
There is a directory for each security system. Please use the systems in the order al-
located to you. Let me know when you finish using each system. Within each of 
these directories is a command used to watch an explanation video, which you can 
watch first, then a demo that shows how it is used. To start using the security system 
run the use batch script. 
 
When you are finished using all three security systems please go into the directory 
named “End Here” and run the complete command. Let me know you are finished. 
Please do not log out of the computer.  
 
Remember:  
·  Let me know when you are finished using a security system. 
·  If you get stuck, ask me for help. 
·  Don’t search the Internet for information about the security systems being 
studied. Specifically do not use the search terms “SELinux”, “AppArmor” or 
“FBAC-LSM”.     262
·  You are not being assessed based on your personal abilities. Your preference 
and performance is used to compare the methods used by the security sys-
tems. 
 
Thank you for contributing to this research, 
 




You use the Opera web browser for chatting online (using IRC), downloading files, 
and to browse web pages. You are concerned that since it often interacts with exter-
nal servers you should confine it in case there are any exploitable vulnerabilities in 
opera. 
 
Command to run: opera 
To find the path used, open a console and type: which opera 
 
Tips: 
·  You may want to create a new directory in your home directory for down-
loads 
·  There is a webpage at: www.murdoch.edu.au 




You have just downloaded and installed a game from the Internet. It is similar to the 
classic game Tetris. Since this game was downloaded from an unauthenticated web-
site you decide to confine the program. 
 
Command to run: ksirtet 
To find the path used, open a console and type: which ksirtet     263
Appendix G  Filesystem Hierarchy Standard 
Reference Handout 
Linux and the Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) 
The Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) is a standard which describes how the di-
rectories and files should be organised on a typical  Linux system. The complete 
standard can be found in “Security Usability Study\Information\Filesystem 
Hierarchy Standard v2.3.pdf”.  
 
An overview: 
/bin  Contains executables. These are all commands which superusers or normal users are al-
lowed to run. And these are more or less essential commands. 
/boot  The files required in order to start the system. 
/dev  Contains files which represent the devices on the system. 
/etc  Contains configuration files for the services and for some programs which run on this 
system. 
/home  Where all the per-user information resides. All the programs which have settings for a 
particular user, all store those settings in the user’s home directory. So for example, 
Mozilla Firefox has a directory which contains all the settings for Firefox for each user. 
This is stored in the hidden directory “/home/user/.mozilla/firefox”. 
/lib  Contains library files. These are predominately shared objects (.so) which are essential-
ly shared code which different programs can reuse. 
/media  Contains directories which represent removable media, such as CDs, DVDs or USB 
flash storage devices. 
/mnt  Used to mount, or load, temporary filesystems. 
/opt  You can manually install things into this directory that the package manager doesn’t in-
stall for you. Sometimes a distribution will install packages into this directory. For ex-
ample, you may find KDE, or Open Office in this directory. 
/proc  A pseudo-filesystem. It is created on the fly by the operating system and describes in-
formation about each of the processes running on the system. 
/root  The root user’s home directory. 
/sbin  Contains executable commands that the root user is allowed to execute. 
/srv  Can contain information about services that the computer provides. 
/sys  Not part of the standard. It is used to configure the Linux kernel. 
/tmp  Stores temporary files. 
/usr  Shareable, read-only data. The “/usr” directory should be able to be hosted on a separate 
computer. In here are a lot of things similar to the above. We have just described. We 
have “/usr/bin” executable files, “/usr/etc” configuration files, “/usr/games” games may 
store information here, “/usr/lib” more library files, “/usr/sbin” more executables that 
the superuser can run.  
/usr/share  Read-only architecture independent data files. Directories for applications. For each of 
these applications there may be various resources or static configuration files in these 
directories. 
/usr/share/applications  Contains .desktop files which can be used to launch graphical programs. 
/var  Contains variable data files. Designed to contain either very big files or files that get 
larger as the system is running. For example, in here you will find the log files that the 
operating system generates as it is running.     264
Appendix H  Scripts and Slides Used in 
Videos 
H.1  Introduction  Video  (Slides  and  Transcription  of 
Audio) 
Hi,  my  name  is  Cliffe  Schreuders.  Thanks  for 
taking  the  time  to  participate  in  this  research. 
This is prerecorded so that all participants expe-
rience the same presentation and are exposed to 
the same information. 
 
 
I will start by  giving some background on the 
motivation for confining individual applications. 
On a Windows or a typical Linux system, it is 
usual for programs to start with all of a user’s 
privileges.  For  example,  when  you  run  a  pro-
gram, that program is given all of the privileges 
that you have. There is nothing forcing that pro-
gram to behave as you expect it to. Usually nothing will stop a program that you run 
from deleting your personal documents or sending them over the Internet. Unfortu-
nately you cant always trust applications to act on your behalf. Vulnerabilities in 
software is a big problem. Programming errors or design flaws often allow attackers 
to subvert the behavior of a program and take control of it. Malware is also a promi-
nent problem where programs are designed to act maliciously. For example, Trojan 
horses are programs which seem benign but act maliciously. In response to this prob-
lem there are a number of security mechanisms which confine applications to  only 












• Applications run with all of a user’s 
privileges





• Applications run with all of a user’s 
privileges
• You can’t trust applications to act on your 
behalf
– Vulnerabilities
– Malware    265
The aim of this research is to assess the different 
methods of doing that. This research will com-
pare the usability of the different methods that 
different security mechanisms use to confine ap-
plications. By participating you are helping me 
to compare these different security methods. 
 
You  are  not  being  assessed  on  your  personal 
abilities. Regardless of how you perform overall, 
your  participation  helps  compare  the  different 
security  systems.  Your  preference  and  perfor-
mance for each of the different security mecha-
nism will be used to compare them. 
 
You are tasked with confining two programs us-
ing three security systems. The details of those 
programs are on the Scenario Handout. You will 




So the order of what will happen in this session 
is  that  you're  watching  this  video  now.  And 
when this video finishes you will fill out the pre-
experiment  questionnaire.  And  then  watch  a 
short  video  about  the  Linux  filesystem,  and 
where things are stored on a Linux system. And 
then, for each of the three security systems you will be using, you will watch a video 
about how it is used and it will give a demonstration. You will then confine those 
two programs yourself. And then fill out a questionnaire about that particular securi-
ty mechanism. At the end you will fill out another questionnaire in hindsight. At the 
end of the session there will be a chance to debrief and talk about what has hap-
pened. 
Aims
• The aim of this study is to compare 
different ways of confining applications 
and to assess the usability of the methods 
used
• You are helping me to assess methods of 
confining applications
Aims
• The aim of this study is to compare 
different ways of confining applications 
and to assess the usability of the methods 
used
• You are helping me to assess methods of 
confining applications
Aims
• You are not being assessed on your 
abilities!
• Your participation helps regardless of how 
you perform
• Your preference and performance for each 
security mechanism is used to compare 
them
Aims
• You are not being assessed on your 
abilities!
• Your participation helps regardless of how 
you perform
• Your preference and performance for each 
security mechanism is used to compare 
them
Your Task
• Create rules to confine two programs 
using three different security mechanisms
• Refer to the Scenario handout for details
Your Task
• Create rules to confine two programs 
using three different security mechanisms
• Refer to the Scenario handout for details
Sequence
• This introduction video
• Pre-experiment questionnaire
• Linux filesystem video
• For each security mechanism
– Mechanism video





• This introduction video
• Pre-experiment questionnaire
• Linux filesystem video
• For each security mechanism
– Mechanism video
– Confine the programs
– Post-task questionnaire
• Post-experiment questionnaire
• Debriefing    266
 
As far as the setup of the software and how to 
access the videos and environments, I will ex-





If you get stuck while you are participating, if it 
is anything to do with the security mechanisms, 
then try to figure it out yourself first. If you are 
still stuck let me know. If it is about anything 
else, then let me know as soon as possible. I can 
give you a hint or help you out. 
 
Now there will be an opportunity to ask some 
questions about the research. And then you can 
fill out the pre-experiment questionnaire. Thanks 
again for participating in this research. 
Setup
• I will explain how to access the 
environments and videos in person
Setup
• I will explain how to access the 
environments and videos in person
If You Get Stuck
• I can give hints or help if you are stuck
– Try to solve it yourself first
• How I will help
– VMWare
– Linux
If You Get Stuck
• I can give hints or help if you are stuck
– Try to solve it yourself first






• Please ask    267
H.2  Linux and the Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (Slide 
and Transcription of Audio) 
Now I’ll give an overview of the Linux Filesys-
tem Hierarchy and how directories and files are 
organised  on  a  Linux  system.  The  Filesystem 
Hierarchy  Standard  (FHS)  is  a  standard  which 
describes how the directories and files should be 
organised  on  a  typical  Linux  system.  And  the 
different  distributions  more  or  less  follow  this 
standard. 
 
(From this point on the video shows the KDE Dolphin file browser to illustrate the 
typical Linux directory structure) 
So if we look at this Linux system we can see that all the files and directories on this 
computer are all organised under a single hierarchy. The root of that hierarchy is rep-
resented by a “/”. This is different from a Windows system which can have a number 
of hierarchies (C:\, D:\, etc) which represent devices on the system. Here we have 
one single hierarchy and it will contain all of those things. Some other differences 
from Windows are that the filesystem is case sensitive and the slashes run in the op-
posite direction.  
 
So I’ll just go though each of these directories and give you an idea of what can be 
found within.  
 
The first directory here, the “/bin” directory, short for binary, contains executables. 
These are all commands which superusers or normal users are allowed to run. And 
these are more or less essential commands. 
 
The “/boot” directory contains the files required in order to start the system. For ex-
ample, grub is a system which is used to start the operating system. 
 
Linux and the 
Filesystem Hierarchy 
Standard (FHS)
Linux and the 
Filesystem Hierarchy 
Standard (FHS)    268
The “/dev” directory contains files which represent all the devices on the system. 
There’s a saying that everything is represented by a file, or “everything is a file on 
Linux”. And here we can see examples of that. For example, “/dev/sda” is a file that 
represents a local hard drive. 
 
The “/etc” directory contains configuration files for the services and for some pro-
grams which run on this system. So these are all specific to this particular system. 
And different services can create files in here to store the settings for those services. 
 
The “/home” directory is where all the per-user information resides. (Here we’ve got 
a user whose name is “user”.) There is a directory which stores all the things for that 
user. This contains all of their “Documents”, “Downloads”, “Videos” or whatever 
they decide to put in there. Here we have hidden files shown. If a file starts with a 
fullstop in Linux it is known as a hidden file or directory. All the different programs 
which have settings for a particular user, all store those settings in the user’s home 
directory. So for example, Mozilla Firefox has a directory which contains all the set-
tings  for  Firefox  for  each  user.  This  is  stored  in  the  hidden  directory 
“/home/user/.mozilla/firefox”.  
 
The “/lib” directory contains library files. These are predominately shared objects 
(.so) which are essentially shared code which different programs can reuse. This is 
similar to .dll files in Windows where different programs can reuse these libraries. 
 
The “/media” directory contains directories which represent removable media, such 
as CDs, DVDs or USB flash storage devices.  
 
The “/mnt” directory is used to mount, or load, other temporary filesystems. 
 
The “/opt” directory contains optional packages. You can manually install things into 
this directory that the package manager doesn’t install for you. Sometimes a distribu-
tion will install packages into this directory. For example, you may find KDE, or 
Open Office in this directory. 
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The  “/proc”  directory  is  a  pseudo-filesystem,  so  it  doesn’t  represent  actual  files 
stored on a disk, rather it is created on the fly by the operating system and describes 
information about each of the processes running on the system. Each process is rep-
resented by a directory. 
 
The “/root” directory is the root user’s home directory. 
 
The “/sbin” directory contains executable commands that the root user is allowed to 
execute. Usually the superuser would be the only user that can execute files in this 
directory. For example, to format a disk. 
 
The “/srv” (service) directory can contain information about services that the com-
puter provides. In this case there are no files in here. 
 
The “/sys” directory is not part of the standard. It is used to configure the Linux ker-
nel. That is, it configures the operating system itself while it is running. 
 
The “/tmp” directory stores temporary files. Programs can create temporary files in 
this directory. It should be safe to delete these files. It’s normal for systems to auto-
matically delete all the files in this directory when the computer starts. 
 
The “/usr” (user as commonly pronounced, or Universal Service Resources) directo-
ry contains a large part of the filesystem. On a modern Linux system, this part of the 
filesystem would usually be quite large. In here are a lot of things similar to what we 
have  just  described.  We  have  “/usr/bin”  executable  files,  “/usr/etc”  configuration 
files, “/usr/games” games may store information here, “/usr/lib” more library files, 
“/usr/sbin” more executables that the superuser can run. 
 
And in the “/usr/share” directory we have lots of directories for many applications. 
For each of these applications there may be various resources or extra configuration 
files in these directories. 
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“/usr/share” also has a directory “/usr/share/applications” which contains .desktop 
files which can be used to launch graphical programs. Some of these are sorted into 
separate directories for KDE programs. 
 
The “/usr” directory should be able to be hosted on a separate computer. So for ex-
ample, this part of the filesystem could be hosted on the network, although this is 
less common nowadays. 
 
The “/var” directory is designed for either very big files or files that get larger and 
larger as the system is running. For example, in here you will find the log files that 
the operating system generates as it is running. 
 
That was an overview of the Filesystem Heirarchy Standard (FHS). I hope that has 
helped you to get an understanding of where things are stored on a Linux system. 
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H.3  SELinux Explanation (Slides and Transcription of 
Audio) 
In  this  video  I  will  explain  SELinux,  then 
demonstrate  the  process  of  confining  applica-
tions using SELinux. SELinux is a Linux securi-





With  SELinux,  all  files  and  processes  are  la-
beled. Each label is made up of a selinux-user, a 
role,  a  type  (which  is  known  as  a  domain  for 
processes)  as  well  as  sensitivity  information. 
When creating a policy to confine an application 
the  most  important  element  is  the  type  or  do-
main. Rules define interactions between domains 
and types which are allowed. Each process is therefore confined to the rules for its 
domain and can only access resources which are labeled with types which the do-
main has been granted access to. 
 
To illustrate this lets look at the output of the ls 
program which can show us the security label at-
tached to the program which is used to change 
passwords : /usr/bin/passwd. 
The “–Z” argument requests the security infor-
mation. The label is shown in orange. The first 
part “system_u” is the selinux-user, the second 
part “object_r” is the role, and “passwd_exec_t” is the type for this file. The ps 
command shows us the processes running. Again, the “–Z” argument shows us the 
security information. Here we can see the security information for a running pro-
SELinux SELinux
SELinux Policy Components
• All files and processes are labelled





• Rules define the allowed interactions 
between processes and files, and when to 
do domain transitions
SELinux Policy Components
• All files and processes are labelled





• Rules define the allowed interactions 







ps -ZA | grep passwd
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:passwd_t:s0







ps -ZA | grep passwd
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:passwd_t:s0
-s0:c0.c1023 2132 pts/1 00:00:00 
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gram. The selinux-user is “unconfined_u” (which is the default selinux-user for nor-
mal users) the role is “unconfined_r” (again standard for normal users) and the type 
is “passwd_t”. There is a rule which states that when an executable file tagged as 
“passwd_exec_t” is run it transitions to the “passwd_t” domain. And now that pro-
gram can only perform actions that the domain “passwd_t” is authorized to perform. 
 
In  order  to  confine  a  program  using  SELinux 
you create a new policy module. This is made up 
of 3 files: a file context file with the file exten-
sion “.fc”, a type enforcement file with the file 
extension “.fc”, and an interface file with the file 
extension  “.if”.  The  file  context  file  defines 
which types files should be labeled with. For ex-
ample, if a program owns all the files in a particular directory which it writes to, a 
new type can be created for all files which are in that directory. The type enforce-
ment file contains all the access rules for any programs in this domain. That is, how 
they can interact with different types. The interface file contains ways that other pro-
grams can interact with the domain just defined. 
 
SELinux domains can be in one of two states. 
Enforcing mode or permissive mode. When in 
enforcing mode the program is restricted to ac-
tions which the domain rules authorises. Any at-
tempts to act beyond this are denied and logged. 
When in permissive mode, the application is not 
restricted by the domain, but any actions which 
would be denied in enforcing mode are logged. These logs can be used to automati-
cally add privileges to domains using the audit2allow command line tool. Note that 
using the Policy Generation Tool, new domains are created in permissive mode and 
need to be set to enforcing mode to be in effect. As will be demonstrated, the mode 




• File context file (.fc)
– Defines how files should be labelled
• Type enforcement file (.te)
– Defines how files and processes with certain 
labels are allowed to interact
• Interface file (.if)
– Defines ways other programs can interact 
with this domain
SELinux On Disk
• File context file (.fc)
– Defines how files should be labelled
• Type enforcement file (.te)
– Defines how files and processes with certain 
labels are allowed to interact
• Interface file (.if)
– Defines ways other programs can interact 
with this domain
SELinux Domain Modes
• Can be set by editing the Type 
Enforcement file (.te) file
• Enforcing
• Permissive
– Allows all access and logs those which would 
have been denied in enforce mode
• Note:
– Using the Policy Generation Tool new 
domains are created in permissive mode
SELinux Domain Modes
• Can be set by editing the Type 
Enforcement file (.te) file
• Enforcing
• Permissive
– Allows all access and logs those which would 
have been denied in enforce mode
• Note:
– Using the Policy Generation Tool new 
domains are created in permissive mode    273
The process of confining a program using SELi-
nux involves creating the files for a new module, 
then compiling and loading the module and re-
labeling files as needed. If necessary the module 
can be updated with new rules and reloaded. The 
Policy Generation Tool can guide you through 
the process of creating a new policy module for 
SELinux, which can define a new domain for confining an application. Then you can 
run the script that it generates to compile the new policy module, load it into the sys-
tem and label your files. You can use command line tools to then update the policy 
based on program behavior. Each time you make changes you run the script to put 
those changes into effect. 
 
Here are some commands which can be used in 
this process. The first (“ls”), shows us the label 
on a file. “su -” is used to log in as the root user, 
which you will have to do to do to run the rest of 
the  commands.  “polgengui”  starts  the  policy 
generation tool. You can run the script created 
by the tool by typing dot slash [the name of the 
application] dot “s.h.”. The next command can display what the program is trying to 
do or add to the .te file to allow the access. If SELinux is denying the access but not 
supplying a reason then the “semodule -DB” command will tell it to log all denials 
(“-B” turns it back to selective logging). 
 
Now I will demonstrate the process of confining 
an application using SELinux. 
(This was followed by the SELinux Demonstra-
tion described in Section H.6) 
 
 
Confining an Application Using 
SELinux
• Create/edit module, compile, load, re-label
• Steps: 
– Use Policy Generation Tool to generate .te .fc
and .if files
– Run script to recompile module and relabel 
files
– Update .te file, and rerun script
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• Create/edit module, compile, load, re-label
• Steps: 
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– Run script to recompile module and relabel 
files
– Update .te file, and rerun script
Helpful Commands for SELinux








– audit2allow -R >> appname.te
• semodule –DB or -B
Helpful Commands for SELinux








– audit2allow -R >> appname.te
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H.4  AppArmor Explanation 
In  this  video  I  will  explain  AppArmor,  then 
demonstrate  the  process  of  confining  applica-
tions  using  AppArmor.  AppArmor  is  a  Linux 




AppArmor policy defines a profile for each ap-
plication which is confined. Each profile lists the 
resources by name that the application is author-
ised  to  access.  In  addition  to  resource  names, 
profiles can also include abstractions which rep-
resent other resources that the application is au-
thorised  to  access.  Abstractions  usually  repre-
sent a group of privileges which are required to perform common tasks. 
AppArmor AppArmor
AppArmor Policy Components
• Lists of resources (by name) and the 
permissions for each
• Abstractions group related file permissions
AppArmor Policy Components
• Lists of resources (by name) and the 
permissions for each
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On disk, the profiles and abstractions are stored 
in the /etc/apparmor.d/ directory. Graphical tools 





As  mentioned,  resources  are  defined  by  name 
when creating rules for an application, and in the 
case  of  files  and  directories  wildcards  can  be 
used to describe any resources which match the 
specified name. So when defining what an appli-
cation  can  do,  the  following  wildcards  can  be 
used: A ‘?’ represents any character except a ‘/’. 
A single asterisk represents any number of characters except a ‘/’. Double asterisks 
represents any number of characters including a ‘/’, meaning that it can include con-
tained directories. Square brackets can include a list of, or a range of, characters. 
Braces represent alternative values. Directories end in a ‘/’ so, names ending with ‘/’ 
will only match directories. Names ending with ‘?’ or ‘*’ won't match directories. 
Names ending with ‘**’ can match directories. You can see some examples here. 
 
AppArmor application profiles can be in one of 
three states. Enforce mode, complain mode, or 
audit mode. When in enforce mode, the program 
is restricted to actions which the profile author-
ises. Any attempts to act beyond this are denied 
and logged. When in complain mode, the appli-
cation is not restricted by the profile, but any ac-
tions which would be denied in enforcing mode are logged. These logs can be used 
to automatically add to application profiles. Audit mode is like enforcing mode ex-
cept that even allowed accesses are logged. Note that new profiles are created in 
complaining mode and need to be set to enforce to be in effect. The mode can be set 
in the AppArmor Control Panel or using command line tools. 
AppArmor On Disk
• Each application has a profile in 
/etc/apparmor.d/
AppArmor On Disk
• Each application has a profile in 
/etc/apparmor.d/
AppArmor Wildcards
? - any single character, except /
* - any number of characters except /
** - any number of characters including /
[abc] - one of a, b, or c
[a-c] - one of a, b, or c
{ab,cd}  - 'ab' or 'cd'
Names ending with / will only match directories. Names ending with ? 
or * won't match directories. Names ending with ** can match 
directories.
/tmp/*   - all files directly in /tmp
/tmp/*/  - all directories directly in /tmp
/tmp/**  - all files and directories underneath /tmp
/tmp/**/ - all directories underneath /tmp
None of these will match /tmp/.
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AppArmor Modes
• Can be set in the AppArmor Control Panel or by 
editing the profile file
• Enforce
• Complain
– Allows all access and logs those which would have 
been denied in enforce mode
• Audit
– Enforced, but all access to resources is logged
• Note:
– Using Add Profile Wizard new profiles are created in 
complaining mode
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The process of confining a program using Ap-
pArmor involves creating a profile, then loading 
the profile into the AppArmor security module. 
If necessary the profile can be updated and re-
loaded. The Add Profile Wizard can guide you 
through the process of creating a profile based 
on  the  behaviour  of  the  program.  Then  if  you 
find that the application needs extra privileges, you can run the Update Profile Wiz-
ard to update the profile. The AppArmor tools automatically reload the policy into 
the security module when changes are made. 
 
Some commands which you may find useful are: 
“su -” is used to log in as the root user, which 
you will have to do to do to run the rest of the 
commands. “yast2” is a graphical configuration 
program  which  has  a  number  of  AppArmor 
graphical tools. “cat” prints the contents of a file 
to the screen, in this case the system logs which 
contain apparmor events. “aa-audit”, complain, and enforce change the mode of a 
profile. “aa-genprof” creates a new profile for a program. “aa-log-prof” is a com-
mand line tool for adding to policies based on the logs. 
Confining an Application Using 
AppArmor
• Create/edit profile, load into security 
module
• Steps:
– Add Profile Wizard
– Update Profile Wizard
Confining an Application Using 
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• aa-log-prof    277
 
Now I will demonstrate the process of confining 
an application using AppArmor. 
(This  was  followed  by  the  AppArmor  Demon-
stration described in Section H.7) 
 
H.5  FBAC-LSM Explanation 
In  this  video  I  will  explain  FBAC-LSM,  then 
demonstrate  the  process  of  confining  applica-
tions using FBAC-LSM. FBAC-LSM is a Linux 




FBAC-LSM defines policy in terms of the func-
tionalities  applications  are  allowed  to  perform. 
Application  policies  define  what  each  applica-
tion is allowed to do, and Functionalities are as-
signed  to  application  policies  based  on  what 
functions the application should provide. Func-
tionalities  represent  the  authority  to  perform  a 
type of behaviour. Functionalities are tuned to the needs of specific applications by 
providing parameter arguments which describe application-specific details such as 
where an application stores certain files. Separate users can create their own policies 








– are assigned functionalities based on what 
the application should be allowed to do
• Functionalities
– represent the authority to perform a function
– are adapted to applications by supplying 
parameter arguments




– are assigned functionalities based on what 
the application should be allowed to do
• Functionalities
– represent the authority to perform a function
– are adapted to applications by supplying 
parameter arguments
• Users can create policies in confinements 
they manage    278
 
The policies for applications and functionalities 
are  stored  in  /etc/fbac-lsm/.  Application  policy 
files specify which functionalities each applica-
tion is allowed to perform and supplies applica-
tion-specific  information.  They  can  also  grant 
specific direct privileges in addition to the func-
tionalities  which  grant  a  number  of  privileges 
depending on the nature of the functionality. While Functionality policy files define 
the privileges that functionalities provide. Tools exist which are used by users to cre-
ate and manage application policies. 
 
Parameter arguments and privileges use resource 
names,  and  wildcards  can  be  used  to  describe 
any resources which match the specified name. 
So  when  defining  what  an  application  can  do, 
the following wildcards can be used: A single 
asterisk represents any number of characters ex-
cept a ‘/’. Double asterisks represents any num-
ber of characters including a ‘/’, meaning that it can include contained directories. A 
hash represents any number of numbers. Directories end in a ‘/’ so, names ending 
with ‘/’ will only match directories. Names ending with ‘*’ won't match directories. 
Names ending with ‘**’ can match directories. You can see some examples here. 
 
FBAC-LSM application policies can be in one 
of three states. Enforcing, complaining or disa-
bled  mode.  When  in  enforcing  mode  the  pro-
gram is restricted to actions which the applica-
tion policy authorises. Any attempts to act be-
yond this are denied and logged. When in com-
plaining mode the application is not restricted by 
the policy, but any actions which would be denied in enforcing mode are logged. 
Complaining mode is used by the learning tool in the FBAC-LSM Policy Manager. 
Using the Policy Manager, new application policies are created in enforcing mode 
FBAC-LSM On Disk
• Stored in /etc/fbac-lsm/
• Application policy files
– specify which functionalities each application 
is allowed to perform
– supplies application-specific information to 
functionalities
– can also include direct privileges
• Functionality policy files
– Define what privileges functionalities provide
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FBAC-LSM Wildcards
* - any number of characters except /
**  - any number of characters including /
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Names ending with / will only match directories. Names 
ending with * won't match directories. Names ending 
with ** can match directories. 
/tmp/*   - all files directly in /tmp
/tmp/*/  - all directories directly in /tmp
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FBAC-LSM Modes
• Can be set using the Policy Manager or by 
editing the application policy file
• Enforcing
• Complaining
– Allows all access and logs those which would 
have been denied in enforce mode
• Disabled
• Note:
– New profiles are in enforcing mode
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and are usually only set to complaining mode while using the learning tool (which 
could be used if the created policy does not allow the application to function as ex-
pected). 
 
The  process  of  confining  a  program  using 
FBAC-LSM  involves  creating  an  application 
policy, then loading the policy. If necessary the 
policy can be updated and reloaded. The FBAC-
LSM Policy Manager can guide you through the 
process of creating an application policy based 
on  the  functionalities  the  application  provides. 
Then  you save  your changes and load the policy into the security module. Your 
changes are not in effect until  you load the policy into the FBAC-LSM security 
module. Then if you find that the application needs extra privileges, you can edit the 
application policy or use the learning mode to add to the policy. 
 
The  “fbac-lsm-manager”  command  starts  the 
graphical  FBAC-LSM  Policy  Manager  tool. 
“fbac-lsm-server”  reloads  the  policy  files  from 
disk into effect. “fbac-lsm-tried” lists the access 
attempts  which  have  been  denied  by  FBAC-
LSM. 
Confining an Application Using 
FBAC-LSM
• Create/edit .fbac files, load into security 
module
• Steps: 
– Use fbac-lsm-manager to create, save and 
load policies into the security module
– If the program does not work add to the policy 
using learning mode
Confining an Application Using 
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• Create/edit .fbac files, load into security 
module
• Steps: 
– Use fbac-lsm-manager to create, save and 
load policies into the security module
– If the program does not work add to the policy 
using learning mode




Helpful Commands for FBAC-LSM
• fbac-lsm-manager
• fbac-lsm-server
• fbac-lsm-tried    280
 
Now I will demonstrate the process of confining 
an application using FBAC-LSM. 
(This was followed by the FBAC-LSM Demon-




H.6  SELinux Demonstration Script Handout 
(The demonstration handouts were transcripts of the audio from the demonstra-
tion videos with screenshots to illustrate. Some additional comments were added to 
the handouts to illustrate points made visually.) 
 
For  this  demo  we  will  create  a  rough  policy  using  SELinux  which  will  confine 
KWrite,  and  we  will  make  sure  KWrite  can  edit  a  file  named 
“/home/user/Demo/mine.txt”.  
 
Graphical tools for managing SELinux can be found in the programs menu. Under 
“Administration”  is  “SELinux  Management”.  This  tool  can  be  used  to  view  and 
manage all the loaded SELinux policies, including domains, file labelling and policy 
modules. 
 
In order to confine an application we create a new SELinux policy module using the 
Policy Generation Tool. This tool will create a bare-bones policy module. It will 
generate a type enforcement file (.te), an interface file (.if), a file context file (.fc) 
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First we specify the type of policy we want to create. We want to create a policy to 




Then we select who the policy applies to. Normal users are usually in the “uncon-
fined_u” role so we select that. Next we select the ports to allow the application to 
listen on, and then the ports it is allowed to connect to. As this program shouldn’t 
need network access we leave those blank. Next we choose common application 
traits which apply to the program. In this case “Interacts with terminal” as we will be 
launching it from a command line, and “Uses dbus” as graphical programs typically 
use dbus to communicate. 
 
Here we select files or directories the application manages. We can add the mine.txt 
file.     282
 
 
Booleans are parts of policy which can be “turned on and off”. Booleans won’t apply 
to our new policy. Next we specify where to generate the files which will make up 
our bare-bones policy. We select “/home/user/Documents”. Click Apply to create the 
files in that directory. 
 
The new policy module we have created is a bare bones policy which we will have to 
add to in order to give the program enough privileges to perform the tasks we expect 
it to perform. Now that we have created a new policy module, let’s have a look at the 
files which have been created.  
 
We type the following commands: 
“su –” is used to change to the superuser (root) 
“cd /home/user/Documents” changes to the directory containing the newly created 
files 
“ls –Z” shows us the security labels associated with those files. 




The type enforcement (.te) file is the most important file as it contains all the rules 
for our new domain which confines our program. 
 
The “permissive kwrite_t” line puts this domain into permissive mode, which allows 
the program to access any resources, but logs the accesses. For now we will leave it     283
in this mode for this quick demonstration. This line is removed later to put this do-
main into enforcing mode. 
 
The two most common types of lines you will see in the “.te” file are allow lines 
which specify something specific the domain is allowed to do, and macros which are 
abstractions which can represent multiple allow lines. 
 
The “.te” file contains the line:  
“allow kwrite_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;” 
Allow lines start with “allow” then the domain (in this case “kwrite_t”) followed by 
the SELinux type to access (in this case “self”, in other words kwrite_t) followed by 
the sort of resource (in this case a unix_stream_socket ) and ending with the types of 
access allowed, in this case create_stream_socket_perms. This line allows the do-
main to create a socket to communicate with other tasks in the same domain. 
 
The “.te” file contains the line:  
 “files_read_etc_files(kwrite_t)” 
 
Macros have a name followed by the parameter arguments sent to that macro. In this 
case the macro “files_read_etc_files” allows the domain “kwrite_t” to read all files 
marked etc_t. Which is the label assigned to many configuration files in the /etc/ di-
rectory. 
 
We exit vi by typing “:q” 
 
We have to run the kwrite.sh script to compile and load the policy module. This 
script was created by the policy generation tool. It compiles the policy model, loads 
it into effect, and also labels our files with types as specified in the file context file. 
 
We can now run KWrite in order to generate logs of what it is trying to do. We 
change from root to user to run KWrite. 
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KWrite has been denied access to dbus, which is confined by a domain in enforcing 
mode. Note that because the kwrite_t domain is in permissive mode most actions are 
permitted and logged. So lets have a look at what KWrite is trying to do and what we 
can do to allow it. Let’s have a quick look at the log files which describe what just 
happened.  
 
We can type the following commands: 
“grep kwrite /var/log/messages /var/log/audit/audit.log” 
We use grep to only show us events related to KWrite, in the two places that SELi-
nux logs to /var/log/messages and /var/log/audit/audit.log. 
“grep kwrite /var/log/messages /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2why” 
We can send these logs to the program audit2why to translate that information into a 
more readable format. As we can see, we need to add type enforcement allow rules if 
we want this access to be allowed. 
“grep kwrite /var/log/messages /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow” 
If we send these logs to audit2allow it will generate rules that can be added to a type 
enforcement file to allow this access.  
“grep kwrite /var/log/messages /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -R” 
With the dash ‘R’ option it tries to find macros which grant the access. 
“grep  kwrite  /var/log/messages  /var/log/audit/audit.log  |  audit2allow  –R  >> 
kwrite.te” 
We can append those rules (using double arrows) to our .te file. 
 
At this point we should edit the type enforcement to choose which rules we want to 
keep, using “vi kwrite.te” 
 
Each time we make changes to our policy, if we want to see them in effect we need 
to run the shell script again: 
“./kwrite.sh” 
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So lets run KWrite as user again, to generate more logs which describe what KWrite 
is trying to do. Since we want KWrite to be able to access the mine.txt file we will 
open it so that that action is logged. This time KWrite is allowed to access all the re-
sources it tries to access because it is still in permissive mode. 
 
Since KWrite is still in a permissive domain if we want KWrite to be able to do these 
things again in the future we have to update the .te file again with the appropriate 
rules. Now we can re-run those commands to add what KWrite just did to the .te file. 
“grep  kwrite  /var/log/messages  /var/log/audit/audit.log  |  audit2allow  –R  >> 
kwrite.te” 
At this point we should decide whether we will leave all these rules in or remove any 
which are not required for KWrite to perform as expected. 
 
Now that we have added all the privileges that the program has needed so far, we can 
put the program into enforcing mode by removing the “permissive kwrite_t” line. 





Enter insert mode “i”. Make the changes then press Esc. Exit vi and save by typing 
“:wq”. 
 
“./kwrite”     286
Everytime we make changes to policy if we want to see those changes in effect we 
need to rerun the shell script. 
 
Again, care needs to be taken when deciding which rules to include. When adding to 
the .te file you should remove duplicate entries. It would have been safer to place the 
domain into enforcing mode before we start generating policy as we can restrict what 
the program is doing as we are creating policy. 
 
Now the program is restricted by our SELinux policy module. We can now test 
KWrite to see if it can perform as expected. We can open the mine.txt file, and save 
changes to it. KWrite can now open any files which are labelled with types which 
our type enforcement file allows access to.  
 
However the “/etc/adjtime” file is labelled with a type which we have not granted 
access to and KWrite is therefore not allowed to open it, even though as users we are 
allowed to read the file. If we wanted to add a rule to allow KWrite this access we 
could run audit2allow again to produce a rule which we could add to our te file to al-
low this access. 
Helpful Commands for SELinux 
ls -Z /path/to/file  Shows the security label on a file. 
ps -ZA | grep appname  Shows the security label on a running process “appname”. 
su -  Used to log in as the root user, which you will have to do to 
do to run the rest of the commands. 
polgengui 
 
The Policy Generation Tool. 
 
grep appname /var/log/audit/audit.log /var/log/messages 
 
Display logged access attempts for the application “appname” 
which would be denied by policy. 
audit2why 
 
Convert logged access attempts to an easier to read format. 
Eg: grep appname /var/log/audit/audit.log /var/log/messages | 
audit2why 
audit2allow -R >> appname.te 
 
Convert logged access attempts to rules which would allow 
the  action  in  the  future.  Eg:  grep  appname 
/var/log/audit/audit.log /var/log/messages | audit2allow. Add-
ing the “-R” uses macros when possible, rather than allow 
rules.  Adding  the  “>>  appname.te”  appends  the  new  rules 
generated by audit2allow to a type enforcement file. 
./appname.sh 
 
You can run the script created by the Policy Generation Tool 
by typing “./”[the name of the application]“.sh”. This com-
piles the rules in the .if, .te and .fc files into a policy module, 
loads the module into effect and labels files with appropriate 
security labels. 
semodule -DB  
or 
semodule -B  
If SELinux is denying the access but not logging a denial then 
the “semodule –DB” command will tell it to log all denials (-
B turns SELinux back to selective logging) 
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H.7  AppArmor Demonstration Script Handout 
(The demonstration handouts were transcripts of the audio from the demonstra-
tion videos with screenshots to illustrate. Some additional comments were added to 
the handouts to illustrate points made visually.) 
 
For this demo we will create a rough policy using AppArmor which will confine the 
text  editor  KWrite,  and  we  will  make  sure  KWrite  can  edit  a  file  named 
“/home/user/Demo/mine.txt”.  
 




Adding  an  application  profile  using  the  “Add  Profile  Wizard”  uses  complaining 
mode to log the behaviour of the program, and then steps us through each resource 
that the program accessed so that we can decide whether or not to allow the program 
to access those resources in the future. 
 
First we supply the name, which should be the command used to start the applica-
tion, “kwrite”. 
     288
 
 
The Add Profile Wizard prompts us to start the program and use it. 
 
We start the program, and open the file we want it to be able to access. Then we 
click “Scan system log for AppArmor events” Now it steps us through each of the 
things the program did and we need to decide whether it should be able to perform 




In this case KWrite is trying to access “/etc/X11/kstylerc” with read access. As a 
guide it classes this as a severity level of 2. This file is a configuration file for KDE, 
the desktop environment. 
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There are a number of options available; we have the option of using the abstraction 
“abstractions/kde” which will also grant other privileges needed by KDE applica-
tions. Or we can click allow to add the privilege to just allow access to this specific 
file. Alternatively we can click glob which will generalise the name using wildcards. 
We can do this manually using edit. 
 
“Opts” can be used to choose whether to only allow the access when the user run-
ning the program owns the file being accessed, also audit can be set so that every 
time the file is accessed it is logged. 
 
In this case we will add the abstraction because we know it is a KDE application. 
 
For each access attempt you should decide whether the program requires access to 
the resources in order to function as expected.  
 
If the program being confined starts another program the options available will be 
different. In that case you choose how you want the subsequent process to be con-
fined. Your choices would then include whether you want the new program to inherit 
the same rules, have its own profile, or be unconfined. 
 
Now that we have created a new policy module, let’s have a look at the file which 
has been created. 
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From the AppArmor Control Panel we can change the mode of profiles. Our new 
KWrite profile is in enforce mode. 
 
Now we can test the profile we created. We run KWrite and check that we can ac-
cess the “mine.txt” file and function as required. If we attempt to access other files 
we are denied that access. 
 
The Update Profile Wizard can be used to add to profiles based on denied access at-
tempts. Note that now we are in enforcing mode we can still develop policy, and this 
is much safer as we are confining what the program can do as we are developing pol-
icy. Profiles can be created in enforce mode by creating an empty profile by starting 
the Add Profile Wizard and clicking finish straight away, ensuring that the mode is 
set to enforce, then running the program and using the Update profile wizard to add 
to the profile. 
 
Care needs to be taken when deciding which rules to include. 
Helpful Commands for AppArmor 
su -  Used to log in as the root user, which you will have to do to 
do to run the rest of the commands. 
yast2  A graphical configuration program which has a number of 
graphical tools for AppArmor. 
cat /var/log/audit/audit.log  Cat prints the contents of a file to the screen, in this case the 
system logs which may contain AppArmor events. 
aa-audit  Change the mode of a profile to audit. 
aa-complain  Change the mode of a profile to complain. 
aa-enforce  Change the mode of a profile to enforce. 
aa-genprof  A command line tool for creating a new profile for a program. 
aa-log-prof  A command line tool for adding to policies based on the logs. 
 
H.8  FBAC-LSM Demonstration Script Handout 
(The demonstration handouts were transcripts of the audio from the demonstra-
tion videos with screenshots to illustrate. Some additional comments were added to 
the handouts to illustrate points made visually.) 
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For this demo we will create a rough policy using FBAC-LSM which will confine 
KWrite,  and  we  will  make  sure  we  can  use  KWrite  to  edit  a  file  named 
“/home/user/mine.txt”. 
 
The graphical tool FBAC-LSM Policy Manager can be found in the programs menu. 
 
To the left is a list of all the sets of rules for this computer. The first of which is our 
discretionary confinement which we can edit or add application policies to in order 
to confine our applications. To the right is a list of all the application policies for our 
confinement. We will add KWrite.  
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First let’s have a look at the functionalities available. By clicking on the functionali-
ties tab we can see all the functionalities available. These functionalities can be used 
to grant privileges to application policies. The way functionalities are viewed can be 
changed using the dropdown box. High level functionalities define what functions 
we want the application to be able to perform. These can be organised into categories 
to group similar functionalities. 
 
Let’s add a policy for KWrite. We start by clicking “Add Application Wizard”. To 




For the name we should use the command used to start the application, “kwrite”. Au-
tomate when possible will attempt to automate some of the steps for us at each point.     293
This can be disabled, in which case you can click an automate button at each point to 
see what recommendations the Policy Manager makes. We will leave it enabled. 
 
Next we can add paths used to start the program. It has automatically made sugges-
tions. 
 
Next we specify what type of program KWrite is: is it graphical or command-line? 
As it suggests, it is a graphical program. 
 
Next we assign the functionalities to our application policy based on what we want 




The tool has suggested (and highlighted) some likely functionalities based on some 
analysis. We will carefully choose from this list based on what we want the applica-
tion to be able to do. Note that the functionalities are organised into categories based 
on the type of behaviour they allow. 
 
Since we want to be able to edit our mine.txt file, we choose the “File Editor” func-
tionality. A platform functionality has been suggested. It states that the program uses 
Perl so we add that too. 
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Next we specify application-specific information for the functionalities we have cho-
sen. The FBAC-LSM Policy Manager attempts to automatically detect the values re-





For each parameter a page like this is shown. This page is requesting information for 
the “Standard Graphical Application” functionality. And the information it wants is 
the peruser directory. As it mentions, programs often have a directory in the user’s 
home directory. There are a number of options available: we can browse for a direc-
tory, or we can type in a value and click “Add Value”. “Change Value” is used to 
change the value of something already in the list. And “Generalise Wildcard (*)” 
will replace parts of the value with asterisks to make the resource name more gen-
eral. 
 
There are options for automation and suggestions. We can click “Automate” (or “Re-
automate Selection”) to ask it do some analysis to try to find values for us. We can 
click “Add Typical Values” to add values which may be appropriate to the list, or 
“Use Typical Values” which uses the typical values without modification. 
 
Let’s accept that KWrite does not have a peruser directory and click next. 
     295
The file editor functionality needs to know which directory the files we want to be 
able to edit are in. We specify “/home/user/Demo”. 
 
And then it asks what names or file extensions we want to be able to access in this 
dir. We could specify *.txt to access any txt files, but here we can specify the whole 
name to only allow access to edit this specific file. We specify “mine.txt”. 
 
Now we specify where we want the new policy to be saved. We can put it anywhere 
but let’s put it with the other text editors. So we choose “text editors.fbac” from the 
list. 
 
Next we can review the profile we just created, look at all the low-level privileges it 
allows, or query the policy to see if it will be able to do a certain thing. 
 




Our new application policy will not be in effect until we save and reload the policy. 
From the main window we save (Policy->Save Application Profiles) and reload (Se-
curity Module->(Re)load Policy into Module). Now KWrite is being confined by our 
policy. FBAC-LSM is now restricting KWrite to only access resources permitted by 
the functionalities we assigned. 
 
Now we can test the application. It can access mine.txt but not a file with a different 
name in the same directory. 
 
If the program cannot perform the actions we want it to be able to, we can add fur-
ther privileges either by editing the policy file or using the Learning mode. Learning     296
can be done in enforcing mode (which is safer as we are restricting what the program 
can do while we are creating policy), or complaining mode. You can add the privi-
lege or add the resource name as an argument for one of the parameters we assigned 
when creating the policy. Care needs to be taken when deciding which rules to in-
clude. 
Helpful Commands for FBAC-LSM 
fbac-lsm-manager  The graphical FBAC-LSM Policy Manager tool. 
fbac-lsm-server  Reloads the policy files from disk into effect. 
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Appendix I  Pre-experiment Questionnaire 
 




Sex: Male / Female 
 
1.  How would you rate your skill with computers? 
Novice  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Expert 
 
2.  How would you rate your knowledge of computer security? 
Novice  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Expert 
  
3.  How often do you use Linux? 
￿     I have never used Linux 
￿     Less than once a month 
￿     About once a month 
￿     A few times a month 
￿     A few times a week 
￿     About once a day 
￿     Several times a day 
 
4.  How would you rate your knowledge of the Linux operating system? 
Novice  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Expert 
 
5.  How would you rate your knowledge of the file system hierarchy used on 
Linux systems? 
Novice  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Expert 
 
Please rate your familiarity with the following Linux security software: 
 
SELinux: 
6.  Please rate your familiarity with SELinux: 
￿     I have never heard of it (please go to question 9) 
￿     I have heard of it, but I am not familiar with it (please go to question 9) 
￿     I have read about it but I have never used it (please go to question 9) 
￿     I have rarely used it 
￿     I use it frequently 
 
If you have used SELinux:  
7.  Have you configured the security policies? Yes / No 
 
8.  How would you rate your experience with SELinux: 
Very Negative  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Positive 
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AppArmor: 
9.  Please rate your familiarity with AppArmor: 
￿     I have never heard of it (please go to question 12) 
￿     I have heard of it, but I am not familiar with it (please go to question 12) 
￿     I have read about it but I have never used it (please go to question 12) 
￿     I have rarely used it 
￿     I use it frequently 
 
If you have used AppArmor:  
10. Have you configured the security policies? Yes / No 
 
11. How would you rate your experience with AppArmor: 
Very Negative  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Positive 
 
FBAC-LSM: 
12. Please rate your familiarity with FBAC-LSM: 
￿     I have never heard of it (please hand in questionnaire) 
￿     I have heard of it, but I am not familiar with it (please hand in questionnaire) 
￿     I have read about it but I have never used it (please hand in questionnaire) 
￿     I have rarely used it 
￿     I use it frequently 
 
If you have used FBAC-LSM:  
13. Have you configured the security policies? Yes / No 
 
14. How would you rate your experience with FBAC-LSM: 
Very Negative  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Positive 
 
Thank you. Please hand in questionnaire.     299
Appendix J  Trojan Horse Simulation 
J.1  Appendix Introduction 
The  Trojan  horse  simulation  was  a  modified  version  of  the  open  source  KSirtet 
game. The program accesses many resources that, as a game, it does not need to have 
access to, and as a malicious program could cause serious security concerns. The re-
sources that the Trojan simulation tries to access and the potential security risks are 
shown in the tables below.  
J.2  Resources the Trojan Simulation Tries to Access 
Table J.1 shows the resources the Trojan simulation tries to access, which are acces-
sible due to deliberate system DAC misconfiguration and could result in information 
leaks. 
Table J.1: Trojan Simulation - System Misconfiguration Information Leak 
Resource  Threat 
Read /etc/shadow  System password hashes, could lead to breaking au-
thorisation and obtaining system passwords. 
Read /var/log/messages  Discovery of login attempts etc. 
Read /etc/ssh/sshd_config  OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file. Discovery 
of SSH settings. 
Read /etc/gshadow  Password hashes for groups. Could lead to breaking 
authorisation and obtaining system group passwords. 
 
Table J.2 shows the resources accessed that could result in direct system compromise 
and that are accessible due to misconfiguration. These actions could modify system 
resources and pose threats to system security.     300
Table J.2: Trojan Simulation - System Misconfiguration Compromise 
Resource  Threat 
Write /etc/login.defs 
Login settings. Among other things, writing this file 
could  change  the  root's  PATH  environment  variable 
which  could  lead  to  the  execution  of  further  Trojan 
horses. 
Write /etc/inittab 
The configuration file of /sbin/init, which is exe-
cuted on start-up. Write access would allow any com-
mands to be run as root at start up. 
Write /etc/hosts  Static name lookups. Editing this file can redirect net-
work connections. 
Write /etc/logrotate.conf  Configuration for log rotation and backup. Could pre-
vent the logging of future events. 
Write /etc/exports  NFS shares. Could grant access to files remotely. 
 
Table J.3 shows system resources that are not typically protected from read access, 
but that applications do not normally require access to and which could leak infor-
mation about the system. 
Table J.3: Trojan Simulation - System Information Leak 
Resource  Threat 
Read /etc/sysctl.conf  Discover kernel options related to networking security. 
Read /etc/group 
Basic group attributes. List of groups and group mem-
bership. May contain passwords hashes that let a user 
join a group. 
 
Table J.4 shows user resources that the Trojan simulation attempts to access, which 
are not required by a game, and could leak private information related to the user. 
Table J.4: Trojan Simulation - Local Privacy 
Resource  Threat 
Read 
/home/user/.opera/typed_history.xml  Opera browsing history (typed addresses). 
Read /home/user/.opera/opera.dir  Opera browsing history. 
Read /home/user/.opera/global.dat  Opera browsing history. 
Read /home/user/.opera/wand.dat  Opera stored passwords. Can be recovered or cracked. 
Read /home/user/.mozilla/firefox/ 
X.default/formhistory.dat 
Firefox form history. Mork/MozStorage format. May 
include credit card numbers if autocomplete!=off. 
 
Table J.5 shows the temporary file that the Trojan horse attempts to create. Although 
not a significant threat, Trojan activities may require the creation of temporary files. 
For example, the creation of a C code file that is subsequently compiled.     301
Table J.5: Trojan Simulation - Temporary File Creation 
Resource  Threat 
Create /tmp/JsXr.c  Linux.Slapper writes a c file before compiling it. 
 
Table J.6 shows files that can lead to user-level compromise. That is, a persistent 
presence on the system within a normal user’s account. 
Table J.6: Trojan Simulation - Local Compromise 
Resource  Threat 
Create 
/home/user/.kde/Autostart/ksirtet 




If the user clicks a malicious .desktop file malicious 
commands can be run. 
 
Table J.7 shows incoming network access the Trojan simulation attempts. 
Table J.7: Trojan Simulation - Ingress Network Access 
Resource  Threat 
Listen to TCP port 5000  Communicate with hosts. Connection initiated remote-
ly. 
Listen to UDP port 5000  Communicate with hosts. Connection initiated remote-
ly. 
 
Table J.8 shows outgoing network access the Trojan simulation attempts. 
Table J.8: Trojan Simulation - Egress Network Access 
Resource  Threat 
Connect to TCP port 80 
HTTP traffic usually uses this port. The Linux.Slapper 
malware  uses  this  port  to  exploit  vulnerable  Apache 
servers. 
Connect to TCP port 22  SSH bruteforce is used by some malware. 
Connect to TCP port 995  Send email. Could leak information or send spam. 
Connect to TCP port 443  Linux.Slapper  connects  to  port  443  HTTPS  and  ex-
ploits a buffer overflow vulnerability. 
Connect to UDP port 53  The Linux.Lion worm, scans class B networks on port 
53 searching for vulnerable versions of BIND. 
Connect to UDP port 1050  General UDP leak. 
 
Table J.9 shows commands the Trojan simulation attempts to execute via the Bash 
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Table J.9: Trojan simulation - Commands run via bash 
Resource  Threat 
Execute via bash  
“netcat -h 2> /dev/null”  Netcat can listen for and forward connections. 
Execute via bash  
“2>&1  echo  \”main()printf(  \\\"hello 
\\n\\\");}\" > HOMEDIR”JsXr2.c ; echo 
ok” 
Write program code. 
Execute via bash  
“gcc  /tmp/JsXr.c  -o  /tmp/JsXr  2> 
/dev/null” 
Compile  another  program.  Linux.Slapper  writes  a  c 
file before compiling it. 
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Appendix K  System Usability Scale 
Questionnaire 
Security system: SELinux | AppArmor | FBAC-LSM 
          Strongly                Strongly  
          disagree                agree 
 
1. I think that I would like to   
   use this system frequently   
         
2. I found the system unnecessarily 
   complex 
         
 
3. I thought the system was easy 
   to use                         
 
 
4. I think that I would need the 
   support of a technical person to 
   be able to use this system   
 
 
5. I found the various functions in 
   this system were well integrated 
         
 
6. I thought there was too much 
   inconsistency in this system 
         
 
7. I would imagine that most people 
   would learn to use this system 
   very quickly       
 
8. I found the system very 
   cumbersome to use 
       
 
9. I felt very confident using the 
   system 
   
 
10. I needed to learn a lot of 
   things before I could get going 
   with this system      
 
© Digital Equipment Corporation, 1986. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5      304
Appendix L  Post-task Questionnaire 
 
Your ID: ___ 
 
1.  Understanding the way that security policy is constructed using System
26 is: 
Very Hard  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Easy 
 
2.  Configuring a security policy to confine an application using System is:  
Very Hard  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Easy 
 
3.  Using System made me feel the computer was: 
Very Insecure   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Secure 
 
4.  How successfully do you think you created policies which would restrict the 
programs from behaving maliciously? 
Very Unsuccessfully  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Successfully 
 
5.  How successfully do you think you created policies which would allow the pro-
grams to perform their tasks?  
Very Unsuccessfully  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Successfully 
 
6.  How likely would you be to use System to secure a computer in the future? 
Very Unlikely  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Likely 
                 
7.  Creating security policy using System is: 
Very Time  
Consuming  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Time  
Efficient 
 
8.  Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
I had enough time to complete the task using System: 
Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree 
                 
 
                                                 
26 The word System was substituted with the name of the security system (SELinux, AppArmor, or 
FBAC-LSM)     305










































Thank you. Please hand in questionnaire.     306
Appendix M  Final Questionnaire 
 
Your ID: ___ 
 
1.  Please rate the three systems, easiest (1) to hardest (3) to use: 
  ___ SELinux 
  ___ AppArmor 
  ___ FBAC-LSM 
 
2.  Rationale for preference: 






3.  Please rate the three systems, easiest (1) to hardest (3) to understand: 
  ___ SELinux 
  ___ AppArmor 
  ___ FBAC-LSM 
 
4.  Rationale for preference: 






5.  Please rate the three systems, most likely to use again (1) to least likely to use 
again (3): 
  ___ SELinux 
  ___ AppArmor 
  ___ FBAC-LSM 
 
6.  Rationale for preference: 
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7.  Did you suspect any of the programs being confined of being malicious? 
￿     Yes 
￿     No (go to question 11) 
 
8.  Which program(s) did you suspect of being malicious? 
￿     Opera 
￿     KSirtet 
 
When you first suspected it\them of being malicious: 
9.  Which security mechanism where you using? 
￿     FBAC-LSM 
￿     SELinux 
￿     AppArmor 
 
10. What activity first made you suspicious of the program(s)? 




11. Restricting applications from misbehaving using the type of security you 
have used during this study is: 
Not At All Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Important 
 
12. How likely would you be to pay for a subscription to policies which would 
be automatically applied to restrict programs from acting maliciously? 
Very Unlikely  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Likely 
 
Thank you. Please hand in questionnaire.     308
Appendix N  Further Detail Regarding the 
Access Permitted 
N.1  Appendix Introduction 
The overall differences in risk exposure between SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-
LSM are analysed in Chapter 11, Section 11.6. The tables in this appendix present 
further detail regarding the access permitted by each security system after they had 
been configured by participants during the usability study. This information supports 
the hypothesis that FBAC-LSM results in decreased risk exposure compared to the 
other two systems, and illustrates in detail the protection provided by the participant-
configured policies for each of the three systems. As mentioned in Chapter 11, these 
results can be attributed to the fact that using FBAC-LSM the highest number of us-
ers were successful in creating policies, ensuring policies were enforced, and confin-
ing the Trojan simulation. Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 further discuss the differences 
in the protection provided by the security systems and the causes of these differ-
ences. 
N.2  Extended Access Results 
Table N.1 illustrates the mean number of security sensitive resources that were left in 
a state where Opera was authorised to access various security sensitive resources. 
This information is organised in terms of categories of resource (that is, the type of 
security risk they present). This includes VMs that did not have enforced policies. 
This information shows the practical impact of each security system. For each secu-
rity system the table shows the portion of participants’ VMs that were left in a state 
that allowed the program to access the specified resource. Table N.2 shows the same 
type of information for KSirtet; again including VMs without enforced policies.  
 
The FBAC-LSM functionalities deployed for the experiment contained a mistake in 
the Web_Browser functionality that granted undue access to Firefox’s files (the 
“local privacy” row for Opera in Table N.1). Also, the liberal access to network ac-    309
cess (as demonstrated in the “network ingress” and “network egress” rows for Opera 
in Table N.1) is due to the FTP_Client functionality, which grants this access to 
allow Active FTP, which requires extensive network access. Also, FBAC-LSM does 
not restrict access to files in /tmp (the “temporary file creation” rows in the two ta-
bles below). As demonstrated in Table N.1 and Table N.2, in all other 13 categories 
FBAC-LSM provided the tightest restrictions. 
Table N.1: Mean Authorisation Granted to Opera to Access Categories of Resources 









System  misconfiguration 
information leak (MAX: 3)  2.45  1.03  0.31 
System  misconfiguration 
compromise (MAX: 5)  3.87  1.71  0.51 
System  information  leak 
(MAX: 2)  1.81  1.13  0.23 
Local privacy (MAX: 1)  0.77  0.37  0.97 
Local compromise (MAX: 3)  2.61  1.03  0.92 
Temporary  file  creation 
(MAX: 1)  0.81  0.61  0.97 
Network ingress (MAX: 2)  1.61  1.58  2.00 
Network egress (MAX: 3)  2.52  2.37  3.00 
Execute commands using bash 
(MAX: 3)  2.32  1.03  0.51 
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Table N.2: Mean Authorisation Granted to KSirtet to Access Categories of Resources 









System  misconfiguration  in-
formation leak (MAX: 3)  3.00  2.21  0.69 
System  misconfiguration 
compromise (MAX: 5)  4.89  3.47  1.03 
System  information  leak 
(MAX: 2)  2.00  1.53  0.41 
Local privacy (MAX: 4)  3.89  2.32  0.82 
Local compromise (MAX: 3)  2.67  1.37  0.64 
Temporary  file  creation 
(MAX: 1)  0.89  0.68  0.97 
Network ingress (MAX: 2)  1.78  1.37  0.56 
Network egress (MAX: 6)  5.33  4.11  3.54 
Execute  commands  using 
bash (MAX: 3)  2.67  0.97  0.59 
 
The tables below show the exact number of systems that could access each of the se-
curity sensitive files. Table N.3 lists all the resources the scoring program assessed 
and illustrates the number of VMs that were left in a state where Opera was author-
ised to access various security sensitive resources. Again, this included VMs that did 
not have enforced policies. For each security system the table shows the number of 
participants’ VMs left in a state that allowed the program to access the specified re-
source. For example, the 10th column shows how many of the policies successfully 
protect the contents of the shadow file from Opera. Of the FBAC-LSM VMs, 10% 
allow this inappropriate access, compared to 34% of the AppArmor VMs, and 77% 
of the SELinux VMs.     311
Table N.3: Authorisation Granted to Opera to Access Resources that Pose Security Risks 







/etc/sysctl.conf r  28 (90%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/group r  28 (90%)  30 (79%)  5 (13%) 
/etc/login.defs rw  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/inittab rw  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
$HOME/.mozilla/firefox/X.default/ formhis-
tory.dat r  24 (77%)  14 (37%)  38 (97%) 
/tmp/JsXr.c w  25 (81%)  23 (61%)  38 (97%) 
$HOME/.kde/Autostart/ksirtet w  27 (87%)  13 (34%)  12 (31%) 
$HOME/Desktop/ksirtet.desktop w  27 (87%)  13 (34%)  12 (31%) 
$HOME/.rhosts w  27 (87%)  13 (34%)  12 (31%) 
/etc/shadow r  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/ssh/sshd_config r  28 (90%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/gshadow r  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/exports rw  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/hosts rw  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
/etc/logrotate.conf rw  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
TCP 22 gateway.murdoch.edu.au  25 (81%)  30 (79%)  39 (100%) 
TCP 995 www.mail.murdoch.edu.au   25 (81%)  30 (79%)  39 (100%) 
UDP 1050 murdoch.edu.au  28 (90%)  30 (79%)  39 (100%) 
TCP 5000  25 (81%)  30 (79%)  39 (100%) 
UDP 5000  25 (81%)  30 (79%)  39 (100%) 




24 (77%)  13 (34%)  12 (31%) 
gcc "HOMEDIR" JsXr2.c -o 
"HOMEDIR"JsXr 2>&1  24 (77%)  13 (34%)  4 (10%) 
 
Table N.4 shows the same type of information for KSirtet; again including VMs 
without enforced policies. The table lists all the resources the Trojan horse simula-
tion attempted to access. KSirtet is allowed to access the shadow file with 23% of the 
FBAC-LSM VMs, compared to 74% of the AppArmor VMs, and 100% of the SELi-
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Table N.4: Authorisation Granted to KSirtet to Access Resources that Pose Security Risks 







/etc/sysctl.conf r  9 (100%)  28 (74%)  8 (21%) 
/etc/group r  9 (100%)  30 (79%)  8 (21%) 
/etc/login.defs rw  9 (100%)  27 (71%)  7 (18%) 
/etc/inittab rw  9 (100%)  24 (63%)  7 (18%) 
$HOME/.opera/typed_history.xml r  9 (100%)  22 (58%)  8 (21%) 
$HOME/.opera/global.dat r  9 (100%)  22 (58%)  8 (21%) 
$HOME/.opera/wand.dat r  9 (100%)  22 (58%)  8 (21%) 
$HOME/.mozilla/firefox/we6ybhyi.default/ 
formhistory.dat r  8 (89%)  22 (58%)  8 (21%) 
/tmp/JsXr.c w  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  38 (97%) 
$HOME/.kde/Autostart/ksirtet w  8 (89%)  18 (47%)  12 (31%) 
$HOME/Desktop/ksirtet.desktop w  8 (89%)  18 (47%)  6 (15%) 
$HOME/.rhosts w  8 (89%)  16 (42%)  7 (18%) 
/etc/shadow r  9 (100%)  28 (74%)  9 (23%) 
/etc/ssh/sshd_config r  9 (100%)  27 (71%)  9 (23%) 
/etc/gshadow r  9 (100%)  29 (76%)  9 (23%) 
/etc/exports rw  9 (100%)  26 (68%)  9 (23%) 
/etc/hosts rw  8 (89%)  27 (71%)  9 (23%) 
/etc/logrotate.conf rw  9 (100%)  28 (74%)  8 (21%) 
TCP 80 murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
TCP 22 gateway.murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
TCP 995 www.mail.murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
TCP 443 murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
UDP 53 murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
UDP 1050 murdoch.edu.au  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  23 (59%) 
TCP 5000  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  11 (28%) 
UDP 5000  8 (89%)  26 (68%)  11 (28%) 




8 (89%)  16 (42%)  7 (18%) 
gcc "HOMEDIR"JsXr2.c -o 
"HOMEDIR"JsXr 2>&1  8 (89%)  11 (29%)  8 (21%) 
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